NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES VS. D.S.H AND W.W. // IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF R.S.H. A-5723-10T1

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES VS. D.S.H AND W.W. // IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF R.S.H.

 A-5723-10T1

We reverse the termination of the mother's parental rights to her eight-year-old daughter, Rachel.  Although the mother’s estranged husband was dismissed from the litigation when a paternity test ruled him out as Rachel's biological father, we determine that he remains Rachel's legal father.  Thus it is not necessary to terminate the mother's parental rights to

facilitate an adoption by her estranged husband.  We view this decision as mandated by precedent and beneficial to all concerned. 4-12-12

Kenneth Van Dunk, Sr., et al. v. Reckson Associates Realty Corporation, et al. (A-69-10; 066949)

Kenneth Van Dunk, Sr., et al. v. Reckson Associates

Realty Corporation, et al. (A-69-10; 066949)

 In this case in which an employee is suing his employer for injuries sustained on the job, the employer’s conduct fell short of an intentional wrong creating a substantial certainty of bodily injury or death; therefore, the workers’ compensation statutory  bar against common-law tort actions precludes this action.  6-26-12

TALMAGE LORD VS. BOARD OF REVIEW, ET AL. A-1054-10T4

TALMAGE LORD VS. BOARD OF REVIEW, ET AL.

 A-1054-10T4

An employee who accepted his employer's directive that he

"had to resign" did not leave his employment "voluntarily" and

therefore is not disqualified under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) from

receiving unemployment compensation benefits. 04-11-12

ANWAR WALID, ET AL. VS. YOLANDA FOR IRENE COUTURE, INC., ET AL. A-3112-10T4

ANWAR WALID, ET AL. VS. YOLANDA FOR IRENE COUTURE,

INC., ET AL. 

 A-3112-10T4

We reviewed the Law Division's findings and conclusions

following a bench trial wherein it was held that plaintiffs

proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant sellers

of a business knowingly misrepresented the business's income

with the intent that plaintiffs rely thereon in buying the

business,  but failed to prove reasonable reliance upon such

misrepresentations.  We have clarified the principle of

reasonable reliance and determined that plaintiffs' proofs at

trial clearly and convincingly established reasonable reliance.

 We also concluded that a general integration clause in the

contract does not prevent the introduction of parol evidence in

an action based upon fraud in the inducement to contract. 04-05-12

JOYCE QUINLAN VS. CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION A-5728-06T1

JOYCE QUINLAN VS. CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION

 A-5728-06T1

In this employment case brought pursuant to the Law Against

Discrimination, we examine, at the Supreme Court's direction,

various open issues that were not previously resolved on appeal. 

See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 204 N.J. 239 (2010),

reversing in part Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 409 N.J.

Super. 193, 218 (App. Div. 2008).  

 Although we affirm the verdict in plaintiff's favor on

liability, we conclude that the trial court erred in instructing

the jury that the defendant employer bore the burden of proving

that plaintiff would fail to mitigate her damages in the future. 

In addition, the jury charge should have made clear that

plaintiff bore the specific burden of proving a reasonably

likely period of time that her loss of earnings would continue

into the future.  Because the jury's $3.65 million award in

future economic losses could have been affected by the flawed

instructions, we remand for a new trial on the issues of front

pay and other related damages. 

 

 We also refer to the Model Civil Jury Charge Committee a

request to develop a charge on front pay, including instructions

addressing these particular issues of reasonable duration and 

mitigation. 04-05-12

BOROUGH OF HARVEY CEDARS V. HARVEY KARAN AND PHYLLIS KARAN A-4555-10T3

BOROUGH OF HARVEY CEDARS V. HARVEY KARAN AND PHYLLIS

KARAN

 A-4555-10T3

 Plaintiff condemned an easement across defendants'

oceanfront property and constructed a huge dune that partially

blocked the previously unobstructed ocean view from their house.

Affirming the trial court, we held that construction of the dune

conferred a general rather than a special benefit on defendants'

property.  The resulting protection from storm damage was the

object of the dune project and was not different in kind from

the benefit conferred on the island as a whole, even if the

benefit to defendants' land might be somewhat greater than that

conferred on houses located further inland.  The trial judge

correctly held a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine whether

plaintiff's proffered evidence could establish a special benefit

or only a general benefit, and properly barred plaintiff from

placing before the jury evidence of general benefit. We declined

to disturb the verdict, which was based on defendants' claim

that, by blocking their ocean view, the dune diminished the value of their house. (*Approved for Publication date) 04-04-12

ALPHA BEAUTY DISTRIBUTORS, INC. VS. WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., ET AL. A-3111-10T2

ALPHA BEAUTY DISTRIBUTORS, INC. VS. WINN-DIXIE STORES,

INC., ET AL.

 A-3111-10T2

In this appeal, the court reviewed a dismissal of this

action based on plaintiff's failure in its Rule 4:5-1(b)(2)

certification to mention a pending federal action, which was

commenced by plaintiff and its majority shareholder against

other shareholders, as well as the entire controversy doctrine. 

In reversing, the court concluded that Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) was not

violated but, even if it was, dismissal represented an

inappropriate sanction.  The court also found the entire

controversy doctrine inapplicable because the core of the

federal action was a dispute between plaintiff's shareholders

and the action here sought the collection of debts allegedly due

from plaintiff's customers.  The court also held the entire

controversy doctrine was not equitably applied because the

defendants were not prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to join

them to the federal action and the interests of judicial economy

were not disserved because there was no likelihood of

duplication of effort or inconsistent determinations. 04-03-12