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Sunday, October 25, 2020

KENNETH ZAHL VS. HIRAM EASTLAND, JR., ET AL. (L-0851-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3696-19T2)

 KENNETH ZAHL VS. HIRAM EASTLAND, JR., ET AL. (L-0851-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3696-19T2)

On leave granted, defendant, a Mississippi attorney (and his associated law firms), appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. R. 4:6-2(b). Defendant was admitted pro hac vice to represent plaintiff in a federal lawsuit filed in the federal district court for the district of New Jersey alleging, among other things, RICO claims against the New Jersey Attorney General and other state officials. The federal suit was ultimately dismissed; the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

Plaintiff initiated this suit alleging malpractice and excessive billing in defendant's representation of him in the prior federal action. As he did before the Law Division, defendant, who never physically appeared in New Jersey in connection with the federal suit, argued that he never personally availed himself of the privileges of doing business in New Jersey, lacked requisite minimum contacts with the state, and that requiring him to defend himself in state court in New Jersey offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice

The court affirmed the Law Division's denial of the motion to dismiss, finding particular significance in defendant's pro hac vice admission, since it required defendant to abide by certain New Jersey Court Rules, including, a limit on contingent fees, financial contribution to the Client Security Fund, and an obligation to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by our Supreme Court.

Sunday, October 18, 2020

IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NOS. 2020-5 AND 2020-6 (DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-3950-19T4/A-3975-19T4/A-3985-19T4

 

IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NOS. 2020-5 AND 2020-6 (DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-3950-19T4/A-3975-19T4/A-3985-19T4/A-3987-19T4/A-4002-19T4)

In these five consolidated appeals, petitioners and intervenors mount a facial challenge to Attorney General Grewal's Directives 2020-5 and 2020-6, which ended New Jersey's decades-long practice of shielding the identities of law enforcement officers receiving major discipline for misconduct

The court upholds the Directives, finding the Attorney General acted within his authority under the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181, and not in violation of Executive Order 11 (Byrne), OPRA, or any right of plaintiffs'. The court's conclusion that the Directives constitute a valid exercise of the Attorney General's authority does not preclude any officer from bringing an as-applied challenge to publication of his or her name pursuant to Directives 2020-5 or 2020-6 for discipline finalized before release of those Directives.


IN THE MATTER OF OFFICER GREGORY DIGUGLIELMO AND NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION) (A-3772-19T2)

IN THE MATTER OF OFFICER GREGORY DIGUGLIELMO AND NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION) (A-3772-19T2)

This case presents the unsettled legal question of whether a campus police officer who has been terminated by a State university or college because of alleged non-criminal misconduct may challenge his termination through what is known as "special disciplinary arbitration" administered by the Public Employment Relations Commission ("PERC" or "the Commission"), pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-209 and -210.

The legal issue arises in the context of an attempt by the New Jersey Institute of Technology ("NJIT") to terminate one of its campus police officers for alleged misconduct in using force to apprehend a potential juvenile offender who was bicycling through the university grounds. Over NJIT's objection, PERC referred the dispute to a special disciplinary arbitrator.

This court affirms PERC's determination that the NJIT police force is a "law enforcement agency" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-200. However, NJIT officers nonetheless are not eligible for special disciplinary arbitration because that option is restricted by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 to officers who work for municipal police departments in jurisdictions that are not part of the civil service system.

In addition, even if that statutory restriction under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 did not pertain, the officer in this case is ineligible because he has not been suspended without pay, as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-209 and -210.

Sunday, October 4, 2020

RIALTO-CAPITOL CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. BALDWIN ASSETS ASSOCIATES URBAN RENEWAL COMPANY, LLC, ET AL. (L-4994-13. HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3502-18T3)

 RIALTO-CAPITOL CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. BALDWIN ASSETS ASSOCIATES URBAN RENEWAL COMPANY, LLC, ET AL. (L-4994-13. HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3502-18T3)

In this appeal, the court considered a condominium association's standing to sue defendants alleged to have been involved in the design, manufacture, and installation of the condominium's windows. The motion judge found the association lacked standing because the master deed declares without ambiguity that the windows are part of the units. The court agreed with that understanding of the master deed and the limits it places on the association's window claims, but the court also recognized that any claim against these defendants based on allegations that their actions altered the buildings' exterior appearance in a way that violated a historic preservation easement could be asserted because the association is bound by the easement and would have a sufficient stake in that claim's outcome. Additionally, the court rejected the motion judge's finding that the association was limited to suing only the unit owners for damages caused to the common elements; that determination is inconsistent with the nature of the association's relationship to the common elements and to the unit owners.