LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. VS. PENSKE TRUCK LEASING, CO., ET AL. (L-3377-17, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5624-17T3)

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. VS. PENSKE TRUCK LEASING, CO., ET AL. (L-3377-17, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5624-17T3)

Section 9.1 of the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (the No-Fault Act), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35, provides insurers, which have paid personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to their insured, with the statutory right to seek reimbursement against certain tortfeasors. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1. If the tortfeasor is insured, the determination whether the insurer that paid the PIP benefits is entitled to recover those payments and the amount of the recovery is by agreement of the parties, and, if they are unable to agree, by arbitration. Ibid.

In this appeal, the non-PIP insurer disputes whether its insured was a tortfeasor. Thus, the question presented is whether that dispute must be arbitrated under Section 9.1 of the No-Fault Act or resolved in a court proceeding. The court holds that the issue of whether a party is a tortfeasor is to be resolved at arbitration when that issue involves factual questions as to the fault or negligence of the insured.

CLARKSBORO, LLC VS. MARK KRONENBERG, ET AL. (F-031537-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3572-17T4)

CLARKSBORO, LLC VS. MARK KRONENBERG, ET AL. (F-031537-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3572-17T4)

In this tax foreclosure matter, defendant, U.S. Bank-Cust/Sass Muni VI DTR (U.S. Bank), a large tax lien investment fund, appeals from final judgment and an order denying its motion to vacate final judgment. U.S. Bank had previously obtained ownership of real property by foreclosing on a tax sale certificate, and then failed to pay property taxes. The Chancery Division granted the opposed motion for final judgment without affording the requested oral argument or providing a cogent reason to deny argument. U.S. Bank thus was not told when final judgment would be entered, which would also end its redemption period. Because oral argument was not provided, the court reverses.

R.A. Feuer v. Merck (08140

R.A. Feuer v. Merck (081409) (Union County and Statewide) (A-34-18; 081409)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the panel’s opinion.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LEWIS HOOPER (13-06-0768, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3436-16T3)

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LEWIS HOOPER (13-06-0768, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3436-16T3)

After allegedly rejecting a recommended thirty-year NERA term and entering an open plea to a nine-count indictment, defendant Lewis Hooper was sentenced to sixty years in State prison, forty-four of which were to be served without parole. He appeals his sentence and the denial of his motion to withdraw his open plea after sentencing based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Because defendant established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude the trial court erred when it refused to consider defendant's claim merely because it was raised in conjunction with a motion to withdraw his plea after sentencing and not in a PCR proceeding. In this case, there was no good reason for the trial court to have insisted that defendant file an appeal and then a petition for PCR in order to have his ineffective assistance claim heard, instead of hearing it along with defendant's Slater motion

We also vacate defendant's sentence on account of the court's failure to address the Yarbough factors after determining to impose an extended-term sentence and remand for resentencing, if necessary, following the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.

CHRISTOPHER LUSKEY VS. CARTERET BOARD OF EDUCATION (C-000009-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(A-3035-17T2)

CHRISTOPHER LUSKEY VS. CARTERET BOARD OF EDUCATION (C-000009-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(A-3035-17T2)

A dispute over the termination of a tenured public school janitor is subject to arbitration under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education and not the Public Employment Relations commission, even if a collective negotiations agreement dictated the length of service required to attain tenure.

IN RE RENEWAL APPLICATION OF TEAM ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE RENEWAL APPLICATION OF ROBERT TREAT ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE RENEWAL APPLICATION OF NORTH STAR ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL OF NEWARK IN RE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO INCREASE ENROLLMENT OF MARIA L. VARISCO ROGERS CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO INCREASE ENROLLMENT OF UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO INCREASE ENROLLMENT OF GREAT OAKS LEGACY CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO INCREASE ENROLLMENT OF NEW HORIZONS COMMUNITY CHARTER SCHOOL (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-3416-15T1/A-4384-15T

