DIANE S. LAPSLEY VS. TOWNSHIP OF SPARTA, ET AL. (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) (A-0958-19T3)

 DIANE S. LAPSLEY VS. TOWNSHIP OF SPARTA, ET AL. (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) (A-0958-19T3)

Petitioner Diane Lapsley appealed from an order of a judge of compensation concluding that injuries she sustained in a February 3, 2014 accident arose out of and in the course of her employment as a Sparta Township librarian pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146. After clocking out and exiting the library premises, petitioner was struck by a snowplow in an adjacent parking lot that happened to be owned by the township. The compensation judge concluded that petitioner's injuries were compensable pursuant to the premises rule, N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, which provides that "[e]mployment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer's place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer . . . ."

The court held that a mechanical application of the premises rule in the context of a public-entity employer deviates from well-settled principles applicable to private employers and invites an overbroad and unwarranted expansion of public-entity liability for workers' compensation claims. The court identified employer-directed control of an employee's use of a parking lot as a critical element in the application of the premises rule. See Novis v. Rosenbluth, 138 N.J. 92, 93 (1994). An injury will be compensable if it is sustained while the employee is using the lot where the manner of ingress or egress is dictated by the employer, or in an area where the employee parks at the employer's direction. Conversely, use of a shared parking lot that accommodates multiple tenants, without specific instruction from an employer, is not sufficient to satisfy to the premises rule.

The stipulated facts of this case established that petitioner's employer exercised no control of its employee's use of the common-use parking lot. Petitioner was off-the-clock at the time of the accident and had exited the library premises. Library employees were not given any instructions about where in the subject lot to park or indeed whether to park in that particular lot, on the street, or anywhere else in town where parking may be available. Nor were library staff instructed on the manner of ingress or egress. The lot was shared with other municipal employees and members of the public alike.

Under these facts, the court concluded that there was no reasoned basis to depart from the general rule that the library's "use" of the common-use parking lot for its employees' benefit was not sufficient to satisfy the premises rule. Accordingly, the court reversed the compensation judge's order finding the accident was compensable.

CITY OF NEWARK VS. TOWNSHIP OF JEFFERSON (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) (A-1303-19T1)

 CITY OF NEWARK VS. TOWNSHIP OF JEFFERSON (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) (A-1303-19T1)

The tax court entered an October 18, 2019 judgment affirming tax assessments on approximately 4036 acres of watershed land owned by plaintiff City of Newark situated in defendant Township of Jefferson for the tax years 2009 to 2019. City of Newark v. Twp. of Jefferson, 31 N.J. Tax 303, 311-18 (Tax 2019). Rejecting the expert testimony of both parties' appraisers, the tax court found while plaintiff may have overcome the presumption of the correctness of the assessments, it failed to maintain its burden of proof to modify the assessments.

This court reversed, holding the assessment was defective and not entitled to the presumption of validity because it was primarily based on a settlement discussion rather than the value of the property. The assessment was also problematic because the assessor relied on another sale he failed to verify. The tax court made no findings regarding the validity of the assessment methodology and the record does not support its validity. The court remanded the matter for reconsideration and further findings on this issue and directed the tax court to make an independent finding of the value of the property for tax purposes.

TARTA LUNA PROPERTIES, LLC, ET AL. VS. HARVEST RESTAURANTS GROUP, LLC, ET AL. (C-000101-16, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4994-18T3)

 TARTA LUNA PROPERTIES, LLC, ET AL. VS. HARVEST RESTAURANTS GROUP, LLC, ET AL. (C-000101-16, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4994-18T3)

This litigation arises out of the lease of a building in which defendants-tenants intended to open a restaurant. The lease agreement contemplated an extensive rebuilding and repair of the premises. During the renovations, plaintiffs-landlord raised numerous issues regarding the quality of the construction. They eventually instituted suit seeking the termination of the lease and imposition of a forfeiture as well as an increase in rent. After a bench trial, the Chancery court entered judgment in favor of defendants, finding plaintiffs' claims meritless.

Nevertheless, the Chancery court considered plaintiffs' application for counsel and expert fees. The Chancery court determined there was no contractual or statutory basis for an award of fees. The trial court also recognized that defendants relied on their professionals – architects and engineers – as well as the municipal officials who approved the construction, issued permits and a certificate of occupancy. However, because "the safety of the public" was compromised by the faulty construction, the Chancery court found that equitable principles demanded the remedy of counsel fees. Therefore, in determining an award of fees was warranted by principles of equity, the trial court awarded plaintiffs nearly $1,000,000 in counsel and expert fees.

