MARISOL RAJI VS. ALFONSO SAUCEDO, ET AL. (DC-008329-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1629-18T1)

MARISOL RAJI VS. ALFONSO SAUCEDO, ET AL. (DC-008329-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1629-18T1)

In considering the nature of a "pay-and-go" consent judgment, which resolved a summary dispossess action, and the judgment's impact on later-asserted claims for damages, we hold that by entering into such a consent judgment the parties entered into an accord and satisfaction and thereby finally resolved all the known claims arising out of the tenancy. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's rejection of the tenants' counterclaim in the landlord's subsequent action for enforcement of the pay-and-go judgment because the counterclaim was based on a claim then known to the tenants that they should have raised during the negotiations that led to the pay-and-go judgment.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON VS. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, ET AL. (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) (A-5423-17T3)

JOHNSON & JOHNSON VS. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, ET AL. (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) (A-5423-17T3)

In this appeal, we address the issue of whether, following the Legislature's 2011 amendment of N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64, plaintiff Johnson & Johnson (J&J) was required to pay an insurance premium tax (IPT) based upon all the risks it insured throughout the United States or based upon only those risks localized in New Jersey. Because both before and after the 2011 amendment, N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64 provided that IPT was to be calculated at the rate of "5% of the gross amount of such premium" paid for insurance procured "upon a subject of insurance resident, located or to be performed within [New Jersey]," we conclude that J&J's IPT obligation should have continued to be based solely upon the risks it insured that were located within New Jersey, rather than upon the total United States premium for the applicable coverage policies. Accordingly, we reverse the Tax Court's contrary interpretation of the statute which is at odds with the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64, and remand for further proceedings.

Barbara Orientale v. Darrin L. Jennings (079953) (Middlesex County and Statewide) (A-43-17;

Barbara Orientale v. Darrin L. Jennings (079953) (Middlesex County and Statewide) (A-43-17; 079953)

The Court brings the use of remittitur and additur in line with basic notions of fair play and equity. When a damages award is deemed a miscarriage of justice requiring the grant of a new trial, then the acceptance of a damages award fixed by the judge must be based on the mutual consent of the parties. Going forward, in those rare instances when a trial judge determines that a damages award is either so grossly excessive or grossly inadequate that the grant of a new damages trial is justified, the judge has the option of setting a remittitur or an additur at an amount that a reasonable jury would award given the evidence in the case. Setting the figure at an amount a reasonable jury would award -- an amount that favors neither side -- is intended to give the competing parties the greatest incentive to reach agreement. If both parties accept the remittitur or additur, then the case is settled; if not, a new trial on damages must proceed before a jury.

CLEMENTINE BATA V. GEORGE KONAN (FD-07-00767-19)

CLEMENTINE BATA V. GEORGE KONAN (FD-07-00767-19)

This matter comes before the court on plaintiff’s application and defendant’s counterclaim. In her application, plaintiff seeks, among other things, an initial custody determination concerning the parties’ minor child. In his counterclaim, defendant opposes plaintiff’s application and contests jurisdiction. Plaintiff, the child’s natural mother, resides in New Jersey. Defendant, the child’s natural father, resides in New York.

DAVID SCOTT LANDAU VS. STACY LANDAU (FM-14-1196-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1240-18T4)

DAVID SCOTT LANDAU VS. STACY LANDAU (FM-14-1196-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1240-18T4)

The question presented by this appeal, here on leave granted, is whether the changed circumstances standard of Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980), continues to apply to a motion to suspend or terminate alimony based on cohabitation following the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n). We determine the party seeking modification still has the burden of showing the changed circumstance of cohabitation so as to warrant relief from an alimony obligation, see Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 353 (1956), and hold the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute did not alter the requirement that "[a] prima facie showing of changed circumstances must be made before a court will order discovery of an ex-spouse's financial status." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157. Because the trial court ordered discovery in this case without a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, we reverse.

Donna Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Company(081602)(Middlesex County and Statewide) (A-16-18;

Donna Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Company(081602)(Middlesex County and Statewide) (A-16-18; 081602)

The excerpts from the settling defendants’ interrogatory answers and corporate representative depositions were admissible as statements against interest under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). Those statements, in combination with other evidence presented at trial, gave rise to a prima facie showing that the settling defendants bore some fault in this matter. The trial court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether a percentage of fault should be apportioned to the settling defendants.

DAVID SCOTT LANDAU VS. STACY LANDAU (FM-14-1196-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1240-18T4)

DAVID SCOTT LANDAU VS. STACY LANDAU (FM-14-1196-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1240-18T4) The question presented by this appeal, here on leave granted, is whether the changed circumstances standard of Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980), continues to apply to a motion to suspend or terminate alimony based on cohabitation following the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n). We determine the party seeking modification still has the burden of showing the changed circumstance of cohabitation so as to warrant relief from an alimony obligation, see Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 353 (1956), and hold the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute did not alter the requirement that "[a] prima facie showing of changed circumstances must be made before a court will order discovery of an ex-spouse's financial status." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157. Because the trial court ordered discovery in this case without a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, we reverse.