Kenneth Mr. Vercammen was included in the 2020 “Super Lawyers” list published by Thomson Reuters.

To schedule a confidential consultation, email us at VercammenAppointments@NJlaws.com, call or visit www.njlaws.com

(732) 572-0500

Sunday, June 30, 2019

DAVID F. CALABOTTA VS. PHIBRO ANIMAL HEALTH CORPORATION, ET AL. (L-1979-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1576-17T3)

This lawsuit is brought by an Illinois resident against his New Jersey-based former employer. Plaintiff alleges the company wrongfully denied him a promotion to a position in New Jersey and thereafter wrongfully terminated him from his job with its subsidiary in Illinois.
Plaintiff claims the company engaged in "associational" discrimination against him, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), based on the fact that his wife was then terminally ill with cancer. The company maintains it treated plaintiff fairly, and that it justifiably discharged him for engaging in inappropriate conduct at a trade show.
The trial court concluded that Illinois law, rather than the NJLAD, must apply to plaintiff's claims of discrimination because he lived in Illinois and worked for defendants' subsidiary in Illinois. Given that Illinois law has yet to recognize a cause of action for associational discrimination, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims with prejudice.
On appeal in this case of first impression, this court holds that the NJLAD, notwithstanding the solitary reference to "inhabitants" in its preamble, can extend in appropriate circumstances to plaintiffs who reside or work outside of this state. However, whether the NJLAD applies to a particular nonresident plaintiff's claims turns upon a weighing of the multiple choice-of-law factors set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws (Am. Law Inst. 1971), as adopted and construed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The court concludes that New Jersey law (specifically the NJLAD's ban against associational discrimination) applies to defendants' alleged failure to give plaintiff fair consideration for a promotion to a position in New Jersey. The Second Restatement factors strongly weigh in favor of applying New Jersey law, not Illinois law, to this failure-to-promote claim. This court therefore reverses the trial court’s dismissal of that discrete claim and reinstate it.
As for plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim, this court vacates its dismissal and remands the choice-of-law issue pertaining to that claim to the trial court, to enable the further development of critical facts and analysis bearing on the Second Restatement factors.

JED GOLDFARB VS. DAVID SOLIMINE (L-3236-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3740-16T2)

Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's denial of his recusal motion. Before trial of this commercial dispute, plaintiff learned that the judge secured the trial assignment in response to an ex parte communication from a former law clerk, who was an attorney with the law firm for defendant. The attorney asked the judge if she was available to preside, and identified the partner who would try the case. The judge said the partner "likes appearing before me." Plaintiff unsuccessfully argued this amounted to "judge shopping."
On appeal, the court concludes that an ex parte communication to have a case assigned to a particular judge is not a mere scheduling matter. The judge's affirmative response to the communication in this case created an appearance of impropriety. As for remedy, the court holds that less than a complete retrial can restore public confidence in the proceedings' integrity and impartiality. The court affirms the jury's verdict on liability. It decides de novo, or as a matter of original jurisdiction, the remaining evidentiary and legal issues on appeal, and remands for a new trial on damages before a new judge.

RICHARD CAPPARELLI VS. MATT LOPATIN (C-000153-17, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1948-17T4)

Business partners entered into two separate settlement agreements to resolve disputes arising from the dissolution of their jointly-owned companies. The first agreement provided for binding arbitration of all disputes before a three-person arbitration panel, one of whom had served as the parties' corporate counsel and was designated as the neutral arbitrator on the three-person panel. In the event he withdrew or was dismissed from the panel by one of the parties, the agreement specified a mechanism for the selection of his replacement.
The second agreement provided for the resolution of disputes pertaining to the collection of accounts receivable from third-party debtors only, and designated corporate counsel as the sole final decision maker. Unlike the first agreement entered two years earlier, the second agreement made no mention of arbitration and provided no mechanism for the replacement of corporate counsel in the event he became unavailable.
When corporate counsel resigned his role as final decision maker under the second agreement, and the parties were unable to agree on a replacement, plaintiff filed an order to show cause and verified complaint, seeking to compel the appointment of a replacement. The court affirmed the Chancery Division's decision that, based upon the doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose, corporate counsel's unavailability rendered the second agreement void. Further, because there was no mention of arbitration in the second agreement, it was not an arbitration agreement governed by the New Jersey Uniform Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32.

DCPP VS. B.H., H.S., AND T.S., IN THE MATTER OF M.S. (FN-13-0236-17, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-4179-17T2)

The court reversed the abuse or neglect finding under Title 9 against defendant, who was the boyfriend of the child's biological mother. During the eighteen months that defendant dated the child's mother, he provided no financial support for the child or the mother; never lived in the same house as the child and the mother; and the child never described defendant using any parental terms. Based on the unrefuted testimony, defendant had no ongoing responsibility or obligation to provide regular care or supervision for the child. The court held that a person who assumes brief or temporary supervision or care of a child, such as a one-time request to babysit or drive a child to a designated location at the request of a biological parent, does not impose a general and continuing obligation between the adult and the child to trigger the requisite duty of care to charge abuse or neglect under Title 9.

CATALINA MARKETING CORPORATION VS. LOUIS HUDYMAN (C-000129-18, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3044-18T4)

Defendant was sued by his former employer, a foreign corporation, and moved to quash two sets of subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum served on defendant's current employer, an out-of-state corporation, in New York and California. Defendant argued the discovery sought was not relevant, Rule 4:10-2(a), or otherwise burdensome or sought for annoyance or embarrassment. R. 4:10-3. Defendant alternatively sought a protective order. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion to quash.
The trial judge denied the motions without prejudice, reasoning she lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act (UIDDA), as adopted in New Jersey by Rule 4:11-5(c). However, while defendant's motion for leave to appeal was pending, the judge supplemented her statement of reasons, clarifying that she did not lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of defendant's motion, but rather, that she lacked jurisdiction to compel out-of-state witnesses to appear for the depositions. See R. 4:11-5 ("A deposition for use in an action in this state . . . may be taken outside this state .. . pursuant to a subpoena issued to the person to be deposed in accordance with Rule 4:14-7 and in accordance with the procedures authorized by the foreign state . . . .").
The court affirmed the orders as modified, holding that a New Jersey court always has jurisdiction to decide the merits of a discovery dispute between parties to the litigation, and that the UIDDA and the express language of Rule 4:11-5 do not compel a contrary result.

TRACEY L. VIZZONI, ETC. VS. B.M.D., ET AL. (L-0575-15, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1255-18T3)

In this case, the court affirms the entry of judgment for the defendant, a psychiatrist, and dismissal of the personal injury case against him. Plaintiff is the estate of a woman killed by the psychiatrist's patient when the patient hit the woman with her car while the woman was riding a bicycle on a narrow country road. Plaintiff sued the psychiatrist after learning the driver was his patient and he had prescribed numerous medications that had the capacity to impair driving.
Plaintiff asserted the psychiatrist's negligent prescription of medications without a warning not to drive was the proximate cause of the fatal crash. Plaintiff argued the psychiatrist had a duty to warn for the benefit of third parties. The trial court's order was affirmed because the court concluded the record did not establish the patient was impaired by the medications prescribed by the psychiatrist when she caused the fatal injury.

NDO SURGI CENTER A/S/O BERNADETTE HARPER V.NJM INSURANCE GROUP (A-1934-17T3)

Defendant New Jersey Manufacturers appeals an order requiring it to reimburse an ambulatory surgical center (ASC) for a Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code. The Department of Banking and Insurance's medical fee schedule listed the designation "N-1" for this CPT code, meaning it could be performed at an ASC but was "not separately reimbursable because the service [was] included in another procedure." In accord with N.J. Manufacturers Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Center, 458 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2019), the court holds that the insurer was not required to reimburse the ASC for this CPT code, even though Medicare would permit reimbursement, because the Department's fee schedule did not list any payment amount for the code.

