tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9557738142357015992024-03-27T02:37:02.772-04:00Civil and Personal Injury Cases NJKenneth Vercammen Law Office. (732)572-0500. Edison, NJ. To email Ken V, go here:
http://www.njlaws.com/ContactKenV.html
Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comBlogger2728125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-88800485692660843522024-01-15T17:21:00.001-05:002024-01-15T17:21:02.890-05:00William DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, I<p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(33, 37, 41); color: #212529; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">The refund provision is limited in scope: N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 provides relief only to victims of food-related fraud as identified in Chapter 347 and does not extend to all CFA violations. Because the allegations in this matter are unrelated to misrepresentations of the “identity of food,” plaintiffs are not entitled to a full refund under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11.</span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-9319335371974487232023-10-15T10:30:00.005-04:002023-10-15T10:30:49.510-04:00JOHN DOE VS. THE ESTATE OF C.V.O., JR. A-2780-21<p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">This appeal pertains to the civil personal injury prosecution of statutory and common law claims arising from allegations of sexual abuse committed fifty-five years ago against a child by his sister, who also was a minor when the acts occurred. </span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">In 2019, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Child Victims Act (CVA), <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">L.</u> 2019, <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">c.</u> 120, which supplemented and amended the statute of limitations for statutory and common law causes of actions for sexual abuse. The CVA enacted two statutes of limitations that expanded the time for filing personal injury claims resulting from the commission of one of the following four enumerated sexual offenses: (1) "the commission of sexual assault"; (2) "any other crime of a sexual nature"; (3) "a prohibited sexual act as defined in [N.J.S.A. 2A:30B-2]"; (4) "or sexual abuse as defined in [the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1]." N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a; N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b. Pertinent to this appeal is the enacted statute of limitations which provided a two-year revival window for victims to file otherwise time-barred claims for sexual crimes committed against them when they were minors. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court considered the dismissal of plaintiff's CSAA claims, concluding a derivative statutory passive abuser claim against a parent was properly dismissed by the motion judge as not cognizable under the CSAA because the alleged sexual abuse was committed by a minor. Because the CSAA defines sexual abuse as sexual contact or sexual penetration committed by an adult, a CSAA claim alleging sexual assault by minor does not present a valid cause of action. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court further considered the motion judge's dismissal of plaintiff's common law claims stemming from the alleged sexual abuse committed by a minor, which were timely filed under the two-year revival window. The court concluded the common law claims are actionable independent of the CSAA. </p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-86750682129025062572023-08-27T21:39:00.005-04:002023-08-27T21:39:28.511-04:00MORRIS PROPERTIES, INC., ET AL. VS. JONATHAN WHEELER,<p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">In this legal-malpractice case, the corporate plaintiff and its president appeal from an order granting defendants' summary-judgment motion. The trial court found plaintiffs' expert had failed to analyze how defendants' alleged breaches of the standard of care would have impacted a potential jury verdict or settlement and had not opined that defendants' alleged malpractice proximately caused any damages. The judge also dismissed the president's individual claim because the undisputed facts showed she and defendants did not have an attorney-client relationship. </span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court affirms, holding plaintiffs had not established proximate cause as a matter of law and that expert testimony was necessary in this case to prove proximate causation and damages. With respect to the president's individual claim of legal malpractice, the court holds she failed to demonstrate the existence of an attorney-client relationship between herself and defendants. </p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-26994278376112657042023-08-20T22:27:00.003-04:002023-08-20T22:27:18.182-04:00AVA SATZ VS. ALLEN SATZ<p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Defendant appeals from Family Part orders enforcing provisions of a marital settlement agreement (MSA). A critical area of dispute centered on plaintiff's desire to obtain a</span><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">get</u><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">—a divorce recognized under Jewish religious law through a process known as a</span><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">beis din</u><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> </span><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">proceeding. Before a verdict was reached in the Family Part divorce trial, the parties reached an agreement on all issues, including each party's obligations with respect to participation in</span><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">beis din</u><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> </span><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">proceedings.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court rejects defendant's argument that the Family Part judge violated his First Amendment rights by ordering him to participate in <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">beis din</u> proceedings and to sign an arbitration agreement with the <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">beis din</u>. The court acknowledges the fundamental principle that civil courts may not become entangled in religious proceedings. The First Amendment's Establishment Clause bars a state from placing its support behind a religious belief, while the Free Exercise Clause bars a state from interfering with the practice of religion. <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">U.S. Const.</u> amend. I. The court concludes the Family Part judge was asked to enforce a civil contract, not a religious one. The court holds the MSA is a legally binding contract based on ample consideration from both parties and entered into knowingly and voluntarily. The Family Part judge therefore had the lawful authority to enforce the agreement as written.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">New Jersey Supreme Court precedent permits civil courts to resolve controversies involving religious groups if resolution can be achieved by reference to neutral principles of law and does not require the interpretation of religious doctrine. Defendant agreed in the MSA to abide by the <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">beis din</u> ruling, whatever that might be. The Family Part judge did not interpret religious doctrine and scrupulously avoided entanglement with religion because the judge applied well-established principles of civil contract law, not rabbinical law. The latter body of law remained solely within the province of the <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">beis din</u> and was not interpreted or applied by the Family Part judge.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court concludes that the orders defendant challenges served the secular purpose of enforcing the parties' contractual obligations under the MSA, which in turn serves the secular purpose of encouraging divorce litigants to resolve their disputes by negotiating and entering an MSA.</p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-63032702713372980152023-08-20T22:13:00.000-04:002023-08-20T22:13:47.124-04:00BRANDON MEREDITH HARDY VS. SUSAN D. JACKSON <p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at a federal prison located in New Jersey, wants to marry someone who is incarcerated at a federal prison located in a different state. He sued the New Hanover Township Municipal Clerk and Registrar, claiming she had violated his civil rights contrary to the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, by applying the requirement in N.J.S.A. 37:1-7 and -8 that couples appear in person to obtain a marriage license. He appeals an order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and granting defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. He argues the enforcement of the in-person requirement was unconstitutional and contends the motion judge should have used his equitable powers to enjoin enforcement of the requirement. </span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"> The court rejects both arguments. The court holds the statutes at issue do not create an unconstitutional bar of a prisoner's right to marry but instead apply to individuals who want to marry and are reasonably related to the legitimate goal of ensuring the validity of marriages. The court also holds the motion judge could not have used his equitable powers to enjoin defendant's enforcement of the statutory in-person requirement. Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and the denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.</p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-66819796007672442592023-08-06T21:32:00.006-04:002023-08-06T21:32:36.836-04:00MUSCONETCONG WATERSHED ASSOCIATION VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,<p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> On February 23, 2017, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued a flood hazard area applicability determination (FHA Determination) to Hampton Farm, LLC (Hampton Farm). Shortly thereafter, appellant Musconetcong Watershed Association (MW Association) requested the DEP to conduct an adjudicatory hearing so it could challenge the FHA Determination. Four years later, on April 6, 2021, the DEP denied that request. MW Association timely appealed from the April 6, 2021 decision. It also sought leave to appeal from the February 23, 2017 FHA Determination, contending it had become final when the DEP denied MW Association's request for a hearing. On an interlocutory motion, a two-judge panel of the court denied leave. The court now reconsiders, reverses that interlocutory ruling, and grants leave to appeal.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"> The court holds that the DEP's FHA Determination became a final agency decision subject to appeal when the DEP denied MW Association's request for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the FHA Determination. At that time, all administrative remedies were exhausted. To address the DEP's four-year time delay in deciding MW Association's request for an adjudicatory hearing, the court holds that any party, including a third-party objector, has the right to petition the DEP to rule on a pending request for an adjudicatory hearing under N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1(a). The DEP will then have thirty days from receipt of the petition to "inform all parties of its determination" regarding that request. N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1(a).</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"> The court also holds that MW Association did not have a right to an adjudicatory hearing because no statute conferred that right to MW Association, which is a third-party objector, and MW Association did not have a particularized property interest warranting a hearing. Accordingly, the court affirms the April 6, 2021 final agency decision.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"> Finally, because the court has reversed the ruling on the interlocutory motion, the DEP has two options concerning its FHA Determination. It can either (1) elect to address MW Association's challenges to its February 23, 2017 FHA Determination and a new briefing schedule will be issued; or (2) request a remand so it can expand and update the factual findings supporting its FHA Determination. </p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-59840031917695963342023-08-06T21:32:00.002-04:002023-08-06T21:32:10.776-04:00CHRISTOPHER NEUWIRTH VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY<p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Plaintiff, who had been terminated from his position as assistant commissioner for the Department of Health, filed a complaint against the State, alleging a claim under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8. In his second amended complaint, plaintiff asserted a defamation claim against Governor Philip D. Murphy. A Law Division judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss the defamation claim, concluding plaintiff had not pleaded the element of actual malice with sufficient specificity. </span></p><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> In his fourth amended complaint, plaintiff again asserted a defamation claim against Governor Murphy, referencing in particular statements made during May 29, 2020 and June 1, 2020 press briefings. Defendants moved to dismiss the defamation claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). The judge denied the motion, concluding plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts in the fourth amended complaint to demonstrate actual malice. </span><br style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;" /><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> The court reversed, concluding the judge had misapplied the actual-malice standard. After conducting a de novo review, the court held plaintiff's conclusory allegations did not meet the actual-malice standard and, as a result, plaintiff's defamation claim failed. Reversing the denial of defendants' motion to dismiss, the court remanded the case with a direction that the judge enter an order dismissing the defamation claim. </span><br style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;" /><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> </span>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-44869543685290963812023-08-06T21:31:00.003-04:002023-08-06T21:31:47.385-04:00JOSEPH JOHNSON, ET AL. VS. CITY OF HOBOKEN, <p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Plaintiffs sued defendants, a law firm and three individuals associated with the firm, claiming that their rights of privacy had been violated when defendants failed to redact their personal identifiers contrary to the directive of </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Rule</u><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> 1:38-7. Plaintiffs also contended that defendants violated one plaintiff's right of privacy by including records of that plaintiff's arrest and criminal charges. The court holds that </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Rule</u><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> 1:38-7 did not create a private cause of action for a violation of the </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Rule</u><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">. Instead, the remedy for a violation of </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Rule</u><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> 1:38-7 is set forth in the </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Rule</u><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">, which states that a party or other interested individual can move, on an expedited basis, to replace documents containing unredacted personal identifiers with redacted documents. </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">R.</u><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> 1:38-7(g). The court also holds that plaintiffs failed to state viable causes of action for invasions of privacy or infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. </span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-72604410021760435552023-07-30T21:51:00.003-04:002023-07-30T21:51:38.243-04:00Elizabeth Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc<p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">510(k) evidence is generally inadmissible because the 510(k) clearance process solely determines substantial equivalency, and not safety and efficacy. However, in a products liability claim premised not only on principles of negligence, but </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">particularly </u><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">on the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, evidence of 510(k) clearance has significant probative value under N.J.R.E. 401 that is not substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice and potential juror confusion under N.J.R.E. 403. Therefore, under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division. However, the Court parts ways with the Appellate Division’s decision as to its suggestion that the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be determined in a Rule 104 hearing. Instead, the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be resolved at the hearing on a motion in limine, which is how the issue was and, presumably, will be raised. Section 5 of the PLA does not bar plaintiffs’ recovery of punitive damages, and because evidence of 510(k) clearance should have been admitted in the first stage of trial as relevant to the reasonableness of Bard’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, it would also be admissible in the second, punitive damages stage.</span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-33328936213139027572023-07-16T21:27:00.003-04:002023-07-16T21:27:30.659-04:00JOSEPH BERARDO VS. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, ET <p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Defendant City of Jersey City's (City) Code of Ordinances Section 105 permits any individual to request a "determination of significance" from the City's Historic Preservation Officer (HPO) regarding whether a subject building warrants preservation. Consistent with local ordinances, plaintiff, who owns a circa-1900 building in Jersey City, sought a determination of significance before applying for a demolition permit. The City's HPO concluded plaintiff's building likely would not be approved for demolition due to its historic, architectural, and cultural significance.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Pursuant to local zoning ordinance, plaintiff appealed to defendant Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which upheld the determination of significance. Thereafter, he filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division alleging defendants' actions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Law Division found the ZBA's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and dismissed the complaint. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court concludes the HPO's issuance of a determination of significance — an advisory opinion seemingly intended to prevent plaintiff's submission of an application for a demolition permit — is not a procedure authorized by the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163. The MLUL does not authorize HPOs to unilaterally grant or deny historic preservation designations that bind a zoning officer in determining whether a demolition permit shall issue; that advisory function belongs solely to the Historic Preservation Commission, as detailed in the MLUL, and cannot be delegated to other entities or individuals. The Commission, in turn, may designate a site as historic only if it is voted upon by a majority of the full governing body. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court reverses and remands to allow plaintiff to apply for a demolition permit in accordance with the MLUL. The court also concludes Jersey City's Code of Ordinances Sections 105-3, 105-4, and 105-7 are ultra vires and inconsistent with the objectives and procedures concerning historic preservation mandated by the MLUL to the extent they delegate powers reserved for a municipality's historic preservation commission to the HPS. </p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-13227381952473499482023-07-16T21:25:00.003-04:002023-07-16T21:25:59.313-04:00MTAG AS CUST FOR ATCF II NJ, LLC VS. TAO INVESTMENTS, LLC<p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">The court considered plaintiff's challenge to a trial court order vacating a final judgment by default in a tax sale foreclosure. Plaintiff obtained a final judgment by default on its tax sale lien and defendants timely moved to vacate the order, alleging defective service of process. The trial court found sufficient defects with process to warrant vacating the final judgment, which reopened the redemption period and allowed defendant to redeem. </span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court affirmed, concluding service of process was defective pursuant to both the general court rules governing personal service, as well as the RULLCA-specific statute governing service of process on LLCs, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17. The court noted the differences between service rules in RULLCA and the Business Corporations Act (BCA), N.J.S.A. 14A:1-1 to: 18-11, in finding plaintiff's waiver argument unavailing. Although RULLCA and the BCA contain some similarities, the rules governing service are distinct and materially different. Service upon a corporation in New Jersey is governed by <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">Rule</u> 4:4-4(a)(6) and N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2, whereas service upon an LLC is governed by <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">Rule</u> 4:4-4(a)(5), and RULLCA, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The RULLCA service of process provision contains an additional method of service lacking in the BCA, providing, as a permissive alternative, that where personal service in accordance with the court rules fails despite reasonably diligent efforts, service may be made upon the State filing office. N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17(b). The BCA service of process provisions do not authorize the State to accept process as an agent of a corporation. <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">R.</u> 4:4-4(a)(6); N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Because final judgment was vacated, the court followed <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">Green Knight Cap., LLC v. Calderon</u>, 252 N.J. 265 (2022), in holding the period of redemption reopened and continued until barred by a valid final judgment of the Superior Court. The court interpreted the holding in <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">Green Knight</u>, in conjunction with <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">Rule</u> 4:64-6(b) and the tax sale law, N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), to mean the redemption period reopens when a final judgment in foreclosure is timely vacated.</p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-42737052433239378262023-07-09T20:55:00.001-04:002023-07-09T20:55:20.357-04:00THOMAS MAKUCH, LLC VS. TOWNSHIP OF JACKSON, ET AL<p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">This appeal arises out of an action challenging the suspension of a company that had been providing towing services in a municipality. As a matter of first impression, the court holds that the company had limited constitutional due process rights when it was suspended from the Township's towing lists. The court also holds that plaintiff received the process due its limited property interest. In addition, the court rejected plaintiff's arguments that its suspension from the towing lists violated its constitutional substantive due process and equal protection rights. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the Township, its police chief, and one of its police officers. </span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-32219003323542197982023-07-09T20:54:00.003-04:002023-07-09T20:54:29.368-04:00KAREN MCKNIGHT VS. BOARD OF REVIEW, ET A<p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> Appellant Karen McKnight appeals from the Board of Review's (the "Board") August 26, 2022 final agency decision, which held her liable to return an overpayment of $6,277 for unemployment benefits she was allegedly ineligible to receive for the weeks ending June 30, 2018 through May 4, 2019, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). The central issue on appeal is whether a claimant, who is otherwise separated from full-time employment, may include wages received from a part-time position, which they continue to maintain, in the calculation of their average weekly wage for purposes of unemployment benefits. The court concluded that the exclusion of the wages contravenes the legislative purpose of the unemployment benefits statute and is arbitrary as legally unsupported. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a recalculation of benefits.</span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-49439631353739067112023-07-09T20:52:00.002-04:002023-07-09T20:52:33.869-04:00Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey <p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution.</span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-58870382916060049812023-07-02T21:35:00.002-04:002023-07-02T21:35:13.334-04:00ALVIN SINGER VS. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES<p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> In this appeal from the Law Division's grant of summary judgment to defendants, the court was asked to consider, for the first time, whether a motor vehicle subject to a recall notice alone is sufficient to establish a claim pursuant to the New Jersey Lemon Law statute, N.J.S.A. 56:12-29 to -49. Defendant issued a recall notice that encompassed plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff subsequently brought the vehicle to the dealer to have the recall repair performed. Primarily due to disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant's ability to complete the recall was delayed.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"> A Law Division judge granted defendant summary judgment. The court affirmed and held the existence of a recall notice alone is not sufficient to establish the "nonconformity" element of a Lemon Law claim. In addition, because plaintiff primarily used the vehicle for business purposes, it is excluded from the Lemon Law's coverage.</p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-24557883959510276192023-07-02T21:34:00.003-04:002023-07-02T21:34:36.870-04:00C. ARSENIS, ET AL. VS. BOROUGH OF BERNARDSVILLE, <p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">The court considers whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for monetary damages, filed years after the statutory deadline for filing a tax appeal, based on allegations that municipal officials committed fraud and other torts by assessing real property in a manner inconsistent with law and at an amount above its true market value. The court concludes that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such claims because they are substantively equivalent to a tax appeal properly venued in the Tax Court or a county board of taxation, and the statutory deadlines for challenging local property tax assessments may not be circumvented by a late-filed complaint seeking damages for alleged torts arising from the tax assessment process. In light of these conclusions, the court affirms the trial court order dismissing the complaint in this matter with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.</span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-56205866088705172392023-07-02T21:33:00.003-04:002023-07-02T21:33:46.941-04:00Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey<p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution.</span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-38103548472753899162023-06-27T10:04:00.003-04:002023-06-27T10:04:39.758-04:00LIDIA BRANCO VS. FRANCISCO ANDRE RODRIGUES, <p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Plaintiff and decedent were partners for twenty-five years but never married. During their relationship, decedent owned an income-producing property in fee simple, which, unbeknownst to plaintiff, he transferred during his lifetime to himself and plaintiff as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Decedent signed and recorded the transfer deed. Plaintiff discovered her interest in the property only after decedent passed away. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to quiet title and was granted summary judgment, based on the trial court's holding that all elements of a valid inter vivos gift were present.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Defendant, who is decedent's son and administrator of the estate, urges reversal, claiming material issues of fact precluded summary judgment, specifically challenging the validity of the inter vivos gift of real property.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court affirms. Defendants presented no evidence to rebut the presumptions of donative intent, delivery and acceptance raised by the recorded transfer deed. Acceptance is presumed subject to plaintiff's right to disclaim her interest within a reasonable time of becoming aware of it. The additional element of relinquishment required for a valid inter vivos gift in New Jersey was also satisfied upon recordation of the transfer deed because decedent could not unilaterally restore his former fee simple estate.</p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-52768839068384545782023-06-25T19:05:00.002-04:002023-06-25T19:05:34.722-04:00Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. Township of Neptune<p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">The Court affirms as modified the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court declines to adopt an exception to the American Rule for common law right of access claims to public records. Those claims impose significant burdens on municipal clerks and other records custodians; they require a careful balancing of competing interests and the application of an array of factors that can challenge even a seasoned judge. Imposing fee-shifting in this category of cases would venture far beyond the narrow exceptions to the American Rule that New Jersey courts have adopted to date. Accordingly, Gannett is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees in this appeal.</span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-34223724289846990692023-06-18T21:58:00.000-04:002023-06-18T21:58:15.106-04:00MADELINE KEYWORTH VS. CAREONE AT MADISON AVENUE<p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"> These consolidated cases require us to consider the scope of the statutory self-critical analysis privilege and determine whether materials developed as part of self-critical analysis conducted pursuant to a facility's patient safety plan are subject to discovery, disclosure, and admissible at trial. This analysis hinges upon whether the facilities involved in these cases met the requirements imposed by the Patient Safety Act (PSA), N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.23 to -12.25, and related regulations, rendering the materials sought by plaintiffs privileged and protected from disclosure.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Defendants argue the trial court erred by ruling incident/investigation reports concerning separate incidents resulting in injuries at two facilities are not privileged under the PSA and therefore discoverable. The court reversed the trial court's orders. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Surveying the case law interpreting the PSA and regulations, the court notes that the PSA was designed to reduce medical errors by promoting internal self-reporting and self-critical analysis related to adverse events and near misses by health care facilities. N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25 renders the entire self-critical-analysis process privileged, shielding a health care facility's deliberations and determinations from discovery or admission into evidence. N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(g), does not condition the privilege on the finding of a Serious Preventable Adverse Event (SPAE). That an event is not reportable does not abrogate the self-critical-analysis privilege. The privilege unconditionally protects the process of self-critical analysis, the results of the analysis, and the resulting reports developed by a facility in its compliance with the PSA. A court may not order the release of documents prepared during the process of self-critical analysis. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(c) requires health care facilities to report every SPAE that occurs in that facility to the Department of Health (DOH). The documents, materials and information submitted to the DOH pursuant to this requirement are absolutely privileged and shall not be "subject to discovery or admissible as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding." N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(f). The statute provides no rationale or standard for parsing the contents of the documents, allowing for some portions to be privileged and others not privileged. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">However, when information sought to be protected from disclosure is not submitted to the DOH, the path to a privilege is different. N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(g) establishes the self-critical analysis privilege for internal documents that are the product of an 'investigative process that may or may not lead to reporting to the DOH. Any documents, materials, or information developed by a health care facility as part of a process of self-critical analysis conducted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(b) is not subject to discovery, disclosure or admissible as evidence in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Accordingly, if documents are submitted to the DOH pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(f) or meet the requirements of N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(g), they are absolutely privileged and not subject to discovery. Under either of those circumstances, a trial court does not engage in a redaction process and release the redacted document. The entire document is statutorily protected from disclosure. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">At the same time, the PSA expressly preserves plaintiffs' right to discover facts through conventional means of discovery if obtained from any source or context other than those specified in the PSA. Moreover, documents created outside the self-critical analysis process are subject to discovery. </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">In each case, plaintiffs are free to engage in discovery of facts from non-privileged sources. Additionally, if defendants produced voluminous medical records in response to a discovery request in either case, plaintiff may request, and the court may order, that defendants provide a "narrative to steer them to information contained in thousands of pages of medical records" in accordance with <u style="box-sizing: border-box;">Brugaletta v. Garcia</u>, 234 N.J. 225, 252 (2018).</p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-253280800025026762023-06-18T21:57:00.000-04:002023-06-18T21:57:01.997-04:00Kathleen DiFiore v. Tomo Pezic; Dora Deleon v. The Achilles Foot and Ankle Group; <p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s core holding that trial courts determine on a case-by-case basis what conditions, if any, to place on a DME -- including who may attend and whether it may be recorded -- with no absolute prohibitions or entitlements. The Court further affirms that video recording, in addition to audio recording, should be included in the range of options; that the parties shall enter into a protective order when a defense expert is concerned about the disclosure of proprietary information; that when third-party observation is permitted, the trial court shall impose reasonable conditions to prevent any disruption of or interference with the exam; and that, if a foreign or sign language interpreter is needed, a neutral interpreter shall be selected by the parties or, failing agreement, by the court.</span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-90227812250012496422023-06-18T21:56:00.001-04:002023-06-18T21:56:10.910-04:00Catherine Parsells v. Board of Education of the Borough of Somerville, <p> <span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Parsells did not knowingly waive her tenured right to a full-time teaching position, and the Court therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s award of “full back pay, benefits, and emoluments, less mitigation.” But the Court rejects the extension of Bridgewater-Raritan to impose a duty on school boards to notify, in advance, full-time teachers who consider voluntarily transferring to part-time teaching positions that they may not have a right to return to their full-time position.</span></p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-57597918275322075472023-06-11T22:09:00.001-04:002023-06-11T22:09:12.319-04:00ROSEMARY BENEDUCI VS. GRAHAM CURTIN, P.A. A-0466-21<p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">This appeal presents a question of first impression regarding whether a claim can be made under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, where (1) an employer merges with another employer, (2) the employee does not apply for a position with the new employer, but (3) the employee contends that while all other employees were offered employment with the new employer, the employer did not extend the same offer, for reasons proscribed by the LAD.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Because of the LAD's remedial purpose, plaintiff's claim that the decision not to transition her employment from Graham Curtin, P.A. <a style="box-sizing: border-box; cursor: pointer; font-weight: 600; position: relative; text-decoration: underline; transition: all 0.2s ease-in-out 0s; z-index: 9;">–</a>– the closing employer –– to McElroy Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP. <a style="box-sizing: border-box; cursor: pointer; font-weight: 600; position: relative; text-decoration: underline; transition: all 0.2s ease-in-out 0s; z-index: 9;">––</a> the new employer –– was based on discriminatory factors may constitute a viable cause of action. There are genuine disputes of material facts regarding whether the decision not to employ her at McElroy Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter was, in fact, discriminatory. Therefore, the court reverses the motion court's summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">In addition, because the motion court did not address the specifics of plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination, retaliatory termination, and aiding and abetting harassment based on age, disability, and use of disability leave, we do not either. </p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-55288794510995909252023-06-11T22:03:00.004-04:002023-06-11T22:03:48.975-04:00URIEL GUZMAN VS. M. TEIXEIRA INTERNATIONAL, INC., A-0841-21<p> <span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Plaintiff alleged his employer wrongfully terminated him based on a perceived disability in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50. The disability allegedly perceived by defendants was that plaintiff was "suffering from COVID-19." A Law Division judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to</span><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> </span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Rule</u><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;"> </span><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">4:6-2(e), finding plaintiff had failed to plead a viable cause of action for perceived disability discrimination under the LAD. </span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The court affirmed, agreeing that even assuming defendants believed plaintiff had COVID-19, the facts plaintiff had alleged in his pleadings – on July 23, 2020, plaintiff felt ill in that he felt "cold, clammy, and weak"; he was able to report to work and stay until the end of the day; the next day he was able to go to a free clinic to obtain a COVID-19 test; he did not allege he had gone to a hospital or a doctor's office or that he had otherwise sought medical attention or treatment; some unspecified time later, he reported he "was feeling better"; he was feeling well enough that he felt able to and offered to return to work; and he was terminated on July 29, 2020, after he had reported his condition had improved and he felt well enough to work – were not sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the LAD that he was terminated because his employer perceived he had a disability.</p>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955773814235701599.post-13259745117287370452023-06-11T21:53:00.004-04:002023-06-11T21:53:56.148-04:00Philip Pantano v. New York Shipping Association <p> </p><div class="modal-body" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; flex: 1 1 auto; padding: 1rem; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">A<span style="color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif;"><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-size: 14.4px;">pplication of the </span></span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Galvao</u><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif;"><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-size: 14.4px;"> multi-factor test -- which can involve matters of disputed fact and witness credibility -- is presumptively for a jury to determine. The court itself should not resolve the borrowed-employee issue unless the evidence concerning the factors is so one-sided that it warrants judgment in a moving party’s favor as a matter of law. Because the evidence in this case concerning the </span></span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Galvao</u><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif;"><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-size: 14.4px;"> factors was not sufficiently one-sided, the trial court incorrectly granted defendant’s </span></span><u style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif; font-size: 14.4px;">Rule</u><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Poppins, sans-serif;"><span style="caret-color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-size: 14.4px;"> 4:40-1 motion and deemed the worker who caused the accident a borrowed employee of plaintiff’s own employer.</span></span></p></div>Vercammen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05005140446459230078noreply@blogger.com