ROBERT ALAM VS. AMERIBUILT CONTRACTORS (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION)

 ROBERT ALAM VS. AMERIBUILT CONTRACTORS (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION)

Ameribuilt Contractors appeals the workers' compensation judge's February 1, 2022 order rejecting a proposed settlement and disqualifying its assigned insurance counsel, Brown & Connery, LLP (B&C), on the basis of a perceived conflict between Ameribuilt's workers' compensation carrier, Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co. (Travelers), and Travelers' ostensible insured, respondent Robert Alam.  The court concludes that the judge erred in finding that a conflict existed and, thus, there was no basis for the disqualification.  Accordingly, the court is constrained to reverse.

A trial judge may order the removal of counsel where there is a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Here, the judge disqualified B&C based on a violation of R.P.C. 1.7, which states, in pertinent part, that "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest."  In evaluating whether a conflict exists, however, we are mindful that "[a] corporation is regarded as an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders."  Tully v. Mirz, 457 N.J. Super. 114, 123 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 549 (1996)).  Additionally, "a corporation is regarded in law as an entity distinct from its individual officers, directors, and agents."  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 761 (1989) (citation omitted).

Guided by these well-established legal principles, the court concludes that the trial judge erred in finding a conflict between Travelers and Alam.  In reaching that conclusion, we hold that the judge failed to distinguish Ameribuilt, the corporation, from Alam, an owner and shareholder.

SUMMARY DCPP VS. D.C.A. AND J.J.C.B., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF I.A.C.C., J.S.C.C., A.I.C.C. AND I.C.C. (FG-06-0025-20, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

 

DCPP VS. D.C.A. AND J.J.C.B., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF I.A.C.C., J.S.C.C., A.I.C.C. AND I.C.C. (FG-06-0025-20, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

Defendant appealed from a judgment of guardianship after trial, terminating her parental rights to four of her children.  The panel addressed whether the trial court improperly considered evidence of the children's relationship with their foster parents in violation of prong two of the best-interests test.  That prong was recently amended by the Legislature, which removed the sentence:  "[s]uch harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child."  N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (amended 2021).  The Legislature did not alter the other components of the best-interests standard.

The panel rejected the argument that, by deleting the above language from prong two, the Legislature intended to bar all evidence concerning a child's relationship with resource caregivers, even in the context of the other prongs of the best-interest standard.  Prong two as amended emphasizes consideration of whether a parent is able to overcome harm to the child as well as whether the parent can cease causing future harm.  The amendment clearly isolates those specific inquiries from consideration of the bonds a child has forged with resource caregivers.  Nevertheless, the amendments to prong two do not mean that such a bond may never be considered within any part of the best-interests analysis.  Neither the legislative history nor the plain text necessitates such a sweeping conclusion. 

The panel construed the deletion from prong two to give greater effect to the alteration, in a manner that remains coherent with prong four.  The amended statute requires a court to make a finding under prong two that does not include considerations of caregiver bonding, and then weigh that finding against all the evidence that may be considered under prong four—including the harm that would result from disrupting whatever bonds the child has formed. 

JAMES MEYERS VS. STATE HEALTH BENEFITS COMMISSION (STATE HEALTH BENEFITS COMMISSION)

 JAMES MEYERS VS. STATE HEALTH BENEFITS COMMISSION (STATE HEALTH BENEFITS COMMISSION)

Petitioner, James Meyers, a retired New Jersey State Police captain, appeals from a final decision of the State Health Benefits Commission (SHBC) which discontinued his fully paid health care insurance coverage under the State Health Benefits Plan, and imposed a premium deduction against his monthly retirement check. Petitioner administratively appealed the deduction, contending the SHBC was estopped from terminating his free health care insurance coverage.

In an initial decision, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the SHBC was estopped from deducting monthly health insurance premiums from petitioner's retirement payments. In a final decision, the SHBC rejected the ALJ's findings and concluded that it had the right to deduct a premium contribution from petitioner's monthly retirement payments to pay for his family's health insurance coverage. Petitioner appealed the final decision, arguing that the SHBC was equitably estopped from discontinuing no-cost health insurance coverage.

The court held that petitioner was not eligible to receive no-cost health care coverage in retirement under N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28d(b)(3), because he did not have the requisite creditable service time as of the effective date of the statute. The court also held that principles of equitable estoppel could not be applied on these facts, where petitioner was statutorily ineligible for such coverage.

Morgan Dennehy v. East Windsor Regional Board of Education

 Morgan Dennehy v. East Windsor Regional Board of Education (086350) (Mercer County and Statewide)The coach’s acts and omissions alleged here are governed by a simple negligence standard rather than the heightened standard of recklessness the Court applied when one participant injures another during a recreational activity.