BRENDA CUMMINGS v.RAHWAY BOARD OF EDUCATION, RAHWAY MIDDLE SCHOOL, RAHWAY 7TH AND 8TH GRADE AND ACADEMY GARRY MARTIN (A-0271-17T2)

Plaintiff, a middle school student, was injured while playing in a student-teacher fundraising basketball game. She appeals from an order granting summary judgment and dismissing her claims against defendants, who were her school, the school board, and a teacher. The court affirms because the undisputed facts establish that defendants did not breach a duty of care to plaintiff.
School officials have a duty to supervise the children in their care. Here, there was no showing of a breach of that duty because the basketball game was officiated by a referee and additional supervision was provided by approximately five teachers who did not participate in the game. Moreover, there were no facts showing that the game was being conducted in a reckless or out-of-control manner.
"[T]he duty of care applicable to participants in informal recreational sports is to avoid the infliction of injury caused by reckless or intentional conduct." Schick v. Ferolito, 167 N.J. 7, 12 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 497 (1994)). Here, there was no showing that the teacher-player was intentionally trying to injure plaintiff or acting recklessly.

DCPP V. M.M. AND V.B., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF K.M.N., Z.B., ZA.B., L.B., ZAR.B., AND Z.U.B. (A-3597-17T2/A-3598-17T2 )


The trial judge terminated the parents' rights, relying upon representations that the grandmother and great aunt were each committed to adopting the children. On appeal, the parents argued the record contained ambiguous hearsay statements by those resource relatives, which arguably indicated they were amenable to or might prefer a kinship legal guardianship ("KLG") arrangement over adoption.
This court upheld most of the trial judge's decision on the statutory factors for termination, but remanded to clarify the record with respect to whether the grandmother and great aunt respectively preferred KLG over adoption.The court construed the policies of the Kinship Legal Guardianship Act, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -7, and the Kinship Legal Guardianship Notification Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-89 to -92, to make relevant a resource parent’s preferences as between adoption and KLG. The resource parent's consent to adopt the children in lieu of KLG must be adequately informed, as well as unambiguous, unequivocal, and unconditional.

ELMER BRANCH, ETC. VS. CREAM-O-LAND DAIRY (L-4744-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1313-17T1)

Plaintiff Elmer Branch and the putative class of similarly situated truck drivers appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Cream-O-Land Dairy and dismissal of their class-action complaint alleging a failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law ("WHL"), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a to -56a38. Under the WHL's good-faith defense, an employer is entitled to a complete bar on liability for violations of the WHL if it acted "in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation by the Commissioner of the [Department of Labor and Workforce Development] or the Director of the Wage and Hour Bureau, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of such department or bureau with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged." N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2. The trial court determined that defendant was entitled to the good-faith defense based on its reliance on three determinations made by the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("DOL") officials in response to complaints brought by individual employees. 
Considering the legislative purpose and the plain language of the WHL, the court holds, in this matter of first impression, that such discrete determinations by DOL officials – which do not rise to a degree of formality so as to constitute broadly applicable guidance by the DOL and are in any event subject to further administrative appeal – do not constitute an "administrative practice or enforcement policy" and are thus insufficient to invoke the good-faith defense. N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2. Accordingly, the court reverses the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remands for further proceedings..

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, NEWARK LODGE NO. 12 VS. CITY OF NEWARK (C-000177-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3298-17T3)

With two limited exceptions, this court upheld the validity of an Ordinance enacted by the City of Newark, which created a civilian complaint review board (CCRB) in response to an alarming "pattern or practice of constitutional violations" by the Newark Police Department. First, the Ordinance improperly required the Chief of Police to accept the CCRB's findings of fact, absent clear error; and second, it allowed for disclosure of complainant and police officer identities. The practical impact of upholding the Ordinance means that the CCRB can function as intended – providing a vital oversight role – by investigating alleged police misconduct, conducting hearings, developing a disciplinary matrix, making recommendations, and issuing subpoenas.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ET AL. VS. L.O. (DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-0007-15T2)

In this appeal, the court considered whether indigent parents and guardians – once notified that an investigation has substantiated them for child abuse or neglect – are entitled to the appointment of counsel when exercising their right to an administrative hearing to challenge that determination. The court held that, because the potential consequences of such administrative proceedings – including permanent listing in the Child Abuse Registry – are of significant magnitude, counsel must be made available for indigent parents and guardians both at the administrative level and in any appeal of right to this court, just as that right exists in Title Nine actions commenced in Superior Court. The court also determined that until such time as the Legislature addresses this constitutional right, the Madden list may be utilized for the appointment of counsel.

CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY PLH-0013397, ETC. VS. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS (L-2040-14, L-2041-14, L-2402-14, L-2405-14, L-1918-15 AND L-0752-16, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4128-17T4)

In this appeal, the court examined the scope of available damages when a defendant's negligence has caused a homeowner to be displaced; that is, the court considered whether a homeowner's damages are generally limited to the cost of alternate shelter or whether the homeowner may also seek additional damages based on a broader concept of inconvenience. In adhering to the legal concepts expressed in Camaraza v. Bellavia Buick Corp., 216 N.J. Super. 263, 265 (App. Div. 1987), where the court held a motor vehicle owner's damages were not necessarily limited to the rental cost of a replacement, and in expanding Camaraza to claims other than those involving the loss of use of a motor vehicle, the court reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of the defense and remand for trial.

G.A.-H. v. K.G.G.(081545)(Ocean County and Statewide) (A-25/26-18; 081545)

No reasonable trier of fact could find that Arthur knew or had special reason to know that Kenneth was engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor. Accordingly, Arthur had no duty to report Kenneth. The record similarly fails to provide a basis for liability to attach to GEM. Because the record here is determinative of Arthur’s and GEM’s liability, the Court need not decide whether a co-worker or employer with knowledge or a special reason to know that a co-worker or employee is engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor has a legal duty to report that co-worker or employee.

S.L.W. v. New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits (081723) (Statewide) (A-32-18; 081723)

Upon review of the PFRS statute’s plain language and history, the Court finds that the Legislature did not intend for children of PFRS members to meet a dependency requirement to receive survivor benefits. The Court’s finding is consistent with the PFRS’s underlying policy goal of financially protecting the family members of deceased PFRS members.

In the Matter of Corey Corbo, Union City Police Department (081005) (Statewide) (A-72-17; 081135)

The Court modifies the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands this matter to the OAL for further proceedings to allow the City the opportunity to demonstrate that the hospital records are admissible as business records, and the opportunity to present any other theories of admissi

Sunday, June 16, 2019

MARY RICHTER VS. OAKLAND BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-0742-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0102-17T2)

MARY RICHTER VS. OAKLAND BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-0742-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0102-17T2) Plaintiff Mary Richter, a middle school teacher who suffers from diabetes, alleges she fainted while teaching due to low blood sugar levels when she was unable to eat lunch at an earlier class period and suffered significant and permanent injuries. She contends the accident would not have occurred had defendants Oakland Board of Education (the Board) and Gregg Desiderio granted her accommodation request to eat lunch earlier. The motion judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Richter's complaint, denied Richter's cross-motion for summary judgment, and denied reconsideration of the dismissal. The judge held that as a matter of law, Richter failed to prove a prima facie case of failure to accommodate her disability because she did not establish an adverse employment action. Thus, her bodily injury claim, which is the subject of the Board's cross-appeal, was denied as moot. Under the circumstances of this case, the court reverses the motion judge's grant of summary judgment dismissing Richter's complaint. Based on our consideration of Supreme Court decisions in Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2008) and Royster v. N.J. State Police, 227 N.J. 482 (2017), the court concludes that Richter need not demonstrate an adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case of a failure to accommodate claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Because there were genuine issues of material facts concerning whether Richter was provided an accommodation and whether the accommodation was adequate, which must be determined at a trial, the court affirms the denial of Richter's cross-motion for summary judgment. As to the Board's cross-appeal, the court concludes the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146, does not bar Richter's bodily injury claim, but should she prevail at trial, the Board should receive a credit based on the amount of medical bills and lost wages it paid in her workers' compensation claim in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-40..