This court concluded that the general concept of public safety has not been recognized as an exception to the American rule and the policy preventing fee-shifting. There was no statutory or contractual basis for the award nor did the litigation fit into any exception under Rule 4:42-9. In addition, the Chancery court found defendants had not acted willfully or engaged in any intentional misconduct. Therefore, the panel concluded the award was not supported by equitable principles. The order granting counsel and expert fees is reversed.

TROY HAVILAND VS. LOURDES MEDICAL CENTER OF BURLINGTON COUNTY, INC. (L-0782-19, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1349-19T3)

 TROY HAVILAND VS. LOURDES MEDICAL CENTER OF BURLINGTON COUNTY, INC. (L-0782-19, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1349-19T3)

In this appeal, the court held that an in-house attorney employed under a multi-year contract, and who was subject to termination based only on cause as defined in the agreement, was not precluded by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16 to pursue contractual damages if wrongfully discharged. In reaching this decision, the court followed similar holdings in Nordling v. Northern State Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991), and Karstetter v. King County Corrections Guild, 444 P.3d 1185, 1191 (Wash. 2019), and found factually distinguishable the decision in Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, Dist. 3, 146 N.J. 140 (1996), which limited an attorney's award of damages for a breach of contract to quantum merit.

In addition, the court concluded the trial court's award of $260,026.88 in damages was supported by sufficient credible evidence and made in accordance with applicable law. The court, however, remanded for the trial court to apply prejudgment interest to the damages award.

KIRK C. NELSON VS. ELIZABETH BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-1377-17, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4580-18T3)

 KIRK C. NELSON VS. ELIZABETH BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-1377-17, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4580-18T3)

In this appeal, the court held that an in-house attorney employed under a multi-year contract, and who was subject to termination based only on cause as defined in the agreement, was not precluded by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16 to pursue contractual damages if wrongfully discharged. In reaching this decision, the court followed similar holdings in Nordling v. Northern State Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991), and Karstetter v. King County Corrections Guild, 444 P.3d 1185, 1191 (Wash. 2019), and found factually distinguishable the decision in Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, Dist. 3, 146 N.J. 140 (1996), which limited an attorney's award of damages for a breach of contract to quantum merit.

In addition, the court concluded the trial court's award of $260,026.88 in damages was supported by sufficient credible evidence and made in accordance with applicable law. The court, however, remanded for the trial court to apply prejudgment interest to the damages award.

New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (083801) (Essex County & Statewide) (A-72/73-19; 083801)

 New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (083801) (Essex County & Statewide) (A-72/73-19; 083801)

The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Yannotti’s thoughtful opinion. The Court relies principally on the Appellate Division’s analysis of the plain language of the relevant insurance policies. 461 N.J. Super. at 454-57. The Court does not rely on the discussion of Appleman’s Rule or the doctrine of contra proferentem. See id. at 460-63.

MARCELLA SIMADIRIS VS. PATERSON PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT (L-1674-19, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0197-19T3)

 MARCELLA SIMADIRIS VS. PATERSON PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT (L-1674-19, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0197-19T3)

The trial court determined that a board of education's decision to certify tenure charges against plaintiff in private violated her alleged right to demand a public proceeding. The school district's appeal pitted that part of the Tenured Employees Hearing Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -25, which declares a charge against a tenured employee "shall no" be discussed by a board of education "at a public meeting," N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11, against that part of the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21, which permits a public body to exclude the public from personnel discussions "unless" the affected employee "request[s] in writing that the matter . . . be discussed at a public meeting," N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8). Because the Legislature's broad strokes in the Open Public Meetings Act were expressly subjected to exceptions existing in other legislation, N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(1), and because tenured employees have other greater procedural rights than non-tenured employees, the court held that N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11's unambiguous declaration that such proceedings "shall not" take place in public – enacted nineteen days after enactment of the Open Public Meetings Act – demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to allow tenured board-of-education employees the right – granted other public employees by N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) – to demand a public hearing. For that reason, defendant was not required to serve this tenured employee with a Rice notice, see Rice v. Union Cnty. Reg'l H.S. Bd. of Educ., 155 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 1977), which serves the purpose of advising public employees of their right to demand a public hearing via N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8).