IN RE RENEWAL APPLICATION OF TEAM ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE RENEWAL APPLICATION OF ROBERT TREAT ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE RENEWAL APPLICATION OF NORTH STAR ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL OF NEWARK IN RE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO INCREASE ENROLLMENT OF MARIA L. VARISCO ROGERS CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO INCREASE ENROLLMENT OF UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO INCREASE ENROLLMENT OF GREAT OAKS LEGACY CHARTER SCHOOL IN RE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO INCREASE ENROLLMENT OF NEW HORIZONS COMMUNITY CHARTER SCHOOL (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-3416-15T1/A-4384-15T1/A-4385-15T1/A-4386-15T1/A-4387-15T1/A-4388-15T1/A-4398-15T1)

The Education Law Center, a non-profit organization, was found to have standing to appeal the Commissioner of Education's final decisions approving increases in enrollment and the expansion of physical plants for seven Newark charter schools.The panel held that even in former Abbott districts, it is the district that bears the burden of demonstrating that charter school funding will prevent delivery of a thorough and efficient education. Furthermore, the panel decided the Commissioner's interpretation of the relevant regulation authorized the grant of approval for expansions that would require satellite campuses, in as yet undetermined locations.charter schools.

JOANNA B. ORLOWSKI VS. ROBERT ORLOWSKI (FM-02-1778-1

JOANNA B. ORLOWSKI VS. ROBERT ORLOWSKI (FM-02-1778-14, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-2969-16T4)

Plaintiff ex-wife appeals from post-judgment orders denying her application for a QDRO payable to plaintiff from defendant's ERISA protected annuity funds to enforce unpaid counsel fee, expert fee, and tuition reimbursement awards. She also appeals from the denial of enforcement of counsel fee judgments by an enhanced wage garnishment. The court reverses, finding the counsel fees, expert fees, and tuition reimbursement related to child support or property distribution, and enforcement of those awards by a QDRO payable to plaintiff did not violate ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The counsel fee judgments were also enforceable by an enhanced wage garnishment to the extent they related to an underlying support obligation

) (Monmouth County and Statewide) (A-63-17; 080612)

Frances Green v. Monmouth University (080612) (Monmouth County and Statewide) (A-63-17; 080612)

The concert was promoting the University’s educational objectives and purposes at the time of Green’s injury, and as a result, Monmouth University is afforded charitable immunity. Although Green was not a Monmouth University student, she was a beneficiary under the language of the Charitable Immunity Act.

Sandra Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts,

Sandra Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc. (081720) (Morris County and Statewide) (A-31-18; 081720)

The MSA required Timothy to “maintain” life insurance to support the children in the event of Timothy’s death. Because Timothy’s suicide barred recovery of the life insurance proceeds, he failed to “maintain” life insurance and therefore breached the Agreement. A precise calculation of Timothy’s outstanding child support obligations would be speculative, and the Chancery Division did not abuse its discretion by finding that Timothy’s outstanding obligations exceed the remaining assets of Timothy’s estate. Thus, there would be no remaining estate assets to pay Sandra’s claims, and a remand for a precise damages calculation is unnecessary.

IN THE MATTER OF RIDGEFIELD PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION AND RIDGEFIELD PARK EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION) (A-1694-17T4)

IN THE MATTER OF RIDGEFIELD PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION AND RIDGEFIELD PARK EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION) (A-1694-17T4)

This dispute concerns the allowable scope of negotiations for employee contributions to health care and prescription coverage (collectively health insurance) costs in accordance with L. 2011, c. 78, §§ 39 and 41 (Chapter 78), codified at N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c and N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1. Chapter 78 prescribed health insurance contribution rates for public employees over a four-year period beginning July 1, 2011 and ending June 30, 2015, at gradually increasing rates designated Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3 and Tier 4.

Petitioner Ridgefield Park Education Association appealed the scope of negotiations ruling by the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) in favor of respondent Ridgefield Park Board of Education, that Chapter 78 preempted the terms of the parties' collective negotiations agreement (CNA) for the period July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2018, such that the Association members were required to contribute at the Tier 4 rate throughout the remaining three years of the 2014-2018 CNA and not just for the first year – July 1, 2014 - June 30, 2015. The court reverses the final agency decision because under the circumstances presented PERC's interpretation of Chapter 78 is contrary to the Legislature's intent since it creates the absurd result of a financial hardship of having Association members contribute at the Tier 4 level for three additional years. The court further remands the matter to PERC to fashion and implement an appropriate remedy within sixty days to refund Association members their health insurance contributions that were improperly deducted.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANDRE COCLOUGH (17-02-0070, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5142-16T4)

