Y.H. AND K.W.C. VS. T.C., ET AL

 In this interlocutory appeal, the court considered the protective breadth of the Expungement of Records statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -31.1 (the expungement statute), against the statutory provisions regulating Transportation Network Companies N.J.S.A. 39:5H-1 to -27 (the TNC statute), where a conviction for aggravated assault bars employment as a rideshare driver and Uber's potential culpability under a theory of negligent hiring or employment.  T.C., an Uber driver, had a previous conviction for aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer.  Uber had knowledge of T.C.'s prior conviction for aggravated assault—in the form of the two background checks—for some period of time prior to the entry of an order of expungement. 

The court addressed the narrow issue of whether the expungement gives T.C.'s employer the ability to assert T.C.'s rights so as to imply ignorance of the prior assault conviction.  The court read N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19 to prevent the evidence of an expunged record to be used against the person for whom the expungement is meant to benefit: the recipient of the expungement.  The court does not read N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19 to give instant cover to third parties without further examination of that third-party's conduct, duty and responsibility in a negligent hiring claim.  The court remanded for further development of the record.

NORMA DAVIS VS. DISABILITY RIGHTS NEW JERSEY,

 In these appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated to issue a single opinion, the court granted plaintiff Norma Davis leave to challenge two separate Law Division discovery orders arising from her lawsuit alleging that defendants Disability Rights New Jersey, Gwen Orlowski, and Ellen Catanese terminated her employment in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.  The orders were stayed pending these appeals. 

In A-0269-22, the trial court order (cell phone record order) granted in part and denied in part plaintiff's motion to quash defendants' subpoena to her cellular provider seeking her cell phone records.  Plaintiff used her cell phone to perform her work duties while allowed to work from home.  The order required plaintiff:  (1) to produce a redacted copy of her personal cell phone records indicating work-related calls and texts made and received during her normal workday from January 1, 2018 to January 31, 2020; and (2) to submit to the court a copy of the redacted records provided to defendants, as well as a Vaughn[1] index of an unredacted copy of the records showing all calls and texts made and received during that period.  National Employment Lawyers Association/New Jersey (NELA) filed an amicus brief in support of plaintiff.

In A-0270-22, the trial court order (social media posts order) granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to compel plaintiff to provide copies of her private social media posts, profiles, and comments (collectively "social media posts" or "social media content") from January 1, 2020 to August 29, 2022, depicting an emotion, attaching a picture of herself, or mentioning:  Disability Rights or her lawsuit's allegations; her vacations or celebrations; her being ill or worrying about being ill; and her work.  NELA and New Jersey Association of Justice (NJAJ) filed amicus briefs in support of plaintiff. 

The court is unpersuaded by plaintiff's and amici's arguments that the trial judge abused his discretion in entering orders which abridged her privacy interests.  The court concludes the judge appropriately considered plaintiff's privacy interests in her social media posts and cell phone bills and did not err in allowing defendants' discovery of limited private social media posts and cell phone bills to defend against her claims that her termination violated the LAD, causing her emotional distress.  The court, however, remands for the judge to add the requirement in the social media posts order –– similar to the cell phone record order –– that plaintiff submit a redacted copy of her private social media posts to defendants and the trial court as well as an unredacted copy of the posts with a Vaughn index to the trial court.

Harold Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp

 The Court concurs with the Appellate Division that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it set the reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel’s work, assessed the number of hours reasonably expended by plaintiff’s counsel in pretrial proceedings and at trial, reduced the lodestar because of plaintiff’s limited success and other factors, and determined plaintiff’s application for an award of costs.

Kevin Malanga v. Township of West Orange

 Like many older buildings, the Library needed improvements in a number of areas. But the record did not establish that it suffered from obsolescence, faulty arrangement, or obsolete layout in a way that harmed the welfare of the community. To designate property for redevelopment under the LRHL, a municipality must demonstrate that certain specified problems exist and that they cause actual detriment or harm. There is insufficient evidence in the record to meet that standard. The designation of the Library as an area in need of redevelopment is invalid.

Woodbridge Library Wills, Estate Planning & Probate Seminar

 

Woodbridge Library

Wills, Estate Planning & Probate Seminar

April 18 at 6:30 p.m.

 

This event will take place in-person at the Woodbridge Main Library.

Free program open to the public, you do not need to be a Township resident to attend.

 

WILLS & ESTATE ADMINISTRATION-PROTECT YOUR FAMILY AND MAKE PLANNING EASY

SPEAKER: Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Edison, NJ (Author- Wills and Estate Administration by the ABA)

            New Main Topics:

1.    Administering the Estate/Probate/Surrogate

2.    Dangers if you have no will or documents invalid

3.    Getting your Estate Planning documents done when you can’t go into a law office

4.    What goes into a Will

5.    Power of Attorneys recommendations

6.    Living Will & Advance Directive for Medical Care

7.    Avoiding unnecessary expenses and saving your family money

 

Link to register online

 

https://woodbridgelibrary.evanced.info/signup/

For questions about registration to this program please contact

Najea Grimes Library Associate

Woodbridge Public Library George Frederick Plaza

Woodbridge, NJ 07095 732-634-4450 ext. 7117

ngrimes@woodbridgelibrary.org

JANAN PFANNENSTEIN, ET AL. VS. CHRISTINE SURREY, D.O.

