Troy Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, Inc. (085419) (Burlington County & Statewide) (A-70-20; 085419)
The AOM statute does not require submission of an AOM to support a vicarious liability claim against a licensed health care facility based only on the conduct of its non-licensed employee.
In the Matter of Proposed Construction of Compressor Station (086428) (Statewide) (A-44-21; 086428)
Appellants should have included Tennessee as an "interested party" pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(d) when they filed their initial Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement in the Appellate Division. Accordingly, the Court declines to reach the arguments advanced under Rules 4:33-1 and -2. The matter is remanded to the Appellate Division to permit appellants to file an amended Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement that names Tennessee as an interested party pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(d).
CHRISTINE ANN DEVERS VS. JEFFREY ERIC DEVERS (FM-07-1537-09, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4481-19)
After many years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement, reserving for the matrimonial court's consideration a single issue about a bank account; the wife claimed the account was a marital asset and the husband claimed it consisted of investor funds. After a plenary hearing, the judge found the Investment Advisers Act deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14a. An order was entered denying the wife's claim "without prejudice." Her reconsideration motion filed three months later was denied as untimely.
Soon after the wife appealed, the court entered an order that limited the appeal to a review of the order denying reconsideration. Later, however, the court allowed the parties to brief all issues, including the merits of the order denying the claim on jurisdictional grounds and whether the merits panel was barred from reconsidering the earlier motion order by the law of the case doctrine.
The court held that the order denying the wife's claim to the account "without prejudice" caused sufficient uncertainty about its finality that the interests of justice permitted the court's consideration of the jurisdictional ruling. The court also held that 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14a grants state courts concurrent jurisdiction, so the case was remanded for a disposition of the wife's claim to the account on its merits.
Troy Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, Inc. (085419) (Burlington County & Statewide) (A-70-20; 085419)
The AOM statute does not require submission of an AOM to support a vicarious liability claim against a licensed health care facility based only on the conduct of its non-licensed employee.
Hamid Harris v. City of Newark (085028) (Essex County & Statewide) (A-59-20; 085028)
The trial court’s order in this case was a decision premised on factual findings as well as legal conclusions, not an exclusively legal determination. A trial court’s order rejecting as a matter of law a claim of qualified immunity should not be designated as a final order appealable as of right under Rule 2:2-3(a), and federal law does not require the contrary result. In an NJCRA action, a defendant seeking to challenge a trial court’s order denying qualified immunity prior to final judgment must proceed by motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Rules 2:2-4 and 2:5-6.
DEBORAH MARINO, ET AL. VS. ABEX CORPORATION, ET AL. (L-0836-10, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1523-19)
The court considered defendant Ford Motor Company's (Ford) appeal from a final judgment awarding plaintiff Deborah Marino, Executrix for the Estate of Anita Creutzberger, (decedent) damages for decedent's death from peritoneal mesothelioma. Ford contended that the trial court erred in ruling that Ford violated a consent order and in implementing sanctions.
Decedent's husband and son worked at several Ford car dealerships where brake dust would spread and cover them. They brought dust home on their clothing where it was laundered by decedent. Decedent's estate sued Ford alleging decedent was exposed to asbestos from Ford brakes and that this exposure caused her mesothelioma. Among other allegations, the estate asserted that Ford negligently violated its duty to protect dealership workers and their families by failing to provide them with the same warnings and guidance for handling its asbestos products that it provided to its own employees.
The parties resolved a discovery dispute with a consent order. Ford agreed to search for Ford training materials that referred to asbestos or handling asbestos products and to produce any responsive documents and a corporate witness having knowledge of facts relating to Ford's training.
During the deposition of this designated witness, the employee denied any knowledge of relevant training manuals and any recent testimony regarding the same. Plaintiff's counsel confronted the employee with a 1974 Ford training manual, which the employee admitted he had seen and then confirmed he had been questioned about in another case a few months earlier.
The trial court, upon plaintiff's motion, sanctioned Ford by: (1) directing verdict to plaintiff on the issues of duty and breach; and (2) ordering that the jury be advised that Ford violated a court order and withheld evidence, so duty and breach of duty had been resolved against them. The court subsequently concluded that the sanctions order necessarily included a directed verdict on general, but not specific, causation. Ford appealed.
This court's review found little support for Ford's claims that it acted in good faith in responding to plaintiff's discovery requests and did not violate the consent order. The trial court's sanctions directly corresponded to the violation. The trial court's subsequent inclusion of a directed verdict on general causation flowed from the fact that a duty to warn only exists when the product is dangerous. Ford presented experts to opine against specific causation of decedent's mesothelioma, but these experts also discussed general causation, mooting Ford's argument that it was prejudiced by the order's directed verdict for general causation.
The court discerned no abuse of the trial court's discretion to impose sanctions for violating the consent order and affirmed.
M.A.P. VS. E.B.A. (FD-09-0282-21, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-1057-21)
In this appeal, the court considered whether two of the seven subsections of New Jersey's Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's long arm statute permitted exertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident alleged to have fathered a child through a sexual relationship with a New Jersey resident that occurred in New York. The court held that the out-of-state act that allegedly caused conception, even though coupled with the nonresident's knowledge that plaintiff was a New Jersey resident, could not be the nonresident's "act" under N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.129(a)(5), which authorizes personal jurisdiction when "the child resides in this State as a result of the [nonresident's] acts or directives." The court also found unavailing N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.129(a)(7), which allows for the exertion of personal jurisdiction whenever commensurate with due process, because the nonresident defendant lacked sufficient contacts with this State. As a matter of first impression, the court also held that the policies underlying N.J.R.E. 408 precluded consideration in the jurisdictional analysis of a letter sent to plaintiff by defendant's New Jersey lawyer proposing an amicable resolution.