This court affirmed the denial of parole to a convicted murderer of a State Trooper. On remand, the full Board questioned Acoli about his rehabilitative efforts and his previous assertion that he was unconscious during the 1973 shooting. The Board found his responses were insincere, rehearsed, shallow, emotionless, contradictory, and implausible. After finding he lacked insight into his criminal behavior, the Board determined there was a substantial likelihood that Acoli would commit another crime if released at this time.
Petitioner applied to the Workers' Compensation Court for reimbursement of continued prescription opioid medication as part of his need for palliative care to treat a lower back injury suffered while he was working for respondent employer.
The compensation judge declined to compel the employer to pay for petitioner's prescription opioid medication in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-15 of the Workers' Compensation Act. The statute requires employers to provide treatment to injured employees when the treatment is "necessary to cure and relieve the worker of the effects of the injury and to restore the functions of the injured member or organ where such restoration is possible . . . ." After six years of treating with the same physician who prescribed his pain medication, petitioner's pain had not been alleviated with either therapy or medication.
The court affirmed the compensation judge, holding petitioner failed to prove continued opioid treatment would cure or relieve his injury and return him to better function. The court found N.J.S.A. 34:15-15 requires proof that opioid medication provides curative relief and that continued use of opioids improves the function of the injured worker.
A jury convicted defendants, the mother and father of a two-year-old daughter, of reckless manslaughter and aggravated manslaughter respectively, and endangering the welfare of a child. The child died of blunt force head trauma and suffered numerous other internal and external injuries. Both defendants provided statements to law enforcement, but neither admitted causing the child's death, and the State had no eyewitnesses to any assault.
The State contended both defendants could be found guilty as principals or accomplices, and it urged the judge to provide instructions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(c) (subsection 1(c)). That provides one may be an accomplice of another if "[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense . . . [and] [h]aving a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort so to do[.]"
Relying on this court's decision in State v. Bass, 221 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 1987), the only reported decision dealing with accomplice liability under subsection 1(c), and at the prosecutor's urging, the judge's jury charge carved out a separate basis for accomplice liability under Bass. The charge failed to tell jurors that in order to find a defendant guilty under subsection 1(c), they must find that defendant's failure to act was accompanied by a purpose to promote or facilitate the other's commission of a crime. The court specifically disapproved of Bass to the extent it implied otherwise, and reversed defendants' convictions.
The court held that a New York doctor who provided medical treatment to a New Jersey resident at a New York hospital was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey in a lawsuit alleging wrongful death and survivor claims resulting from the medical treatment. Moreover, web-based videos and internet postings describing the doctor's practice are insufficient contacts by themselves to support personal jurisdiction.