VADIM CHEPOVETSKY, ET AL. VS. LOUIS CIVELLO, JR. (C-000008-19, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0476-21)
In January 2007, defendant sold a business to a relative of the plaintiffs. All but $12,500 of the $196,5000 purchase price was financed by defendant. The loan was secured by a mortgage on plaintiffs' residence and the personal guaranty of plaintiff Vadim Chepovetsky. Shortly thereafter, the buyer defaulted. The maturity date of the mortgage was February 22, 2012. Litigation in 2008 did not result in a judgment. In 2011, plaintiffs filed a joint Chapter Seven bankruptcy. The debt schedules list defendant as an unsecured creditor. The bankruptcy trustee abandoned his interest in the plaintiffs' residence. A discharge was granted to plaintiffs and a final decree was entered closing the case a no-asset bankruptcy. Defendant received timely notice of the bankruptcy filing and the discharge.
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this action to quiet title. Defendant filed a counterclaim, seeking to enter judgment for personal liability against plaintiffs on the guaranty and to fix the amount due on the mortgage. Plaintiffs did not raise the affirmative defense of discharge in bankruptcy. Plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed for failing to provide discovery. The court conducted a bench trial on the counterclaim. Plaintiffs did not attend the trial and their attorney did not raise the defense of discharge in bankruptcy. The court entered judgment for $410,800 against Chepovetsky but not Svetlana Nashtatik.
Thereafter, plaintiffs moved to vacate the judgment, alleging it was void due to their bankruptcy discharge, and to vacate the dismissal of their complaint, because they were not required to respond to defendant's discovery demands related to a debt discharged in bankruptcy. They also argued that foreclosure was barred by the six-year statute of limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1. Defendant opposed the motion, relying on equitable principles, including unclean hands, and asserted that plaintiffs did not prove that Chepovetsky's liability on the guaranty was discharged.
The trial court vacated the judgment and the order dismissing the quiet title action. The court found the judgment was void ab initio because Chepovetsky's "personal debt" to defendant was discharged in bankruptcy. The court stated it was unaware of the discharge in bankruptcy when it entered judgment against Chepovetsky. The court found the order dismissing the complaint was "improvidently entered" and reinstated the complaint, noting that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524, plaintiffs were "not obligated to do anything" and were "entitled to disregard" discovery that was part of an attempt to collect a discharged debt. The court also found that the mortgage matured on February 22, 2012, and defendant failed to institute a timely foreclosure action within six years. Therefore, an action to quiet title was appropriate.
We granted defendant leave to appeal. Applying the Supremacy Clause, the court held that the nature, extent, and enforceability of a discharge in bankruptcy is controlled by the Bankruptcy Code and interpretative federal case law. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524, debtors are not required to defend a postdischarge collection action. Consequently, they were not required to provide discovery, and the failure to plead discharge in bankruptcy as an affirmative defense did not waive that defense or estop plaintiffs from asserting it. Enforcing the waiver of the affirmative defense of discharge in bankruptcy under Rule 4:5-4 would violate the Supremacy Clause and be inconsistent with substantial justice. The court rejected defendant's reliance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The court held that Chepovetsky's personal liability on the guaranty was discharged in bankruptcy and that Nashtatik was not a guarantor of the loan. Accordingly, the judgment imposing personal liability on Chepovetsky was void ab initio and properly vacated.
As to the mortgage lien, the court held that defendant was entitled to a judgment fixing the amount due on the mortgage, explaining that a discharge in bankruptcy only discharges the personal liability of the debtors, and the mortgage lien remains enforceable against their real property if the foreclosure action is timely filed. The court expressed no opinion on whether a future action to foreclose the mortgage would be time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The ruling that foreclosure was time-barred was vacated, with that issue to be reconsidered on remand.