 At issue in this medical negligence matter is the kind-for-kind specialty requirement embodied in the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patients First Act (PFA), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-37 to -42.  This appeal requires the court to determine whether the affidavit of merit (AOM) of a board-certified hematology expert satisfied the PFA's equivalency requirement where neither defendant doctor specialized, nor was board certified, in hematology when they rendered care to the decedent.  Instead, both defendants specialized in internal medicine at the time of the alleged treatment, and one was board certified in that specialty, but plaintiff's proffered expert did not specialize in internal medicine.  The trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to provide a sufficient AOM, essentially concluding the affiant's hematology subspecialty was "subsumed" in defendants' internal medicine specialty and, as such, the affiant was qualified to opine that defendants deviated from the standards of medical care by improperly prescribing heparin to the decedent.

The court granted defendants leave to appeal from the April 14, 2022 Law Division order.  The court holds the PFA's kind-for-kind specialty requirement embodied in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) is not satisfied when the AOM's affiant specialized in a subspecialty of the treating doctor's specialty but did not specialize, nor was board certified, in the physician's specialty when the alleged medical negligence occurred.  The court therefore concludes plaintiff failed to satisfy the PFA's equivalency requirements and reverse the trial court's order denying defendants' dismissal motion.  In doing so, the court rejects plaintiff's alternate argument that she satisfied the waiver exception to the PFA under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(c), which would have rendered moot defendants' appeal.

GEORGE CASTANO VS. WENDELL D. AUGUSTINE, ET AL

 The court granted defendants leave to appeal from the Law Division's orders denying summary judgment and reconsideration.  Plaintiff was injured while driving his motorcycle when defendants' tractor trailer pulled into plaintiff's lane of travel.  Plaintiff admitted having several drinks throughout the day and that he was speeding at the time of the accident, but, at his deposition, equivocated as to whether he was intoxicated.  Blood was drawn at the hospital, and defendants' expert extrapolated from that sample that plaintiff's BAC at the time of the accident was between .159 and .162.  Police issued no motor vehicle summonses to plaintiff.

In moving for summary judgment, defendants relied upon N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b), which provides:

Any person who is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, operating a motor vehicle in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50, [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a], or a similar statute from any other jurisdiction, in connection with an accident, shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of the accident.

[(Emphasis added).]

The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that the statute did not apply to plaintiff because he was not convicted of DWI and also because there were material disputed facts as to whether plaintiff was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident.

The court affirmed, agreeing with the motion judge that there were material factual disputes as to plaintiff's state of intoxication at the time of the accident.  More importantly, the court concluded the plain language of the statute denied a cause of action only to those plaintiffs actually convicted of DWI. 

LEONOR ALCANTARA, ET AL. VS. ANGELICA ALLEN-MCMILLAN, E

 Appellants, parents of children enrolled in the Lakewood Public School District (District or Lakewood), filed a petition alleging the District was not providing its public-school students a thorough and efficient education as required by our State's Constitution.  N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1.  They contend this is due to the failure of the New Jersey Department of Education (DOE) to adequately fund the District.  To that end, they assert the School Funding Reform Act (SFRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -70, which sets certain standards for the DOE, is unconstitutional as applied to Lakewood.  The record demonstrates Lakewood's school district is in a unique and precarious position.  Due, in large part, to demographic trends in the area.  Lakewood Township has seen a population rise in recent decades, primarily resulting from a thriving Orthodox Jewish community.  As a result of this demographic shift, the township has approximately 37,000 school-aged children, however, only about 6,000 are enrolled in the secular public schools.  The majority—eighty-four percent—are enrolled in private religious schools.  Testimony before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) established this demographic trend is likely to continue and accelerate.

Like other districts, Lakewood's state-issued school aid is calculated based upon its 6,000 enrolled public-school students.  The total budget for the most recent school year at the time of that decision was $143.45 million.  Of that, over half—$78 million—went to transportation and special education tuition for non-public students.  This is an abnormal and unsustainable imbalance.  The court concluded the record generated before the ALJ cannot fairly be said to support a finding Lakewood's students are receiving a constitutionally sound education.

