STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAKEVIS A. STEWART A-0562-17T6

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAKEVIS A. STEWART 

A-0562-17T6 

At a detention hearing held pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to 2A:162-26 (the CJRA), the State proceeded by proffer. Defendant subpoenaed the police officer, who prepared the affidavit of probable cause as a witness, and sought to subpoena other officers. Over the State's objection, the judge entered an order that permitted defendant "to subpoena the [police] officers at the scene of the incident to testify at the [d]etention [h]earing." The court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal and reversed. 

The CJRA provides that at a pretrial detention hearing, a "defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, and . . . shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise." N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1) (emphasis added). However, federal courts interpreting the Bail Reform Act that contains similar language have recognized the defendant's right to produce adverse witnesses is conditional, not absolute. 

The court adopts the reasoning of the majority of federal courts, which require a defendant make a proffer as to how the anticipated testimony of an adverse witness, i.e., police officers, victims, and State's witnesses, would 1) negate the State's evidence as to probable cause; or 2) rebut or diminish the State's proffered clear and convincing evidence supporting detention. 

A.E.C. VS. P.S.C., IN THE MATTER OF J.S.E. A-1290-16T4

 A.E.C. VS. P.S.C., IN THE MATTER OF J.S.E. 

A-1290-16T4 

Following O.Y.C.P. v. J.C.P., 442 N.J. Super. 625 (App. Div. 2015), the court further addressed the Family Part's jurisdiction over person between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one who apply to the Family Part for predicate findings in special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) cases. In this case, the court addressed the Family Part's jurisdiction to grant an application for child custody, made in connection with an SIJ-related application. The court held that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, the Family Part has jurisdiction to grant a parent custody of an unemancipated child who is over eighteen, but under twenty-one, and to issue a 

declaratory ruling that the child is dependent on the parent and is not emancipated. 

NEWTON MEDICAL CENTER VS. D.B. A-5101-15T4

NEWTON MEDICAL CENTER VS. D.B. 

A-5101-15T4 

In this appeal, this court was asked to determine whether a patient who requires emergent psychiatric treatment, resulting in his involuntary commitment to a hospital, should be treated differently for charity care purposes than a patient who suffers a physical injury or illness. This issue of first impression arose from a dispute regarding a hospital's attempt to recover payment from an indigent mental health patient, who was involuntarily committed to its facility after being screened by a psychiatric emergency screening service, when the hospital followed the charity care procedures applicable to a non-emergent admission instead of those applicable to an admission through the hospital's emergency room. The trial court determined on summary judgment that the procedures governing a regular admission applied, and the hospital was entitled to recover from the patient based on a theory of quasi-contract. 

This court reversed, holding that when a mental health patient is admitted to a hospital on an emergent basis through the referral of a psychiatric emergency screening service, the provisions of the charity care regulations dealing with emergency room admissions applied. 

NEWTON MEDICAL CENTER VS. D.B. A-5101-15T4

NEWTON MEDICAL CENTER VS. D.B. 

A-5101-15T4 

In this appeal, this court was asked to determine whether a patient who requires emergent psychiatric treatment, resulting in his involuntary commitment to a hospital, should be treated differently for charity care purposes than a patient who suffers a physical injury or illness. This issue of first impression arose from a dispute regarding a hospital's attempt to recover payment from an indigent mental health patient, who was involuntarily committed to its facility after being screened by a psychiatric emergency screening service, when the hospital followed the charity care procedures applicable to a non-emergent admission instead of those applicable to an admission through the hospital's emergency room. The trial court determined on summary judgment that the procedures governing a regular admission applied, and the hospital was entitled to recover from the patient based on a theory of quasi-contract. 

This court reversed, holding that when a mental health patient is admitted to a hospital on an emergent basis through the referral of a psychiatric emergency screening service, the provisions of the charity care regulations dealing with emergency room admissions applied.