PATRICIA SOLIMAN ET AL. VS. THE KUSHNER COMPANIES, INC, ET AL. A-5397-10T2

 PATRICIA SOLIMAN ET AL. VS. THE KUSHNER COMPANIES, INC, ET AL.

A-5397-10T2

This appeal involves four consolidated law suits brought by employees of tenants and members of their families, including minors, against the landlord and managers of this commercial office building, as well as a number of other companies responsible for installing and maintaining video monitoring and recording equipment intentionally concealed inside smoke detectors in four public bathrooms, two male and two female. Plaintiffs allege intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, common law invasion of privacy, and invasion of privacy under N.J.S.A. 2C:58D-1(b). They seek common law compensatory damages, punitive damages under the Punitive Damages Act, and statutory damages under N.J.S.A. 2C:58D-1(c).

The Law Division granted defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' cause of action as a matter of law. We reverse the Law Division's order dismissing the counts in their complaints grounded on invasion of privacy. As a threshold issue, plaintiffs must show defendants' actions to clandestinely monitor their activities in a gender-restricted bathroom is subject to liability because it is the type of intrusion that a reasonable person would find to be highly offensive.

Consistent with the approach endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Rumbauskas v. Cantor, 138 N.J. 173 (1995), we also hold that a plaintiff in a cause of action predicated on the tort of invasion of privacy, grounded in the subcategory of "invasion of intrusion on the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion," which includes the

characteristics of unconsented prying, may recover compensatory damages for "personal hardships," similar in kind and scope to those codified in N.J.S.A. 10:5-3, if plaintiffs can show a causal link between defendants' intrusion and these "personal hardships." 10-17-13










 

KELLY GREENE VS. AIG CASUALTY COMPANY

KELLY GREENE VS. AIG CASUALTY COMPANY
 A-2990-12T3

We held that defendant had the right to present expert
testimony concerning his heroin addiction and withdrawal
symptoms and the potential impact of his physical and
psychological condition on the reliability of his
confession. The expert may explain how heroin withdrawal
could have affected the defendant during the police
interrogation, but may not opine that the defendant's
confession was unreliable or was false, because such
testimony would usurp the jury's role. While the expert
may rely in part on hearsay to explain his opinions,
N.J.R.E. 703, there must be some legally competent evidence
that defendant was in fact suffering from withdrawal at the
time he made the confession. 10-16-13

ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. VS. GREGORIO LAJARA, ET AL. A-5684-11T4

ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. VS.

GREGORIO LAJARA, ET AL.

A-5684-11T4

In this interlocutory appeal, we affirm the trial court's order striking a jury demand in a private civil action under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30. We previously held that a right to trial by jury does not apply to a civil action under the Act by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance. State v. Sailor, 355 N.J. Super. 315, 323-24 (App. Div. 2001).

We analyze the statute in view of established principles of statutory construction, and reject defendants' argument that the Act impliedly establishes a right to a jury trial. We distinguish Zorba Contractors, Inc. v. Housing Authority of Newark, 362 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2003), which found an implied jury trial right under the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -109. We also conclude that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury under the fraud prevention law because the equitable nature of the statutory right to relief was unknown at common law before adoption of the State Constitutions. 10-09-13

Anthony D’Agostino v. Ricardo Maldonado (068940; A-82/83-11)

Anthony D’Agostino v. Ricardo Maldonado

(068940; A-82/83-11)

Maldonado’s execution of the transaction at issue gave rise to an unconscionable commercial practice under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. Notwithstanding the trial court’s

restoration of plaintiffs’ equity in their home, the transfer of that equity to Maldonado constituted an ascertainable loss within the meaning of N.J.S.A.

56:8-19, and the trial court’s determination of damages was within its discretion. 10-3-13

I/M/O NEW JERSEY D.E.P. CONDITIONAL HIGHLANDS APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION,PROGRAM INTEREST NO. 435434 A-3236-10T1

I/M/O NEW JERSEY D.E.P. CONDITIONAL HIGHLANDS 

APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION,PROGRAM INTEREST NO. 435434 

A-3236-10T1 

This appeal arises from the second challenge to JCP&L's construction of a 230 kV/12.5 kV electrical substation in Tewksbury Township by the Friends of Fairmount Historic District (FFHD). In its last appeal, FFHD appealed from a final determination of the Board of Public Utilities that the substation was necessary to address repeated power outages in Tewksbury caused by an increased demand and we affirmed. In this case, FFHD appeals from a final agency decision of the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which determined that the construction of the substation was exempt from the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act (the Highlands Act), N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to -35, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11). That exemption applies to "the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines . . . by a public utility . . . ." We affirm. 09-26-13 

IMO Advisory Letter No. 3-11 and Opinion No. 12-08 of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Extrajudicial Activities

IMO Advisory Letter No. 3-11 and Opinion No. 12-08 of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Extrajudicial Activities (A-23-10/A-26-11; 066271) 

The judge’s acting and comedy career is incompatible with the Code of Judicial Conduct and therefore he may not serve as a municipal court judge while continuing with that career. 9-19-13  

In the Matter of the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing

In the Matter of the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing 

(A-90/91/92/93/94-10; 067126) 

The Third Round Rules are at odds with the FHA, which incorporated the Mount Laurel II remedy. Although that remedy imposed thirty years ago should not be viewed as a constitutional straightjacket to legislative innovation of a new remedy responsive to the constitutional obligation, the FHA remains the current framework controlling COAH’s actions. With respect to the current version of the FHA, the Third Round Rules are ultra vires. 9-26-13