DAVID M. NAMEROW, M.D. v. PEDIATRICARE ASSOCIATES, LLC, SCOTT ZUCKER, M.D., JEFFREY M. BIENSTOCK, M.D., AND MELISSA CHISM, M.D.(C-000273-17)

DAVID M. NAMEROW, M.D. v. PEDIATRICARE ASSOCIATES, LLC, SCOTT ZUCKER, M.D., JEFFREY M. BIENSTOCK, M.D., AND MELISSA CHISM, M.D.(C-000273-17)

Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment to which plaintiff responded with a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On January 1, 2000, the parties entered into an Operating Agreement in order to form the limited liability company, PediatriCare. Subsequently, on March 12, 2001, the parties executed an amended and restated Operating Agreement, which was the operative document governing the relationship. In January 2016, plaintiff announced his intention to retire, which triggered Section 10 of the Operating Agreement. Section 10 provided the process for calculating the retirement purchase price, which required a net worth valuation methodology, in order to determine a value for a negotiated buyout price of plaintiff. However, various calculations of fair market valuation were done in order to effectuate a settlement as to a voluntary buy-out number, which the parties agree was never reached

Defendants then sought to invoke the net worth valuation of Section 10 of the Operating Agreement. Plaintiff argued that over a sixteen-year period, the Operating Agreement was modified to use the fair market value as opposed to a net worth valuation, based on the parties’ conduct over this time period. Defendants argue that the Operating Agreement is clear in its express provision concerning how to calculate the buyout price. Moreover, defendants note that the Operating Agreement also unambiguously states that it may be modified only through a vote of 80% of the membership interests in the company, and not through the course of conduct that plaintiff contends. The court found, upon reviewing the plain language of the Operating Agreement, and upon a lack of evidence that it was changed by the remaining members, that the net worth valuation methodology remained a part of the Operating Agreement and was the correct method for a retirement purchase price.

In addition, plaintiff suffered no oppression since the economic loss doctrine bars recovery when entitlement flows from the Operating Agreement. There was also no breach of fiduciary duty when the members acted in conformity with the provisions of the Operating Agreement. The court ultimately granted in part, and denied in part, defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. As such, the court dismissed Counts I, II, and III of plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

Christine Minsavage v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund (081507) (Statewide) (A-48-18; 081507)

Christine Minsavage v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund (081507) (Statewide) (A-48-18; 081507)

Neither membership nor prior approval of a retirement application is required for modification of a retirement selection where good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence are shown. The Court remands this matter for further proceedings to allow petitioner Christine Minsavage the opportunity to argue in favor of modification under that standard.

Christine Minsavage v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund (081507) (Statewide) (A-48-18; 081507)

Christine Minsavage v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund (081507) (Statewide) (A-48-18; 081507)

Neither membership nor prior approval of a retirement application is required for modification of a retirement selection where good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence are shown. The Court remands this matter for further proceedings to allow petitioner Christine Minsavage the opportunity to argue in favor of modification under that standard.

CRAIG SASHIHARA, ETC. VS. NOBEL LEARNING COMMUNITIES, INC., ETC. (L-2227-16, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0603-18T1)

CRAIG SASHIHARA, ETC. VS. NOBEL LEARNING COMMUNITIES, INC., ETC. (L-2227-16, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0603-18T1)

In this case the court held the Director of the Division of Civil Rights does not have the general authority to sue in Superior Court, the Superior Court may not grant permanent injunctive relief on the director's complaint, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination does not recognize a claim for failure to contract with parents of a disabled child.

A.J. v. R.J. (FM-20-0954-13, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-1168-18T4)

A.J. v. R.J. (FM-20-0954-13, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-1168-18T4)
Plaintiff A.J. appeals from a September 28, 2018 order sanctioning her by transferring custody of the parties' children to defendant R.J., for failure to comply with a prior order related to her unilateral intra-state relocation. We hold in cases where a court exercises its authority pursuant to Rules 1:10-3 and 5:3-7(a)(6), it must make findings under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 that the sanction imposed is in the best interests of the children. We further hold the factors in Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91 (2001) no longer apply when a court is addressing an intra-state relocation, and instead, pursuant to Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309 (2017), the court must apply N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. Because the trial judge applied the wrong law related to the intra-state relocation and did not apply N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 when he sanctioned plaintiff, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MARISOL RAJI VS. ALFONSO SAUCEDO, ET AL. (DC-008329-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1629-18T1)

MARISOL RAJI VS. ALFONSO SAUCEDO, ET AL. (DC-008329-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1629-18T1)

In considering the nature of a "pay-and-go" consent judgment, which resolved a summary dispossess action, and the judgment's impact on later-asserted claims for damages, we hold that by entering into such a consent judgment the parties entered into an accord and satisfaction and thereby finally resolved all the known claims arising out of the tenancy. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's rejection of the tenants' counterclaim in the landlord's subsequent action for enforcement of the pay-and-go judgment because the counterclaim was based on a claim then known to the tenants that they should have raised during the negotiations that led to the pay-and-go judgment.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON VS. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, ET AL. (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) (A-5423-17T3)

JOHNSON & JOHNSON VS. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION, ET AL. (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) (A-5423-17T3)

In this appeal, we address the issue of whether, following the Legislature's 2011 amendment of N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64, plaintiff Johnson & Johnson (J&J) was required to pay an insurance premium tax (IPT) based upon all the risks it insured throughout the United States or based upon only those risks localized in New Jersey. Because both before and after the 2011 amendment, N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64 provided that IPT was to be calculated at the rate of "5% of the gross amount of such premium" paid for insurance procured "upon a subject of insurance resident, located or to be performed within [New Jersey]," we conclude that J&J's IPT obligation should have continued to be based solely upon the risks it insured that were located within New Jersey, rather than upon the total United States premium for the applicable coverage policies. Accordingly, we reverse the Tax Court's contrary interpretation of the statute which is at odds with the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64, and remand for further proceedings.