After settling her medical malpractice suit with plaintiff's estate, defendant-doctor Bowers was prepared to try her third-party contribution claim against third-party defendant Comiskey, who also treated plaintiff but was never named as a direct defendant. Comiskey moved to dismiss, arguing the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Law, (the JTCL), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 to -5, predicated a contribution-only claim upon plaintiff's recovery of a "money judgment" against Bowers. The settlement and release executed by the parties did not satisfy the JTCL. The motion judge denied Comiskey's motion, finding it was untimely, and because the settlement was placed on the public website of the Division of Consumer Affairs, as required by regulation, the settlement was the equivalent of a money judgment.
On leave granted, the court reversed. The court reviewed a line of cases from the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division that have consistently construed the right to contribution under the JTCL as requiring entry of a money judgment against the contribution claimant.
The court also raised concern about continued application of the Court's holding in Young v. Steinberg, 53 N.J. 252 (1969). In Young, the Court held that "[a] suit for contribution based on a settlement which has been elevated to the status of a judgment by formal court proceeding, and which discharges the injured party's claim against a non-settling joint tortfeasor, comports with the intent of our statutory scheme." Id. at 255 (emphasis added). At trial, the contribution claimant must still "establish a common liability . . . and the quantum of the damages ensuing from the joint offense." Ibid.
The court noted Young was decided prior to enactment of the Comparative Negligence Act (the CNA), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8. As a result, pro rata apportionment of damages under the JTCL was supplanted by apportionment of liability and damages based on comparative fault.