DCPP VS. J.B. AND C.R., IN THE MATTER OF CA.R. AND C.R., JR. (FN-13-0079-18, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-3019-18T3)

DCPP VS. J.B. AND C.R., IN THE MATTER OF CA.R. AND C.R., JR. (FN-13-0079-18, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-3019-18T3) In this case, two children under the age of five have been in the continuous care, custody, and supervision of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency due to the abuse and neglect of their parents. The trial court granted the Division's application to vaccinate the children with age-appropriate immunizations over the religious-based objections of the parents. The court granted the mother leave to appeal. The children are not students. Therefore, the religious-based exemption to immunization of students afforded by N.J.S.A. 26:1A-9.1 and N.J.A.C. 8:57-4.4(a) does not apply. Rather, the matter is governed by the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6B-1 to -6, and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.86(b), which collectively require that children in placement receive adequate and appropriate medical care to maintain and advance their mental and physical well-being, and N.J.A.C. 3A:51-7.1(a)(2), which specifically requires the administration of all age-appropriate immunizations. Parental rights are not absolute and must yield to the safety and well-being of the children. While parents do not lose all of their parental rights when their children are placed in the custody of the Division, they are situated differently than parents who retain legal and physical custody. Pursuant to the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children, the Division has a duty to provide appropriate medical care and treatment to children in its custody. This duty encompasses the authority to administer age-appropriate immunizations over the religious objections of the parents. The court perceives no meaningful distinction between the power to order prophylactic medical care in the form of vaccinations to prevent a child from contracting infectious diseases and medical treatment for diseases already contracted.

ESTATE OF BRANDON TYLER NARLESKI, ET AL. VS. NICHOLAS GOMES, ET AL. (L-7085-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5144-17T4)

ESTATE OF BRANDON TYLER NARLESKI, ET AL. VS. NICHOLAS GOMES, ET AL. (L-7085-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5144-17T4) In this appeal, the court clarifies the standard for evaluating a claim of the work-product privilege. Consistent with the language of Rule 4:10-2(c), the court holds that there is no per se or presumptive rule that materials prepared or collected before litigation are not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Instead, as set forth in Rule 4:10-2(c), there is a multi-part, fact-specific test. The first inquiry is whether the materials were prepared or collected in anticipation of litigation or trial by another party or that party's representative. If so, to obtain the materials, a party must satisfy a two-part standard. The party seeking the materials must (1) show a substantial need for the discovery, and (2) demonstrate that he or she is unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials

CAROLINE PALADINO, ET AL. VS. AULETTO ENTERPRISES, INC., ETC. (L-2574-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0232-18T1)

CAROLINE PALADINO, ET AL. VS. AULETTO ENTERPRISES, INC., ETC. (L-2574-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0232-18T1) In this wrongful death case, the defendant liquor store sold vodka and beer to the nineteen-year-old decedent without checking his identification. Decedent and a group of his friends – all of whom were likewise young adults under the legal drinking age of twenty-one – then converged at the home of one of the youths. They drank the purchased alcohol in the young host's bedroom. Decedent then left the house as a passenger in the car of one of the inebriated youths. He died when the driver lost control of the car and it flipped over. The decedent's estate sued the car driver and its owners for negligence and the liquor store under the Dram Shop Act. The liquor store pled a third-party complaint against the young man who had hosted the gathering and his parents. The trial court granted them summary judgment, finding they had not violated any established legal duty. Under the circumstances presented, the parents had no statutory or common law duty to prevent their adult son from allowing his adult underage friends to drink alcohol in their home without their proven knowledge or consent. Nor did the son who hosted the gathering have a duty of care under current law.

Wednesday, June 5, 2019

STEVEN I. GROSS, ET AL. VS. KEVIN A. IANNUZZI, ET AL. (L-3360-14 AND L-6543-14, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0018-16T2)

Addressing 2017 amendments to N.J.S.A. 58:16A-103 (the Act), the court held that the Act allowed defendant to elevate his Sandy-damaged oceanfront townhome for flood safety, despite prohibitions contained in a Declaration of Covenants governing the townhome development. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that, even if defendant was allowed to raise the elevation of the townhome's first floor, he must maintain the existing height of the roofline by reducing the living space within the townhome. That cramped interpretation, aimed at preserving plaintiffs' ocean view, would defeat the legislative purpose to encourage flood-safe construction after Superstorm Sandy.