The court held the Commissioner utilized an incorrect standard in rejecting the ALJ's finding, and further held the Commissioner owed appellants a thorough review of their substantive argument:  the funding structure of the SFRA was unconstitutional as applied to Lakewood's unique demographic situation.  The court reversed and remanded for the agency to consider the substantive arguments pertaining to SFRA in light of our Supreme Court's previous directive in Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 199 N.J. 140, 146 (2009):  the State has a continuing obligation to "keep SFRA operating at its optimal level" and "[t]here should be no doubt that we would require remediation of any deficiencies of a constitutional dimension, if such problems do emerge." 

KRISTIN K. M. STRICKLAND, ET AL. VS. FOULKE MANAGEMENT, CORP

      In this matter arising out of the purchase of a vehicle, the court considered whether parties may expand the scope of judicial review of an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16.  The agreement here contained a clause that permitted a court to review an arbitrator's award for errors of New Jersey law.  Guided by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), the court concluded that when the FAA controls an arbitration agreement, its vacatur terms are exclusive and cannot be modified by contract.  Therefore, the pertinent clause in the arbitration agreement is unenforceable and severable from the remainder of the agreement.  The court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint seeking to vacate the arbitration award.

CHRISTOPHER MAIA, ET AL. VS. IEW CONSTRUCTION GROUP (L-1842-22,

 

     On April 13, 2022, plaintiffs, individually and as representatives of a proposed class, filed a complaint seeking relief under the Wage Payment Law (WPL) and the Wage and Hour Law (WHL), alleging defendant failed to pay them for pre- and post-shift work.  Defendant moved to partially dismiss the complaint, arguing plaintiffs sought the retroactive application of L. 2019, c. 212 (Chapter 212), which became effective August 6, 2019.  
     Chapter 212 amended both statutes, permitting employees to seek liquidated damages equal to 200% of the wrongfully withheld wages.  Additionally, Chapter 212 permitted successful WPL claimants to recover counsel fees and costs, previously allowed only under the WHL.  And, Chapter 212 extended the "look-back" period under the WHL, i.e., that period of time for which an employee could seek unlawfully withheld wages, from two to six years, prior to the "commencement" of the action in court.  The WPL has never had a similar provision, and Chapter 212 did not amend the WPL in this regard.
     The Law Division judge granted defendant's motion dismissing plaintiffs' WPL and WHL claim based on violations that occurred prior to August 6, 2019.  The court granted leave to appeal and reversed.
     Relying largely on the Court's recent decision in W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506 (2023), the court held that plaintiffs were entitled to the statutory remedies available as of the date they "commenced" their action in court.  See W.S., 252  N.J.  522 ("Applying the law in effect at the time a complaint is filed . . . is not applying a statute retroactively; it is applying a statute prospectively to cases filed after its effective date.").  The court also held that based on the legislative history of Chapter 212, the Legislature clearly intended to permit a six-year look back period under the WPL.   

NASIR MEMUDU, ETC. VS. JOSHUA M. GONZALEZ, ET AL. (L-8102-20,

     This appeal raises the novel issue of whether the statutory bar set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) precludes plaintiff's wrongful death and survivor claims stemming from the second of two separate motor vehicle accidents occurring a half hour apart at the same location, the latter of which resulted in the death of the uninsured driver as he attempted to retrieve a cell phone from his disabled vehicle.  In considering this question, the court addressed whether decedent was "operating" his uninsured vehicle at the time of the second accident for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).  The court further distinguished Perrelli v. Pastorelle, where the Supreme Court determined the statutory bar to recovering damages under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) applied to the owner of an uninsured vehicle, even where the owner was injured while a passenger in the vehicle.  206 N.J. 193, 208 (2011).  The court ultimately concluded the statutory bar pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) was not implicated because decedent was not operating his vehicle.

Highland Park-Wills & Power of Attorney Seminar

 

Wills & Power of Attorney Seminar -PROTECT YOUR

FAMILY AND MAKE PLANNING EASY

Highland Park Office of Aging

March 8, 2023 at 2:30pm Free community program

 

Open to the public. You do not need to be a resident to attend

SPEAKER: Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Edison, NJ (Author- Wills and Estate Administration by the ABA)

Main Topics:

1. Administering the Estate/Probate/

2. Dangers if You Have No Will or Documents Invalid 

3. Getting your estate planning documents done when you can’t go into a law office

4. What goes into a will                                                                        

5.  Power of Attorneys recommendations                                                      

6.  Living Will & Advance Directive for Medical Care

7. Avoiding Unnecessary expenses and saving your family money

                                                                                                         

COMPLIMENTARY MATERIAL: Brochures on Wills, "Answers to Questions about Probate" and Administration of an Estate, Power of Attorney, Living Wills, Real Estate Sales for Seniors, and Trusts.

   Free but registration requested

Highland Park Senior Center

220 South 6^th Ave.

Highland Park, NJ 08904

Fee: no cost

 

 For additional information, call the Highland Park Office of Aging  732-819-0052

Nicole Huff nhuff@hpboro.com

 

https://www.facebook.com/events/2030889920569304/