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANDRE COCLOUGH (17-02-0070, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5142-16T4)

The court affirmed defendant's burglary and criminal mischief convictions, rejecting his contentions, raised as plain error, regarding the court's jury instructions and police witnesses' identification-related testimony. The court also rejected defendant's argument that he must be resentenced because of a breakdown in his relationship with his trial counsel. Although a defendant is entitled to conflict-free representation, the court holds that he may not profit from undermining his attorney-client relationship through his own abusive or threatening conduct. Despite defendant's insults and threats, defense counsel wished to proceed, as did defendant. The court discerned no basis for resentencing.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO N.J.A.C. 11:22-1.1 (DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND INSURANCE) (A-2828-17T2)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO N.J.A.C. 11:22-1.1 (DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND INSURANCE) (A-2828-17T2)

Regulations adopted by the Department of Banking and Insurance to implement the provisions of the Health Claims Authorization, Processing and Payment Act (HCAPPA), L. 2005, c. 352 (codified as amended in various sections of titles 17, 17B, and 26 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated), are valid because: HCAPPA permits payers to obtain reimbursement of overpayments of claims paid, including claims under "stand-alone" or "dental-only" plans, and allows payers to offset overpayments to a provider against future claims the provider submits for other persons

MEDFORD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT VS. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BUILDINGS AMERICAS, INC. (L-0787-18, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5798-17T4)

MEDFORD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT VS. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BUILDINGS AMERICAS, INC. (L-0787-18, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5798-17T4)

At issue in this appeal is an arbitration clause of a contract for work performed by a general contractor to implement an energy services program for a school district. The arbitration clause provided disputes "may be settled by binding arbitration." In that respect, it conflicted with a request for proposals for the contract and another prior agreement between the parties for the same project, both of which mandated litigation of disputes in a judicial forum.

The court concludes the terms of the arbitration clause, when read in pari materia with the mandatory governing law provisions of the prior documents between the parties are permissive and not mandatory. Accordingly, the court affirms the Law Division order enjoining and dismissing the arbitration proceedings filed by defendant.

Garden State Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. State of New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance(081044)(Statewide)(A-1-18; 080861)

Garden State Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. State of New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance(081044)(Statewide)(A-1-18; 080861)

The only requirements for an asset sale are that a seller is conducting business by holding a valid license and is not subject to an action by the Commissioner. As such, the asset sale was valid, the Irvington location retained its grandfathered status, and DOBI’s decision to grant the license to New Loan was appropriate.

Beryl Zimmerman and Judy Comment v. Sussex County Educational Service Commission (080861)(Statewide) (A-75-17; 080861)

Beryl Zimmerman and Judy Comment v. Sussex County Educational Service Commission (080861)(Statewide) (A-75-17; 080861)

Protection of compensation is not restricted to protection of the hourly rate of pay, and a remand is needed. A record must be created to allow the Commissioner to assess the SCESC’s reasons for allocating work among its part-time teachers in a manner that severely reduced the number of hours afforded to the two tenured teachers and awarded work to non-tenured and less senior staff. The Court thus affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division but does not encourage a strict arithmetic calculation along the lines the panel has suggested

Patricia J. McClain v. Board of Review (080397)(Statewide) (A-52-17; 080397)

Patricia J. McClain v. Board of Review (080397)(Statewide) (A-52-17; 080397)

Based on its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), the Court concludes that McClain and Blake are entitled to UI benefits because (1) they qualified for UI benefits at their former employment at the time of their departure, (2) they were scheduled to commence their new jobs within seven days of leaving their former employment, and (3) their new job offers were rescinded through no fault of their own before the start date.

Cynthia M. Blake v. Board of Review (080198)(Statewide) (A-65-17; 080198)

Cynthia M. Blake v. Board of Review (080198)(Statewide) (A-65-17; 080198)

Based on its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), the Court concludes that McClain and Blake are entitled to UI benefits because (1) they qualified for UI benefits at their former employment at the time of their departure, (2) they were scheduled to commence their new jobs within seven days of leaving their former employment, and (3) their new job offers were rescinded through no fault of their own before the start date.