UNDERWOOD PROPERTIES, LLC VS. CITY OF HACKENSACK, ET AL. (L-7980-19, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0044-20)

 UNDERWOOD PROPERTIES, LLC VS. CITY OF HACKENSACK, ET AL. (L-7980-19, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0044-20)

The parties were involved in litigation relating to the Hackensack Planning Board's zoning determinations and ordinances adopted in the City's redevelopment plan. Separately, plaintiff's attorney submitted requests for records from defendants pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, designated as OPRA requests from the attorney.

Defendants argued plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under OPRA because the requests were submitted from plaintiff's attorney. The trial judge rejected the standing argument because counsel had implied authority to submit the requests. The trial judge also noted the Denial of Access complaint form adopted by the Government Records Council requires parties represented by counsel who make a request to state the name of the client on whose behalf the complaint is being filed.

Among other arguments raised by the parties in their respective appeals, defendants repeated their standing argument and urged the court to "establish the standard that if an attorney is filing an OPRA request on behalf of a client, it must clearly disclose that fact to the custodian of records, or if the response proceeds to litigation the attorney must be deemed the 'requestor.'"

The court affirmed, rejecting defendants' argument for the same reasons expressed by the trial judge. Although N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 states the right to institute a suit under OPRA belongs "solely" to the requestor, OPRA and the rules of standing are broadly construed. Therefore, the literal reading of the statute urged by defendants should be eschewed.

TRENTON RENEWABLE POWER, LLC VS. DENALI WATER SOLUTIONS, LLC (C-000049-20, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3060-20)

 TRENTON RENEWABLE POWER, LLC VS. DENALI WATER SOLUTIONS, LLC (C-000049-20, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3060-20)

In this breach of contract action, the owner/operator of an aerobic biodigester facility sued defendant, Denali, which was contractually obligated to deliver quantities of organic waste to the facility for processing. Shortly after entry of the initial case management order, Denali served subpoenas on plaintiff and several nonparties, including Symbiont Science, Engineering and Construction, Inc. (Symbiont), which had designed and retrofitted the facility for plaintiff. Symbiont's subpoena required it to identify a corporate designee with familiarity in seventeen topic areas and demanded documents and electronically stored information in thirteen categories.

Much of the requested information centered on communications between plaintiff and Symbiont, such as the terms of Symbiont's agreement with plaintiff, "including the drafting, revision, and execution of the agreement"; "[t]he calculation of Symbiont's guaranteed maximum price to complete the construction to retrofit the Trenton Facility"; and "[a]ll communications with [plaintiff c]oncerning the construction and design" of the facility, "including but not limited to, the construction cost, construction schedule, and design modifications." Denali served similar requests on plaintiff.

When negotiations regarding the scope of production broke down between Denali and plaintiff, and between defendant and Symbiont, Denali moved to compel, and plaintiff and Symbiont moved to quash. The judge granted Denali's motion as to both plaintiff and Symbiont, relying on the broad scope of discovery permitted by Court Rules and case law.

The court granted Symbiont's motion for leave to appeal and reversed. Despite the broad scope of discovery permitted between parties, a court facing a discovery dispute involving a nonparty to the litigation must consider additional factors. The court also noted the special recognition the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide to discovery demanded from nonparties.

ESTATE OF MICAH SAMUEL TENNANT DUNMORE VS. PLEASANTVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION ANGELA TENNANT VS. PLEASANTVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-0889-20 and L-0901-20, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-4314-19

 ESTATE OF MICAH SAMUEL TENNANT DUNMORE VS. PLEASANTVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION ANGELA TENNANT VS. PLEASANTVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-0889-20 and L-0901-20, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-4314-19/A-4451-19)

In these matters arising out of the tragic shooting of a minor during a football game and his subsequent death several days later, the court considered whether the time for a minor's parent to file a notice of tort claim for her Portee1 claim is tolled under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3. In reading in pari materia N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, which extends the statute of limitations for an injured minor to institute a cause of action until two years after their eighteenth birthday, and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which tolls a parent's claim for the duration of the child's tolling period, and because the parent's Portee claim essentially includes the elements of the minor's claim, the court concludes it is only logical to toll the notice requirements under the TCA for the parent's Portee claim to coincide with the tolling period of the minor's claim. The court's ruling is consistent with the purposes underlying the entire controversy doctrine and in promoting judicial economy.

________________________________________
1 Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88 (1980).

Diane S. Lapsley v. Township of Sparta (085422)(Statewide) (A-68/69-20

 Diane S. Lapsley v. Township of Sparta (085422)(Statewide) (A-68/69-20; 085422)

Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment because the parking lot where she was injured was owned and maintained by the Township, adjacent to her place of work, and used by Township employees to park. Lapsley was therefore entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

JAMES T. KOPEC VS. ANNA M. MOERS JOSEPH LOPRESTI VS. JENNIFER LOPRESTI RICK G. ZORN VS. CHRISTINA ZORN SAMUEL MCGEE VS. LILLIAN MCGEE SANDRA WEED VS. LEROY WEED II MARY DETER VS. ROY L. DETER KAREN PREVETE VS. THOMAS MENDIBURU CHRIS DEFONTES VS. NICOLE DEFONTES CHRISTINE OSHIDAR VS. DARIUS OSHIDAR SUZZAN M. HEISLER VS. ERIC HEISLER (FM-19-0423-15, FM-19-0177-16, FM-19-0063-14, FM-20-0815-15, FM-14-0311-16, FM-14-0691-16, FM-14-1312-04, FM-14-0753-13, FM-03-1029-12, and FM-03-1221-13, SUSSEX, UNION, MORRIS, AND BURLINGTON COUNTIES AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-2551-18