GLORIA COLON, ET AL.VS. STRATEGIC DELIVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC, ET AL. (L-3994-16, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-2378-17T4)

The court holds that the New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, applies to require arbitration of plaintiffs' wage, hour and payment claims if the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 does not apply.
Plaintiffs are truck drivers under contract with defendant Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC (SDS) to deliver products to SDS's customers. The contract provides that disputes are to be arbitrated under the FAA. Plaintiffs contend they are not required to arbitrate their claims because they are engaged in interstate commerce, making them exempt from the FAA under Section one.
The complaint is reinstated and remanded for the trial court to determine if plaintiffs are exempt under section one of the FAA. If the FAA does not apply, the court holds that the FAA does not preempt arbitration under the NJAA. The court also holds that plaintiffs waived a jury trial and the ability to proceed as a class on their wage, hour and payment claims.

ABC BAIL BONDS, INC. VS. GLENN A. GRANT (C-000075-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3961-17T2)

ABC Bail Bonds appealed from Judge Paul Innes's decision that Administrative Directive #22-17, "Bail and Bail Forfeitures -- Revisions to Procedures and Forms" (Aug. 7, 2017), was not unconstitutional, could be applied prospectively, and did not effectuate an unlawful material change in the terms of existing surety bond contracts. The panel affirmed, finding the Directive was a lawful exercise of the Supreme Court's authority to administer the criminal justice system, should be applied retroactively, and did not result in a material change to existing contracts, despite the one-year limitation to remission after a defendant fails to appear. In accord with N.J.S.A. 2A:162-8, the Directive retains a trial judge's discretion to decide remission. A judge may, where "exceptional circumstances" can be demonstrated, allow remission beyond a year from the failure to appear.

Janell Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp; Sasha Robinson and Tijuana Johnson v. Mall Chevrolet (081258) (Camden County and Statewide) (A-3/4-18


The trial courts’ resolution of these matters was correct and consistent with clear rulings from the United States Supreme Court that bind state and federal courts on how challenges such as plaintiffs’ should proceed. Those rulings do not permit threshold issues about overall contract validity to be resolved by the courts when the arbitration agreement itself is not specifically challenged. Here, plaintiffs attack the sales contracts in their entirety, not the language or clarity of the agreements to arbitrate or the broad delegation clauses contained in those signed arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court’s precedent compels only one conclusion: an arbitrator must resolve plaintiffs’ claims about the validity of their sales contracts as well as any arbitrability claims that plaintiffs may choose to raise.

Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Wells Fargo Bank NA (080669) (Statewide) (A-49-17; 080394)

The Court answers both parts of the first certified question in the affirmative: a life insurance policy procured with the intent to benefit persons without an insurable interest in the life of the insured does violate the public policy of New Jersey, and such a policy is void at the outset. In response to the second question, a party may be entitled to a refund of premium payments it made on the policy, depending on the circumstances.

Sunday, June 2, 2019

GOURMET DINING, LLC VS. UNION TOWNSHIP, ET AL. (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) (A-4799-17T3)

The premises on the campus of Kean University where Gourmet Dining, LLC, manages and operates a restaurant and catering facility are exempt from local property taxes because, while Gourmet Dining is a private, for-profit entity, the evidence presented to the trial court establishes that the premises are being used for a public purpose. That evidence shows, among other things, that: Gourmet Dining uses the premises pursuant to a management agreement, not a lease; students and other members of the University community regularly dine at the restaurant; the University views the restaurant as an important recruiting tool for students and faculty members; the restaurant generates management fees which are used for University scholarships; and a substantial percentage of the restaurant's employees are University students.

THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY VS. THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC. (L-4541-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3104-17T2)

The Port Authority Police Benevolent Association, Inc. appealed from an order of the trial court vacating an arbitration award in favor of one of its members. The arbitration award was entered pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the Association and plaintiff The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The panel determined the Port Authority, as a bi-state public corporate instrumentality, is subject to New Jersey arbitration law and reinstated the award