DCPP VS. T.D., R.C. AND R.G., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.G., B.C. AND A.G. (FG-20-0040-13, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-4918-15T1/A-4923-15T1)

DCPP VS. T.D., R.C. AND R.G., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.G., B.C. AND A.G. (FG-20-0040-13, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-4918-15T1/A-4923-15T1)

The New Jersey Division Of Child Protection and Permanency (Division), and the Law Guardian on behalf of the two young children, appeal from the Family Part's order denying termination of parental rights following an extended eighteen-month trial at which twelve witnesses testified and hundreds of exhibits were admitted into evidence. This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of T.D., a mother suffering from multiple sclerosis and R.C., the father of her two youngest children, born in 2012 and 2014, and removed from the care of their parents shortly after birth. The trial judge found, in particular, that the Division did not provide meaningful services to the mother, who uses a wheelchair. Considering the limited standard of review of a decision not to terminate parental rights, we affirm.

FELICIA PUGLIESE VS. STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, ESSEX COUNTY EDGARD CHAVEZ VS. STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, ESSEX COUNTY (COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION)(CONSOLIDATED) (A-3689-15T1/A-5527-15T1)

FELICIA PUGLIESE VS. STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, ESSEX COUNTY EDGARD CHAVEZ VS. STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, ESSEX COUNTY (COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION)(CONSOLIDATED) (A-3689-15T1/A-5527-15T1)

In Pugliese v. State-Operated School District of City of Newark, 440 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2015), the court vacated and remanded for reconsideration anew an arbitrator's award sustaining tenure charges against appellants. In this appeal, the court had to construe N.J.S.A. 18A:6-14 and determine what impact its decision to remand had on the suspended educators' entitlement to back pay while the remand was pending. The statute provides for an educator's suspension without pay for 120 days or until the issuance of a final determination of the disputed tenure charges, whichever is sooner. If the matter is not resolved within 120 days, compensation must resume until a determination is reached. In this case, the court concluded that the entitlement to compensation after 120 days continues under the statute despite the fact there was an initial award terminating employment that was vacated and remanded, without a dismissal of the tenure charges.

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, ETC. VS. STEVEN LONEGAN (L-2169-11, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(A-1767-16T3)

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, ETC. VS. STEVEN LONEGAN (L-2169-11, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(A-1767-16T3)

In this case, we affirm the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's qui tam complaint which alleged defendant Steven Lonegan violated the New Jersey False Claims Act (FCA), N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-1 to -18, by submitting a false statement in a request for public campaign funds. Although the trial court dismissed on other grounds, we affirm the grant of summary judgment because we hold plaintiff lacks standing to bring the FCA complaint. We conclude the record clearly shows plaintiff is not the original source of the information supporting the allegations in his complaint.

NRG REMA LLC, ET AL. VS. CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS CORP., ET AL. CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS CORP. VS. NRG REMA LLC, ET AL. (L-3587-1

NRG REMA LLC, ET AL. VS. CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS CORP., ET AL. CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS CORP. VS. NRG REMA LLC, ET AL. (L-3587-15 AND L-0344-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-5432-15T3/A-0567-16T3)

In these appeals, the court reviewed orders compelling arbitration because the automobile sales contracts executed by plaintiffs included an agreement to arbitrate all disputes. Although the record revealed disputed facts about contract-formation issues that the trial courts must be resolved before arbitration may be compelled, the court also recognized there was no dispute that the parties mutually agreed to rescind those sales contracts. Consequently, among other things, the court held that the trial judges erred in compelling arbitration of any claims relating to the agreements to rescind, which did not contain arbitration provisions. The orders under review were reversed and both cases remanded for trial court proceedings to determine, among other things, whether plaintiffs' claims were based on the sales contracts or on the agreements to rescind.

SAVE CAMDEN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ET AL. VS. CAMDEN CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-1552-16,

SAVE CAMDEN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ET AL. VS. CAMDEN CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-1552-16, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0133-16T2)

In this appeal the court interprets two statutes concerning the right of Camden citizens to vote on the classification of their school district. That vote will determine whether members of the Camden City Board of Education (Board) are elected or appointed by the mayor. Plaintiffs contend that a vote on that issue was required in April 2014, under a 2010 amendment to the Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery Act (MRERA), N.J.S.A. 52:27BBB-63.1(c). Defendants counter that because the school district was placed into full State intervention in 2013, the classification vote is not required until the district satisfies certain performance indicators under the Quality Single Accountability Continuum Act (QSAC), N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-49(e). MRERA and QSAC contain provisions that set forth different frameworks for school district classification votes.

The court holds that the 2010 amendment to MRERA governs because its language is clear in granting Camden citizens the right to a school district classification vote, and nothing in QSAC restricts that right. Granting Camden citizens the right to a school district classification vote does not interfere with the State's full intervention because the Board will continue to serve in an advisory role until the conditions of QSAC are satisfied. Accordingly, the trial court's August 15, 2016 order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint is reversed. The case is remanded with direction that the trial court conduct a hearing within thirty days to determine when the school district classification vote will be held.

JANELL GOFFE VS. FOULKE MANAGEMENT CORP., ET AL. SASHA ROBINSON, ET AL. VS. MALL CHEVROLET, INC. (L-4162-16

JANELL GOFFE VS. FOULKE MANAGEMENT CORP., ET AL. SASHA ROBINSON, ET AL. VS. MALL CHEVROLET, INC. (L-4162-16 AND L-4122-16, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-2658-16T4/A-2659-16T4)

In these appeals, the court reviewed orders compelling arbitration because the automobile sales contracts executed by plaintiffs included an agreement to arbitrate all disputes. Although the record revealed disputed facts about contract-formation issues that the trial courts must be resolved before arbitration may be compelled, the court also recognized there was no dispute that the parties mutually agreed to rescind those sales contracts. Consequently, among other things, the court held that the trial judges erred in compelling arbitration of any claims relating to the agreements to rescind, which did not contain arbitration provisions. The orders under review were reversed and both cases remanded for trial court proceedings to determine, among other things, whether plaintiffs' claims were based on the sales contracts or on the agreements to rescind

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Rochelle Hendricks ( (A-22-16

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Rochelle Hendricks (  (A-22-16; 077885)  Judicial review is premature because factual disputes require resolution before the Secretary can make a properly informed decision on the grant applications. Because an informed administrative decision could not have been made without the benefit of a proper record, the matter is remanded to the Secretary, in order that a contested case proceeding be conducted prior to the ultimate administrative decision of the Secretary concerning the challenged grants