L.R. VS. CHERRY HILL BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-5609-11, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1819-20)

 L.R. VS. CHERRY HILL BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-5609-11, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1819-20)

Plaintiff L.R. is the mother of a disabled student attending the Camden City Public Schools. She served defendant Cherry Hill Board of Education and its record custodian with an Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -17, request for all settlement agreements from all lawsuits in which defendant was sued by a student and/or their parent. The request asked defendant to redact the parent and student names leaving only their initials. Defendant produced the documents sought but redacted all personally identifiable information (PII), including initials.

Plaintiff appealed. Following the decisions in L.R. v. Camden City Public School District (L.R. I), 452 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 2017), and L.R. v. Camden City Public School District (L.R. II), 238 N.J. 547 (2019), the trial judge dismissed the complaint finding plaintiff was not entitled to the initials because she: (1) Was not authorized to obtain the information by means of a court order; and (2) lacked a common law right of access to student records because defendant had a legitimate claim of confidentiality under the Family Educational Records and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. 1232g, and the New Jersey Pupil Records Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19.

Following this appeal, the Department of Education promulgated new regulations governing public access to student records under OPRA in response to L.R. II. The regulations define PII and student records that may be released pursuant to a court order provided the records do not contain any PII. N.J.A.C. 6A:32-2.1. They also state student "records removed of all [PII]" may be released without consent. N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(g)(1).

On appeal, the court affirmed, holding the new regulations were not retroactive, and even if they were defendant's redaction of the initials was consistent with the regulations and the trial judge's ruling that plaintiff was not entitled to unredacted records. The court held plaintiff's reliance on Keddie v. Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36, 40 (1997), establishing the public's common law right to records, and C.E. v. Elizabeth Public School District, 472 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2022), establishing the right to settlements entered before the Office of Administrative Law under OPRA, were inapposite because those cases involved the failure to produce documents not whether a defendant should have redacted the PII altogether.

SCOTT C. MALZBERG VS. CAREN L. JOSEY, ET AL. (L-7858-17, (A-2883-20)

 SCOTT C. MALZBERG VS. CAREN L. JOSEY, ET AL. (L-7858-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-2883-20)

This case presents a question of first impression regarding the scope of the Transportation Network Company Safety and Regulatory Act (TNCSRA or Act), N.J.S.A. 39:5H-1 to -27. The TNCSRA, which was enacted in 2017, comprehensively regulates companies and drivers that use a digital network such as a mobile phone application (app) to connect a "rider" to a "prearranged ride." Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while he was operating his motorcycle as an Uber Eats delivery driver. The novel legal issue raised in this appeal is whether the Act—which requires "transportation network companies" to provide at least $1.5 million in underinsured motorist coverage—protects drivers while they are delivering food and not just when they are in the process of transporting passengers. The court concludes that the Act by its literal terms applies only to the prearranged transport of riders and not to the prearranged delivery of food.

In determining the scope of the statute's intended reach, that is, its "overall meaning," the court pays special attention to the definition section, noting that the very existence—or non-existence—of specific definitions reveals the basic concepts and principles the Legislature deemed to be especially important, warranting precise and explicit formulations. The Legislature's decision to define certain terms but not others, the court reasons, can provide insight into the overall meaning of the statutory scheme and the scope of its reach. In this instance, nothing in the definition section—or any other section of the Act for that matter—refers to the delivery of food. The absence of any reference to food delivery in the definition section stands in stark contrast to the interrelated definitions that refer explicitly and repeatedly to "rides" and "riders," which clearly denote the transport of human passengers.

Because the primary question posed in this case is easily resolved under a plain-text analysis, the court acknowledges that it need not consider extrinsic sources to determine legislative intent. The court nonetheless adds in the interest of completeness that nothing in the legislative history supports plaintiff's contention that the Act applies to food delivery services. The court further notes that regulations promulgated by the Motor Vehicle Commission support the court's interpretation as to the scope of the Act.

The court acknowledges that by enacting the TNCSRA, the Legislature recognized the commercial and societal value of new technologies that use mobile digital networks to connect customers with service providers. But while the use of an app is necessary to trigger the Act's provisions, that alone is not sufficient. The court concludes that to fall within the Act's jurisdiction—and thus to invoke the protections of its minimum insurance coverage provisions—the app-based connection must be used to arrange a ride for a human passenger.

The court further acknowledges that while the TNCSRA is of comparatively recent vintage, it was enacted before the COVID-19 pandemic, during which the imperative for social distancing simultaneously increased the demand for home delivery of food and reduced the demand for ridesharing. The court emphasizes that the evolution of the supply and demand marketplace since the TNCSRA was enacted does not change its plain text. While there may be circumstances, not present here, where it is necessary and appropriate to teach an old law to do new tricks, a statute's text does not evolve sua sponte. Reviewing courts, moreover, must afford due deference to the legislative process. Accordingly, the court stresses, it is for the political branches, not the Judiciary, to amend a statute to account for new developments and to fill any "holes" in the statute's scope and reach.