 JAMES T. KOPEC VS. ANNA M. MOERS JOSEPH LOPRESTI VS. JENNIFER LOPRESTI RICK G. ZORN VS. CHRISTINA ZORN SAMUEL MCGEE VS. LILLIAN MCGEE SANDRA WEED VS. LEROY WEED II MARY DETER VS. ROY L. DETER KAREN PREVETE VS. THOMAS MENDIBURU CHRIS DEFONTES VS. NICOLE DEFONTES CHRISTINE OSHIDAR VS. DARIUS OSHIDAR SUZZAN M. HEISLER VS. ERIC HEISLER (FM-19-0423-15, FM-19-0177-16, FM-19-0063-14, FM-20-0815-15, FM-14-0311-16, FM-14-0691-16, FM-14-1312-04, FM-14-0753-13, FM-03-1029-12, and FM-03-1221-13, SUSSEX, UNION, MORRIS, AND BURLINGTON COUNTIES AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-2551-18/A-2552-18/A-2553-18/A-2554-18/A-2726-18/A-2731-18/A-2758-18/A-3579-18/A-4190-18/A-4191-18)

In these ten back-to-back appeals, consolidated for the purpose of issuing one opinion, Weinberger Divorce & Family Law Group, LLC filed post-judgment motions in the Chancery Division, Family Part, to enforce its retainer agreements against its former clients. The law firm sought judgments for unpaid fees, or alternatively, orders compelling the parties to attend binding arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision in its retainer agreements. The court affirms the denial of the law firm's enforcement motions, concluding: its applications should have been filed as complaints in the Law Division pursuant to the Rules of Court; the law firm was not entitled to entry of judgment for fees in any of the matters because it failed to provide the courts with the necessary information to assess the reasonableness of the fees requested by the firm; and the binding arbitration provision in the firm's retainer agreement is unenforceable because its vague, confusing and contradictory language fails to support the conclusion that the clients and the law firm mutually assented to its terms

STEINER VS. STEINER (FM-07-2818-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-2440-20)

 STEINER VS. STEINER (FM-07-2818-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-2440-20)

After sixty-three years of marriage, plaintiff Sylvia Steiner commenced this divorce action. At the conclusion of a bifurcated trial for the sole purpose of resolving the parties' dispute about whether there were grounds for divorce, the trial judge found irreconcilable differences and entered a judgment of divorce. In appealing, defendant David Steiner argued, among other things, that bifurcation should not have been permitted and that the trial judge erred in finding irreconcilable differences. The court affirmed, holding that what constitutes irreconcilable differences varies from couple to couple and that the judge's determination that this couple's differences were irreconcilable and had endured for six months, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(i), was entitled to deference. The court also held that the presiding judge did not abuse his discretion in bifurcating the cause of action from the parties' equitable distribution issues because of both the parties' ages and judicial economy, considering that a potential ruling on the cause of action in defendant's favor would negate the need for a time-consuming and costly trial on the parties' extensive equitable distribution issues.

SEAVIEW HARBOR REALIGNMENT COMMITTEE, LLC, ET AL. VS. TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF EGG HARBOR TOWNSHIP, ET AL. (L-0079-17, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3048-19)

SEAVIEW HARBOR REALIGNMENT COMMITTEE, LLC, ET AL. VS. TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF EGG HARBOR TOWNSHIP, ET AL. (L-0079-17, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3048-19)

In this appeal, plaintiffs, Seaview Harbor Alignment Committee and certain residents of Seaview Harbor, challenge Egg Harbor Township's denial of their deannexation petition, which would have permitted Seaview Harbor to secede from the Township and annex with neighboring Borough of Longport. The trial court correctly affirmed the Township's decision. In doing so, the court considered and applied the three-part test enumerated in N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, and concluded that although plaintiffs established that the Township's refusal to consent to deannexation was detrimental to a majority of Seaview Harbor residents, the Township's decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and plaintiffs failed to establish that deannexation would not cause significant harm to the well-being of the Township.

The court holds that a petition under N.J.S.A. 40:7-12.1 may be appropriately denied where a municipality establishes that deannexation would be detrimental to the majority of residents despite the undisputed fact that deannexation would produce considerable property tax savings for the petitioning homeowners, who seek to become part of a lower tax municipality. That detriment can include the loss of significant services to the community at large, removal of a diverse citizenship, and likely erosion of valuable civic participation caused by the absence of those homeowners who seek to deannex from the community

Here, the harm to the residents of Egg Harbor included not only the potential loss of revenue and attendant services, but the removal of a critical municipal resource – the diverse Seaview residents. That unique loss was not limited to its current and future economic impact, but also encompassed the transfer of a portion of Egg Harbor's population that historically participated in all phases of local government, and brought significant and substantive value to the deliberative decision-making process necessary for a healthy and robust community and government. 

Michele Meade v. Township of Livingston (085176)(Essex County and Statewide) (A-52-20

 Michele Meade v. Township of Livingston (085176)(Essex County and Statewide) (A-52-20; 085176)

Here, sufficient evidence was present for a reasonable jury to find that what Livingston Township Councilmembers perceived to be Police Chief Handschuch’s discriminatory attitude toward Township Manager Meade influenced the Council’s decision to terminate her, in violation of the LAD. Accordingly, the Court reverses the grant of summary judgment and remands this matter for trial.