510(k) evidence is generally inadmissible because the 510(k) clearance process solely determines substantial equivalency, and not safety and efficacy. However, in a products liability claim premised not only on principles of negligence, but particularly on the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, evidence of 510(k) clearance has significant probative value under N.J.R.E. 401 that is not substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice and potential juror confusion under N.J.R.E. 403. Therefore, under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division. However, the Court parts ways with the Appellate Division’s decision as to its suggestion that the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be determined in a Rule 104 hearing. Instead, the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be resolved at the hearing on a motion in limine, which is how the issue was and, presumably, will be raised. Section 5 of the PLA does not bar plaintiffs’ recovery of punitive damages, and because evidence of 510(k) clearance should have been admitted in the first stage of trial as relevant to the reasonableness of Bard’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, it would also be admissible in the second, punitive damages stage.
Sunday, July 30, 2023
Sunday, July 16, 2023
JOSEPH BERARDO VS. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, ET
Defendant City of Jersey City's (City) Code of Ordinances Section 105 permits any individual to request a "determination of significance" from the City's Historic Preservation Officer (HPO) regarding whether a subject building warrants preservation. Consistent with local ordinances, plaintiff, who owns a circa-1900 building in Jersey City, sought a determination of significance before applying for a demolition permit. The City's HPO concluded plaintiff's building likely would not be approved for demolition due to its historic, architectural, and cultural significance.
Pursuant to local zoning ordinance, plaintiff appealed to defendant Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which upheld the determination of significance. Thereafter, he filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division alleging defendants' actions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Law Division found the ZBA's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and dismissed the complaint.
The court concludes the HPO's issuance of a determination of significance — an advisory opinion seemingly intended to prevent plaintiff's submission of an application for a demolition permit — is not a procedure authorized by the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163. The MLUL does not authorize HPOs to unilaterally grant or deny historic preservation designations that bind a zoning officer in determining whether a demolition permit shall issue; that advisory function belongs solely to the Historic Preservation Commission, as detailed in the MLUL, and cannot be delegated to other entities or individuals. The Commission, in turn, may designate a site as historic only if it is voted upon by a majority of the full governing body.
The court reverses and remands to allow plaintiff to apply for a demolition permit in accordance with the MLUL. The court also concludes Jersey City's Code of Ordinances Sections 105-3, 105-4, and 105-7 are ultra vires and inconsistent with the objectives and procedures concerning historic preservation mandated by the MLUL to the extent they delegate powers reserved for a municipality's historic preservation commission to the HPS.
MTAG AS CUST FOR ATCF II NJ, LLC VS. TAO INVESTMENTS, LLC
The court considered plaintiff's challenge to a trial court order vacating a final judgment by default in a tax sale foreclosure. Plaintiff obtained a final judgment by default on its tax sale lien and defendants timely moved to vacate the order, alleging defective service of process. The trial court found sufficient defects with process to warrant vacating the final judgment, which reopened the redemption period and allowed defendant to redeem.
The court affirmed, concluding service of process was defective pursuant to both the general court rules governing personal service, as well as the RULLCA-specific statute governing service of process on LLCs, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17. The court noted the differences between service rules in RULLCA and the Business Corporations Act (BCA), N.J.S.A. 14A:1-1 to: 18-11, in finding plaintiff's waiver argument unavailing. Although RULLCA and the BCA contain some similarities, the rules governing service are distinct and materially different. Service upon a corporation in New Jersey is governed by Rule 4:4-4(a)(6) and N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2, whereas service upon an LLC is governed by Rule 4:4-4(a)(5), and RULLCA, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17.
The RULLCA service of process provision contains an additional method of service lacking in the BCA, providing, as a permissive alternative, that where personal service in accordance with the court rules fails despite reasonably diligent efforts, service may be made upon the State filing office. N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17(b). The BCA service of process provisions do not authorize the State to accept process as an agent of a corporation. R. 4:4-4(a)(6); N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2.
Because final judgment was vacated, the court followed Green Knight Cap., LLC v. Calderon, 252 N.J. 265 (2022), in holding the period of redemption reopened and continued until barred by a valid final judgment of the Superior Court. The court interpreted the holding in Green Knight, in conjunction with Rule 4:64-6(b) and the tax sale law, N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), to mean the redemption period reopens when a final judgment in foreclosure is timely vacated.
Sunday, July 9, 2023
THOMAS MAKUCH, LLC VS. TOWNSHIP OF JACKSON, ET AL
This appeal arises out of an action challenging the suspension of a company that had been providing towing services in a municipality. As a matter of first impression, the court holds that the company had limited constitutional due process rights when it was suspended from the Township's towing lists. The court also holds that plaintiff received the process due its limited property interest. In addition, the court rejected plaintiff's arguments that its suspension from the towing lists violated its constitutional substantive due process and equal protection rights. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the Township, its police chief, and one of its police officers.
KAREN MCKNIGHT VS. BOARD OF REVIEW, ET A
Appellant Karen McKnight appeals from the Board of Review's (the "Board") August 26, 2022 final agency decision, which held her liable to return an overpayment of $6,277 for unemployment benefits she was allegedly ineligible to receive for the weeks ending June 30, 2018 through May 4, 2019, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). The central issue on appeal is whether a claimant, who is otherwise separated from full-time employment, may include wages received from a part-time position, which they continue to maintain, in the calculation of their average weekly wage for purposes of unemployment benefits. The court concluded that the exclusion of the wages contravenes the legislative purpose of the unemployment benefits statute and is arbitrary as legally unsupported. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a recalculation of benefits.
Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey
Based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution.
Sunday, July 2, 2023
ALVIN SINGER VS. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES
In this appeal from the Law Division's grant of summary judgment to defendants, the court was asked to consider, for the first time, whether a motor vehicle subject to a recall notice alone is sufficient to establish a claim pursuant to the New Jersey Lemon Law statute, N.J.S.A. 56:12-29 to -49. Defendant issued a recall notice that encompassed plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff subsequently brought the vehicle to the dealer to have the recall repair performed. Primarily due to disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant's ability to complete the recall was delayed.
A Law Division judge granted defendant summary judgment. The court affirmed and held the existence of a recall notice alone is not sufficient to establish the "nonconformity" element of a Lemon Law claim. In addition, because plaintiff primarily used the vehicle for business purposes, it is excluded from the Lemon Law's coverage.
C. ARSENIS, ET AL. VS. BOROUGH OF BERNARDSVILLE,
The court considers whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for monetary damages, filed years after the statutory deadline for filing a tax appeal, based on allegations that municipal officials committed fraud and other torts by assessing real property in a manner inconsistent with law and at an amount above its true market value. The court concludes that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such claims because they are substantively equivalent to a tax appeal properly venued in the Tax Court or a county board of taxation, and the statutory deadlines for challenging local property tax assessments may not be circumvented by a late-filed complaint seeking damages for alleged torts arising from the tax assessment process. In light of these conclusions, the court affirms the trial court order dismissing the complaint in this matter with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey
Based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution.