GEORGE C. RILEY VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD A-1004-09T1
Retroactive application of the Sex Offender Monitoring Act to persons who committed sex offenses before its enactment violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Dissent by Judge Parrillo. 9-22-11
In this product liability action, the trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motion and dismissed plaintiff's case after excluding plaintiff's expert report as a net opinion. We reverse because the deficiency in the expert's report was caused by the trial court's error in denying plaintiff the 450 days of discovery he is entitled to receive under Track III. R. 4:24-1(a).
Initially filed in the Law Division, the case was temporally removed to the United States District Court by one of the named defendants. The federal court thereafter granted plaintiff's motion to remand the case to the Law Division. Under the facts presented here, the Law Division erred by not tolling the running of the discovery period under Track III during the time the case was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. 9-09-11
We affirm the trial court's order of summary judgment in favor of defendants Timothy L. O'Brien, the author of the book TrumpNation, The Art of Being The Donald, and his publishers, determining that Trump failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that O'Brien acted with actual malice when he reported that three unnamed sources had estimated Trump's net worth as between $150 million and $250 million, not the $5 to $6 billion that Trump claimed. In doing so, we focus principally on when an inference of actual malice may arise when an allegedly false report is published solely in reliance on confidential sources. 9-07-11
In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs challenge provisions in their respective auto insurance policies excluding coverage for the diminution in the value of their autos damaged as a result of vehicular mishaps. Plaintiffs claim the exclusion provisions are ambiguous, contrary to the reasonable expectations of insureds, unconscionable, and also contrary to public policy.
We conclude the exclusion provisions are specific, plain, and clear, and provide no basis for plaintiffs to reasonably expect that diminution-in-value coverage is included in the policies. Additionally, we hold that exclusion of diminution- in-value coverage is not contrary to public policy. 8-30-11
This case involved a public employee who appealed from the final decision of the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System, which denied her application for deferred retirement benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-38. We determined that the Board erred in ruling that appellant'sdeferred retirement benefits were forfeited as a result of her conviction of two counts of assault by auto. We conclude that where the removal from employment for cause is based on charges of misconduct or delinquency not related to the employee's official duties, the public employee is entitled to his or her vested deferred retirement allowance. 8-30-11
Although the employment relationship is a factor to be considered, Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 511 (1998), the elements of proof on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, in accordance with Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Society, 111 N.J. 355, 366 (1988), are not altered by the "power dynamics of the workplace." Plaintiff's evidence that defendant supervisor directed her to remove pictures and ballet slippers of her deceased teenage daughter from her cubicle at work, and that she not talk about her daughter to co-workers, did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, "to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Also, plaintiff's evidence was not sufficient to prove that the employer acted intentionally or recklessly to cause her emotional distress. 8-25-11
Plaintiff was injured in a car accident while being driven to a school-sponsored track meet by a fellow student-athlete. He sued the track coach, Holy Spirit High School, and the Catholic diocese of Camden, claiming these defendants failed to provide him with a safe means of transportation to the school- sponsored event and, under principles of agency, were vicariously liable for the driver's negligence.
By leave granted from the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the Charitable Immunity Act, we hold that the exemption to immunity provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c)(2) applies only to a "trustee, director, officer, employee, agent, servant or volunteer" of a charitable entity who causes "damage as the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle." By its plain and clear language, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c)(2) does not vitiate the immunity otherwise granted by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a) to an associated charitable entity. 8-18-11