Sunday, June 30, 2019
Sunday, June 16, 2019
MARY RICHTER VS. OAKLAND BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-0742-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0102-17T2)
MARY RICHTER VS. OAKLAND BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-0742-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0102-17T2) Plaintiff Mary Richter, a middle school teacher who suffers from diabetes, alleges she fainted while teaching due to low blood sugar levels when she was unable to eat lunch at an earlier class period and suffered significant and permanent injuries. She contends the accident would not have occurred had defendants Oakland Board of Education (the Board) and Gregg Desiderio granted her accommodation request to eat lunch earlier. The motion judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Richter's complaint, denied Richter's cross-motion for summary judgment, and denied reconsideration of the dismissal. The judge held that as a matter of law, Richter failed to prove a prima facie case of failure to accommodate her disability because she did not establish an adverse employment action. Thus, her bodily injury claim, which is the subject of the Board's cross-appeal, was denied as moot. Under the circumstances of this case, the court reverses the motion judge's grant of summary judgment dismissing Richter's complaint. Based on our consideration of Supreme Court decisions in Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2008) and Royster v. N.J. State Police, 227 N.J. 482 (2017), the court concludes that Richter need not demonstrate an adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case of a failure to accommodate claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Because there were genuine issues of material facts concerning whether Richter was provided an accommodation and whether the accommodation was adequate, which must be determined at a trial, the court affirms the denial of Richter's cross-motion for summary judgment. As to the Board's cross-appeal, the court concludes the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146, does not bar Richter's bodily injury claim, but should she prevail at trial, the Board should receive a credit based on the amount of medical bills and lost wages it paid in her workers' compensation claim in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-40..
DCPP VS. J.B. AND C.R., IN THE MATTER OF CA.R. AND C.R., JR. (FN-13-0079-18, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-3019-18T3)
DCPP VS. J.B. AND C.R., IN THE MATTER OF CA.R. AND C.R., JR. (FN-13-0079-18, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-3019-18T3) In this case, two children under the age of five have been in the continuous care, custody, and supervision of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency due to the abuse and neglect of their parents. The trial court granted the Division's application to vaccinate the children with age-appropriate immunizations over the religious-based objections of the parents. The court granted the mother leave to appeal. The children are not students. Therefore, the religious-based exemption to immunization of students afforded by N.J.S.A. 26:1A-9.1 and N.J.A.C. 8:57-4.4(a) does not apply. Rather, the matter is governed by the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6B-1 to -6, and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.86(b), which collectively require that children in placement receive adequate and appropriate medical care to maintain and advance their mental and physical well-being, and N.J.A.C. 3A:51-7.1(a)(2), which specifically requires the administration of all age-appropriate immunizations. Parental rights are not absolute and must yield to the safety and well-being of the children. While parents do not lose all of their parental rights when their children are placed in the custody of the Division, they are situated differently than parents who retain legal and physical custody. Pursuant to the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children, the Division has a duty to provide appropriate medical care and treatment to children in its custody. This duty encompasses the authority to administer age-appropriate immunizations over the religious objections of the parents. The court perceives no meaningful distinction between the power to order prophylactic medical care in the form of vaccinations to prevent a child from contracting infectious diseases and medical treatment for diseases already contracted.
ESTATE OF BRANDON TYLER NARLESKI, ET AL. VS. NICHOLAS GOMES, ET AL. (L-7085-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5144-17T4)
ESTATE OF BRANDON TYLER NARLESKI, ET AL. VS. NICHOLAS GOMES, ET AL. (L-7085-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5144-17T4) In this appeal, the court clarifies the standard for evaluating a claim of the work-product privilege. Consistent with the language of Rule 4:10-2(c), the court holds that there is no per se or presumptive rule that materials prepared or collected before litigation are not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Instead, as set forth in Rule 4:10-2(c), there is a multi-part, fact-specific test. The first inquiry is whether the materials were prepared or collected in anticipation of litigation or trial by another party or that party's representative. If so, to obtain the materials, a party must satisfy a two-part standard. The party seeking the materials must (1) show a substantial need for the discovery, and (2) demonstrate that he or she is unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
CAROLINE PALADINO, ET AL. VS. AULETTO ENTERPRISES, INC., ETC. (L-2574-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0232-18T1)
CAROLINE PALADINO, ET AL. VS. AULETTO ENTERPRISES, INC., ETC. (L-2574-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0232-18T1) In this wrongful death case, the defendant liquor store sold vodka and beer to the nineteen-year-old decedent without checking his identification. Decedent and a group of his friends – all of whom were likewise young adults under the legal drinking age of twenty-one – then converged at the home of one of the youths. They drank the purchased alcohol in the young host's bedroom. Decedent then left the house as a passenger in the car of one of the inebriated youths. He died when the driver lost control of the car and it flipped over. The decedent's estate sued the car driver and its owners for negligence and the liquor store under the Dram Shop Act. The liquor store pled a third-party complaint against the young man who had hosted the gathering and his parents. The trial court granted them summary judgment, finding they had not violated any established legal duty. Under the circumstances presented, the parents had no statutory or common law duty to prevent their adult son from allowing his adult underage friends to drink alcohol in their home without their proven knowledge or consent. Nor did the son who hosted the gathering have a duty of care under current law.