NICOLE PICKET, ETC. VS, MOORE'S LOUNGE, ET AL. (L-5298-15, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-2330-17T2)

NICOLE PICKET, ETC. VS, MOORE'S LOUNGE, ET AL. (L-5298-15, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-2330-17T2)

In this insurance coverage case, the court interprets a policy provision that excludes damage claims "arising out of any act of 'assault' or 'battery' committed by any person," including claims "arising out of . . . any act or omission in connection with the prevention or suppression of such 'assault' or 'battery.'" The court concludes that the exclusion barred an insured tavern's demand for a defense and indemnification arising out of one patron's fatal shooting of another. Specifically, the exclusion encompassed claims by the estate of the deceased patron that the tavern negligently hired, trained, and retained staff, and negligently failed to maintain a place free of reasonably foreseeable criminal activity. Those claims related to acts or omissions in connection with preventing the assault or battery of the victim. In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished L.C.S., Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co., 371 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 2004).

Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark

 Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark (083197)(Essex County & Statewide) (A-15-19; 083197)

The Ordinance is sustained subject to the Court’s further modifications to comply with current legislative enactments. The Court concludes that state law permits the creation by ordinance of this civilian board with its overall beneficial oversight purpose. The Court holds that this review board can investigate citizen complaints alleging police misconduct, and those investigations may result in recommendations to the Public Safety Director for the pursuit of discipline against a police officer. In addition, the review board may conduct its oversight function by reviewing the overall operation of the police force, including the performance of its IA function in its totality or its pattern of conduct, and provide the called-for periodic reports to the officials and entities as prescribed by municipal ordinance. However, to the extent some investigatory powers that the City wishes to confer on its oversight board conflict with existing state law, the Court modifies the Appellate Division’s judgment. The board cannot exercise its investigatory powers when a concurrent investigation is conducted by the Newark Police Department’s IA unit. An investigation by the IA unit is a function carefully regulated by law, and such an investigation must operate under the statutory supervision of the police chief and comply with procedures established by Newark’s Public Safety Director and the mandatory guidelines established by the Attorney General. Concurrent investigations would interfere with the police chief’s statutory responsibility over the IA function, and the review board’s separate investigatory proceedings would be in conflict with specific requirements imposed on IA investigations and their results. The Court also invalidates the conferral of subpoena power on this review board.

Amy Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc. (A-86-18;

 Amy Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc. (082509)(Mercer County & Statewide) (A-86-18; 082509)

Pfizer’s Agreement and related communications informed Skuse that if she remained a Pfizer employee more than sixty days from her receipt of that Agreement, she was deemed to assent to it. Those communications clearly and unmistakably explained the rights that Skuse would waive by agreeing to arbitration, thus complying with waiver-of-rights case law, and Pfizer’s delivery of the Agreement by e-mail did not warrant its invalidation. Pfizer’s use of the word “acknowledge” was appropriate in the circumstances of this case, given the terms of Pfizer’s arbitration policy and other expressions of assent that immediately preceded that request. Pfizer should not have labeled its communication explaining its arbitration agreement a “training module” or training “activity,” but that is not a basis to invalidate the Agreement. The Agreement was valid and binding, and the Court concurs with the trial court’s decision to enforce it.

In the Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education (A-2-19

In the Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education (083091) (Statewide) (A-2-19; 083091)

The health insurance premium contribution rates paid by the Association’s members were preempted by statute and therefore non-negotiable. PERC’s construction of Chapter 78 comports with the statute’s language and the Legislature’s stated objective to achieve a long-term solution to a fiscal crisis.

SYNCHRONY BANK v. APRIL DANIELS (DC-004705-16)

 SYNCHRONY BANK v. APRIL DANIELS (DC-004705-16)

A levy was placed on a bank account belonging to defendant judgment-debtor. Defendant objected to the levy on the grounds that the only money in the account was from the part of defendant’s wages that were exempt from a wage garnishment. The question presented is whether a levy can be made on money deposited in a bank account from wages that were previously subject to garnishment. Based on the applicable statutes, the court found that previously garnished wages deposited in a bank account does not exempt the money from levy.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, by the COMMISSIONER OF TRANSPORTATION VS. ST. MARY'S CHURCH, ET AL. (L-3076-10, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4452-18T3)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, by the COMMISSIONER OF TRANSPORTATION VS. ST. MARY'S CHURCH, ET AL. (L-3076-10, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4452-18T3)

The court considers whether interest on a jury award of compensation for the condemnation of property by the Commissioner, Department of Transportation (Commissioner), is subject to the fixed six percent per annum interest rate established in N.J.S.A. 27:7-22. The court held that N.J.S.A. 27:7-22, which applies only when property is condemned by the Commissioner, was impliedly repealed by the subsequently enacted N.J.S.A. 20:3-50. That provision of the Eminent Domain Act of 1971 established uniform standards for the condemnation of property by all State entities. Because of the implied repeal of N.J.S.A. 27:7-22, interest on an award of compensation for the condemnation of property by the Commissioner must be determined in accordance with N.J.S.A. 20:3-32. That statute vests in the trial court broad discretion to establish an interest rate based on evidentiary submissions. This discretion includes the authority to determine when the rate of interest should be simple or compound.

CAROLYN REPKO VS. OUR LADY OF LOURDES MEDICAL CENTER, INC. (L-3559-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(A-2181-19T1)

 CAROLYN REPKO VS. OUR LADY OF LOURDES MEDICAL CENTER, INC. (L-3559-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(A-2181-19T1)

The court considers, on leave granted, the denial of defendant Our Lady of Lourdes Medical Center, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the complaint filed in the name of plaintiff Carolyn Repko ten months after her death and granting the motion of her estate to amend the complaint to substitute itself as plaintiff after the running of the statute of limitations. Because a complaint by a dead person is a nullity, leaving nothing for an amended complaint to "relate back" to under Rule 4:9-3, the court reverses the denial of Lourdes' motion and remands for entry of an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice