NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE COMPANY VS. SPECIALTY SURGICAL CENTER OF NORTH BRUNSWICK, ET AL. (L-3647-17 AND L-4927-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-0319-17T1/A-0388-17T1)

NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE COMPANY VS. SPECIALTY SURGICAL CENTER OF NORTH BRUNSWICK, ET AL. (L-3647-17 AND L-4927-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-0319-17T1/A-0388-17T1)

In these back-to-back appeals involving automobile insurance, consolidated for purposes of this opinion, defendants appeal from Law Division orders vacating binding arbitration awards entered in their favor against plaintiff New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Company (NJM). In both cases, the Law Division held the PIP fee schedule does not provide for payment to an ambulatory surgical center (ASC) for procedures not listed as reimbursable when performed at an ASC. Defendants argue that N.J.A.C. 11:3-29.4(g) requires insurance companies to reimburse ASCs for any procedures performed under Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes subsequently approved by Medicare. Defendant's arguments are rejected and the trial court orders are affirmed.

REGINA TASCA VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM (POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM) (A-4028-15T1)

REGINA TASCA VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM (POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM) (A-4028-15T1)

The court rejects Regina Tasca's appeal of the final agency decision of the Board of Trustees (Board), Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS), denying her twenty-year service (early) retirement pension benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-5(3). Tasca's transfer of six years of service credit that gave her more than the twenty-year service credit threshold needed for early retirement did not qualify her for early retirement pension benefits. The Board properly interpreted N.J.S.A. 43:16A-5(3) in determining that because she was not a PFRS "member" at the critical time of the statute's January 18, 2000 effective date, she was ineligible for early retirement pension benefits. The court also concludes that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not afford Tasca relief against a governmental body, such as the Board, and there was no misrepresentation by the PFRS staff that she was eligible for early retirement pension benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-5(3). The court further concludes that even though the Law Division action settlement with her former employer include her seeking early retirement pension benefits based on the good faith belief that she was eligible for the benefits, the public policy favoring settlements against parties who have entered into them serves no basis for granting her the benefits in this matter. The Board's decision is affirmed.

K.G. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD C.C. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD J.L. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD D.C. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) (CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-0042-16T2/A-4339-16T1

K.G. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD C.C. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD J.L. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD D.C. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) (CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-0042-16T2/A-4339-16T1/A-4343-16T4/A-4797-16T3)

Appellants K.G, C.C., J.L., and D.C. are convicted sex offenders who are monitored by respondent New Jersey State Parole Board (the "Board") as offenders who are subject to parole supervision for life ("PSL") under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. Each appellant challenges certain conditions of PSL, most of which restrict Internet use, that the Board has imposed upon them. The instant appeals follow in the wake of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in J.I. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204 (2017), which addressed the parameters of the Board's authority to impose conditions restricting Internet access.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part. In particular, we reach the following major legal conclusions: (1) the Board's imposition of Internet monitoring conditions upon PSL offenders, including the use of monitoring software, mandatory password disclosure, and unannounced device inspections, does not facially violate the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches or the constitutional rights to privacy; (2) the Board's use of the terms "Internet-capable device," "social networking service," "frequenting establishments whose primary purpose is the sale of alcohol," and "sexually-oriented websites, material, information or data" does not violate due process under the void for vagueness doctrine; (3) all conditions restricting Internet access, including monitoring conditions, should be reasonably tailored to the circumstances of the individual offender, "taking into account such factors as the underlying offense and any prior criminal history, whether the Internet was used as a tool to perpetrate the offense, the rehabilitative needs of the offender, and the imperative of public safety[,]" J.I., 228 N.J. at 224; and (4) in the administrative appeals process, PSL offenders are not entitled to discovery and are only entitled to a hearing when warranted based on "the timing of and justification for the Internet restriction, the severity and length of the restriction, whether facts are contested or uncontested, and whether credibility determinations must be made." Id. at 233.

DCPP V. E.M.C., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.E.C. (A-4577-15T2)

DCPP V. E.M.C., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.E.C. (A-4577-15T2)

The court affirms the trial court's termination of E.M.C.'s parental rights to his child, A.E.C. The child's mother did not appeal the judgment terminating her parental rights. The trial record supported that E.M.C. was given a meaningful opportunity to reunify with his child. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency's (Division's) requirement that E.M.C. attend a psychological and bonding evaluation was not unreasonable nor did it thwart his relationship with the child or reunification efforts. The Division made reasonable efforts to locate E.M.C., especially where, as here, E.M.C. was aware the child was in placement and had a phone number to contact him. The records supported the trial court's finding that E.M.C.'s absence from the child was voluntary. The court distinguishes this case from N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145 (2010), where the parent took affirmative steps to satisfy the conditions the Division set for him, which was not the case here for E.M.C.

Judge Guadagno wrote a dissent.

ROBERT KATCHEN VS. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. (L-2766-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5685-16T4)

ROBERT KATCHEN VS. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. (L-2766-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5685-16T4)

The primary question raised in this appeal is whether an auto insurer may combine uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in a single section and include exclusions not listed on the policy's declaration page. We also consider if an insurer may exclude underinsured motorist coverage for an accident involving a vehicle owned by the insured but not covered under the subject policy. Because we find the exclusion does not violate public policy or result in ambiguity, we reverse.

Judge Suter wrote a dissent.

DCPP VS. V.F., IN THE MATTER OF T.Q., A.Q., S.F., AND VI.F. (FN-15-0061-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-1343-17T1)

DCPP VS. V.F., IN THE MATTER OF T.Q., A.Q., S.F., AND VI.F. (FN-15-0061-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-1343-17T1)

In this appeal, the panel extends to a Family Part context the ruling in State v. Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super. 530, 536 (App. Div. 2000) holding that a HGN test is not admissible at a trial to show an individual is guilty of driving under the influence. The court now holds that HGN test results cannot be considered in a Title 9 abuse or neglect hearing to establish that defendant was under the influence when supervising his four minor children while the mother was unconscious. However, the panel concludes the order finding abuse or neglect was consistent with the law because it was supported by substantial independent credible evidence that defendant was under the influence and that his conduct created a substantial risk to the children's mental health and physical safety. The panel affirms the order.

All The Way Towing, LLC and Chayim Goodman v. Bucks County International, Inc. and Dynamic Towing Equipment and Manufacturing, Inc. (079700) (Ocean County and Statewide) (A-66/67-17; 079700)

All The Way Towing, LLC and Chayim Goodman v. Bucks County International, Inc. and Dynamic Towing Equipment and Manufacturing, Inc. (079700) (Ocean County and Statewide) (A-66/67-17; 079700)

The customized tow truck and rig fit within the CFA’s expansive definition of “merchandise” and, therefore, plaintiff’s CFA claim should not have foundered based on an application of that term. The Court further agrees with the appellate panel’s remand to the trial court for a determination of whether defendants’ other bases for seeking summary judgment are meritorious.

New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.S.K. (A-50-17)

New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.S.K. (A-50-17) (079700)
(NOTE: The Court did not write a plenary opinion in this case. Instead, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in the per curiam opinion, which is published at ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017).)
Argued January 2, 2019 -- Decided January 23, 2019 PER CURIAM
The Court considers the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of E.M.C. (“Eric”) to his son, A.E.C. (“Adam”) based on the record and the application of the best-interests-of-the-child test.
Adam was born on November 14, 2009, and began residing with Eric in March 2012. Before Adam came to live with him, Eric had last seen him in July 2011.
The first referral to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) was made in April 2012, after Eric brought twenty-nine month-old Adam to the pediatrician with severe eczema. Adam was undernourished, weighing twenty-one pounds, the weight of a child half his age. His speech was mumbled. Eric cooperated with the Division’s investigation. The April 2012 investigation summary reported Eric “followed-up with all the child’s medical appointments” and Adam was “now up to date with his immunizations and . . . receiving treatment for his eczema.” Because Adam was residing with Eric, the allegation of abuse and neglect against Adam’s mother, A.K. (“Ali”) was deemed unsubstantiated.
In September 2012, a second referral to the Division was made by an anonymous neighbor of Ali’s, reporting drug use by Ali, her sister and mother while children were in their care. The investigation confirmed Adam continued to reside with Eric at this time and, although child welfare concerns persisted regarding Ali’s admitted drug use, the allegations of neglect and inadequate supervision were deemed to be unfounded.
Ali gave birth to a third child in June 2013, and alleged Eric was the biological father.Eric’s fiancée was displeased that Eric had another child with Ali and, by July 2013, Adam returned to live with Ali.
In December 2013, the Division was granted care and supervision of all three of Ali’s children. The children were eventually placed with M.L. (“Maisie”), a resource identified by Ali. The Division was unable to contact Eric because his whereabouts were unknown.

1

In May and June 2014, the Division embarked upon an extensive search to locate Eric. The search ended, by coincidence, on June 18, 2014, during an unannounced home visit to Ali. Eric emerged from her residence as Ali was speaking with the caseworker. The caseworker exchanged contact information with Eric. She also advised him a Family Team Meeting was scheduled and it was important for him to attend. Eric did not attend the meeting and, after the caseworker contacted him about the importance of attendance, histelephone number was shut off. The Division’s goal changed from reunification for the three children to adoption in January 2015 and a guardianship complaint was filed.
The Division was again unable to locate Eric for an extended period of time. The Primary Worker on this matter testified she was in the process of checking addresses for him when his grandmother provided an address. While she was on her way there, she received a call from Eric, who had been called by his grandmother, and was then able to meet with him. Eric’s first appearance in the guardianship litigation was on January 14, 2016, approximately eleven months after it had been initiated. Eric expressed a desire for visitation and to parent.
A psychological evaluation was scheduled and guardianship proceedings commenced. Eric attended few of the many scheduled appearances and never had an evaluation.
Although he had requested visitation with Adam, Eric had only two hours of supervised visitation and did not visit Adam at the foster home even though he had the ability to do so.
At the time of trial, Adam had been living with Maisie for approximately two years.A psychologist testified that Maisie had “become the psychological parent for all three children. The data suggests that they have a very secure attachment. And should that relationship be severed there would likely be some significant negative consequences . . . .”The psychologist noted the children enjoyed an added benefit by the fact that all three were together, giving them “an opportunity to foster a relationship amongst themselves.”
Termination of parental rights is warranted when the Division establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the four prongs of the best-interests-of-the-child test codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) are met.
The first and second prongs of that test -- (1) “The child’s safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;” and(2) the parent’s unwillingness or inability to eliminate that harm -- are interrelated. As to the first prong, a parent’s withdrawal of solicitude, nurture, and care for an extended period of time is in itself a harm that endangers the health and development of the child. The trial court found that the Division had established that element, citing Eric’s missed appearances,failure to visit Adam, and lack of a plan for correcting the situation. The trial court also found that the Division had met the second prong in light of Eric’s inaction.
The Appellate Division majority agreed. ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2017) (slip op. at 32). The panel found it “evident Eric was capable of recognizing and caring for Adam’s needs because, during the time Adam lived with him, Eric saw to it that Adam received appropriate medical treatment.” (slip op. at 28). The panel stressed, however, that

2

“from July 2013, the time he returned Adam to the care of a person Eric knew had neglected him, until January 2016, the only initiative Eric took to reach out to the Division was the phone call he made after his grandmother contacted him.” (slip op. at 29). The panel alsofound significant Eric’s awareness of but failure to appear at scheduled evaluations and trialproceedings. (slip op. at 30-31). The panel thus determined that “there was ample evidence to satisfy the first and second prongs of the best interests test.” (slip op. at 32).
The third prong of the best-interests tests asks whether “[t]he [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child’s placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights.” The trial court cited the Division’s attempts to contact Eric and Eric’s failure to appear at appointments, as well as the Division’s consideration of alternative placements. The court found that the Division had met the third prong. The panelagreed, rejecting Eric’s arguments that his failure to be evaluated was excusable and that the Division should have considered placing Adam with Eric’s mother. (slip op. at 34-35).
The fourth prong of the best-interests test asks whether “[t]ermination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.” The trial judge found this prong was satisfied by clear and convincing evidence, relying primarily on the psychologist’s testimony. Notingthat “[t]he unrefuted evidence here is that Adam has an emotional attachment to Maisie, who wants to adopt him and his siblings, and he wants to continue to live with her,” and that “[n]o evidence was presented to suggest Eric, an inconsistent presence in Adam’s life, has any ability to ameliorate the harm Adam would suffer,” the Appellate Division majority found that “[t]here is ample evidence here to support the court’s findings.” (slip op. at 37).
The panel majority affirmed the termination of Eric’s parental rights to Adam. (slipop. at 42). Judge Guadagno dissented, and Eric appealed as of right.
HELD: The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in panel majority’s per curiam opinion. The Court adds only the following.
1. The Division acknowledged that, in its search efforts for Eric, there were some deviations from its normal procedures. Ultimately, in this matter, Eric was located, and the Court perceives no prejudice to him in this proceeding attributable to the delay in service. The errors in this instance -- anomalous as they may be -- created needlessly drawn out proceedings that have now kept Adam from receiving permanency for an additional two-and- a-half years. Current Division processes would be enhanced by conducting a new search for a parent for each phase of litigation and implementing procedures that retain a party’s pastcontact information. The Division made representations about enhancing its efforts to diligently search for and serve absent parents. The Court accepts its representations.
AFFIRMED.

LLEDON JAMES, ET AL. VS. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY (L-5051-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4761-15T2)

LLEDON JAMES, ET AL. VS. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY (L-5051-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4761-15T2)

Plaintiffs purchased an auto policy from State Farm that provided $15,000 in PIP coverage and designated a private health insurance provider as primary. They filed a verified complaint seeking to reform their auto policy to provide the maximum $250,000 PIP benefits, claiming: (1) the policy was invalid because their adult son was not insured by private health insurance; (2) the State Farm agent required them to sign a blank coverage selection form and thereafter selected the lower PIP coverage option; (3) this act by the agent was willful, wanton, intentional, or grossly negligent. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found State Farm is entitled to immunity under N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.9.

This court affirms and holds that insureds are under a duty to examine their insurance documents and to notify the insurer if there is a discrepancy between what they initially requested and what the insurer has actually provided. State Farm met all of the requirements for immunity under N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.9.

THE PLASTIC SURGERY CENTER, PA VS. MALOUF CHEVROLET-CADILLAC, INC. THE PLASTIC SURGERY CENTER, PA VS. LEONE INDUSTRIES THE WOODS O.R., INC. VS. LEONE INDUSTRIES STEVEN J. PARAGIOUDAKIS, M.D. VS. CAFÉ BAYOU MARC MENKOWITZ, M.D. VS. CAFÉ BAYOU (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-5597-16T1/A-5603-16T1/A-5604-16T1/A-0151-17T1/A-0152-17T1)

THE PLASTIC SURGERY CENTER, PA VS. MALOUF CHEVROLET-CADILLAC, INC. THE PLASTIC SURGERY CENTER, PA VS. LEONE INDUSTRIES THE WOODS O.R., INC. VS. LEONE INDUSTRIES STEVEN J. PARAGIOUDAKIS, M.D. VS. CAFÉ BAYOU MARC MENKOWITZ, M.D. VS. CAFÉ BAYOU (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-5597-16T1/A-5603-16T1/A-5604-16T1/A-0151-17T1/A-0152-17T1)

In 2012, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 34:15-15, granting the Division of Workers' Compensation exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought by medical providers for payment of services rendered to injured employees. These appeals questioned whether, through its silence, the Legislature intended – via this 2012 amendment – to apply the two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 34:15-51, contained in the Workers' Compensation Act, or whether the Legislature intended to leave things as they were and continue to apply the six-year statute of limitations for suits on contracts, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, to such claims. The court concluded that subjecting medical-provider claims to the two-year time-bar would be like jamming a square peg into a round hole, and that to reinterpret the two-year time-bar to fit such claims would require the reshaping of the edges of this square peg contrary to principles of judicial restraint. The court reversed the judgments that dismissed these medical-provider claims.

AMY SKUSE VS. PFIZER, INC., ET ALS. (L-2374-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3027-17T4)

AMY SKUSE VS. PFIZER, INC., ET ALS. (L-2374-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3027-17T4)

This case exemplifies an inadequate way for an employer to go about extracting its employees' agreement to submit to binding arbitration for future claims and thereby waive their rights to sue the employer and seek a jury trial.

The employer in this case emailed to its workforce what it called a "training module" (or "activity" or "course"). The module described the company's mandatory arbitration policy, as presented in a series of slides on computer screens. One screen provided employees with the opportunity to access a "Resource" link to the full text of the policy. In a separate email, the employer supplied a computer link to Frequently Asked Questions ("FAQs") concerning the policy.

On the third slide of the module presentation, the employees simply were asked to "acknowledge" it with the click of an electronic button. The module declared that if an employee did not click the acknowledgement, but continued to work for the company for sixty or more days, the employee would be "deemed" to be bound by the arbitration policy.

Although the arbitration policy is labeled an "agreement" and that word appears multiple times on the slides and within the linked policy, the module did not request employees to provide signatures conveying their agreement. Nor were the employees asked – within the four corners of the pivotal "click" box at the end of the presentation – to memorialize that they expressly agreed to the policy. They were only asked within the box to "acknowledge" it.

This oblique procedure does not yield the valid personal agreement of an employee to give up his or her statutorily protected rights to litigate claims against an employer in a public forum and seek a trial by jury. The procedure falls short of the requirements of New Jersey contract law, particularly the Supreme Court's longstanding precedent in Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 303 (2003) (holding an employee's valid waiver of statutory rights, there in the context of an employer's binding arbitration policy, "results only from an explicit, affirmative agreement that unmistakably reflects the employee's assent") (emphasis added), as well as the Court's more recent opinion in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 447 (2014) (holding the words of an arbitration agreement "must be clear and unambiguous that a [person] is choosing to arbitrate disputes rather than have them resolved in a court of law") (emphasis added).

JOSEPH J. NORMAN VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (STATE PAROLE BOARD) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-3920-17T4)

JOSEPH J. NORMAN VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (STATE PAROLE BOARD) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-3920-17T4) The primary question raised in this appeal is whether an appellant, who has served his sentence pursuant to the Sex Offender Act (SOA), N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 to -10, can be compelled to undergo a psychological evaluation, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(i)(3) and 10A:71-7.19A, for violation of certain conditions of parole supervision for life (PSL), and mandatory parole supervision (MPS), imposed outside the SOA. The panel reverses the Board's decision in part, holding it cannot compel such an evaluation. Absent further comment by the Legislature, these regulations only apply to individuals who have been released on parole before completing their sentence.

Pamela O’Donnell v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority (080735) (Middlesex County and Statewide) (A-69-17; 080735)

Pamela O’Donnell v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority (080735) (Middlesex County and Statewide) (A-69-17; 080735)

Under the limited circumstances of this case, extraordinary circumstances existed justifying O’Donnell’s late filing.

Amanda Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc. and Choice Home Warranty (079680) (Middlesex County and Statewide) (A-15-17; 079680)

Amanda Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc. and Choice Home Warranty (079680) (Middlesex County and Statewide) (A-15-17; 079680)

The so-called “arbitration agreement” within this consumer contract fails to support a finding of mutuality of assent to form an agreement to arbitrate. The provision’s language is debatable, confusing, and contradictory -- and, in part, misleading. The “arbitration agreement” is also obscure when this consumer contract is viewed as a whole. The provision does not fairly convey to an ordinary person that arbitration would be the required method of dispute resolution. Accordingly, this arbitration agreement is not enforceable.

JAMES MURRAY VS. COMCAST CORP., ET AL. (L-2552-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1987-17T4)

JAMES MURRAY VS. COMCAST CORP., ET AL. (L-2552-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1987-17T4) Plaintiff filed a civil action against his employer alleging wrongful termination. The Law Division granted defendant's motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 4:49-2 that was received by defendant and the trial court more than twenty days from the date defendant's served plaintiff with the order compelling arbitration. The trial court nevertheless granted plaintiff's motion and directed the matter to proceed to trial. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties' failure to object, nor conferred upon the court by the parties' agreement. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 65-66 (1978). This court holds that judges have an independent, non-delegable duty to raise and determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case whenever there is a reasonable basis to do so. Here, the Law Division did not have subject matter jurisdiction at the time it granted plaintiff's untimely motion for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2.

BOROUGH OF GLASSBORO VS. JACK GROSSMAN, ET AL. (L-0075-18, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4556-17T2)

BOROUGH OF GLASSBORO VS. JACK GROSSMAN, ET AL. (L-0075-18, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4556-17T2) The panel addresses the evidentiary implications of a key provision within the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law ("LRHL"), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -49. The provision in question, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(c), authorizes a municipality or redevelopment agency to acquire by condemnation any lands or buildings which are "necessary for the redevelopment project." The panel holds that if a landowner within the redevelopment area contests the necessity of a condemnation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(c), the statute logically requires the condemning authority to articulate a definitive need to acquire the parcel for an identified redevelopment project. That articulated need must be more specific than the mere "stockpiling" of real estate that might hypothetically be useful for a redevelopment project in the future. In addition, the condemning authority in such a contested case must present to the court at least some evidence – consisting of facts, expert opinion, or both – that provides reasonable substantiation of the need. To hold otherwise and allow the condemning authority merely to proclaim a need, without

Josh Finkelman v. National Football League, et al (080501

Josh Finkelman v. National Football League, et al (080501) (Statewide) (A-38-17; 080501) (1) The term “person” in section 35.1 includes not only ticket brokers and resellers, but also other individuals and entities with “access to tickets to an event prior to the tickets’ release for sale to the general public.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-35.1. (2(a)) The sale of tickets to winners of the NFL’s ticket lottery constitutes a “release for sale to the general public” within the meaning of section 35.1. (2(b)) The Super Bowl tickets sold to lottery winners were the only 2014 Super Bowl tickets designated by the NFL for “release for sale to the general public” within the meaning of section 35.1, however. The NFL’s distribution of other tickets to the 2014 Super Bowl to its teams, other selected individuals, and entities therefore does not constitute the unlawful withholding of more than five percent of “tickets to an event prior to the tickets’ release for sale to the general public” under section 35.1.

MATTHEW P. TERRANOVA, ET AL. VS. GENERAL ELECTRIC PENSION TRUST, ET AL. (L-6691-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5699-16T3)

MATTHEW P. TERRANOVA, ET AL. VS. GENERAL ELECTRIC PENSION TRUST, ET AL. (L-6691-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5699-16T3)

Plaintiffs, after prevailing in an action against property owners they alleged were the sole dischargers liable pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, brought suit seeking clean-up contribution under the Spill Act from other owners of the same property.

The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding the doctrine of judicial estoppel was a defense to Spill Act claims. Although plaintiffs possessed information sufficient to put them on notice of possible Spill Act claims against other property owners, they did not name those owners as defendants in the first action. The court held the application of judicial estoppel to Spill Act claims compels plaintiffs to pursue in a single action all dischargers that are known or knowable. Plaintiffs' subsequent action against the dischargers of which they had notice was precluded.

J.G. VS. J.H. (FD-21-0329-14, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1326-17T2)

J.G. VS. J.H. (FD-21-0329-14, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1326-17T2)

Because the welfare of children is paramount whether the parents are married, divorced or never-married, the court reverses and remands for a plenary hearing in this non-dissolution, FD, child custody matter. The mother, J.G. (Jane) appeals from a custody and parenting time order entered after the judge denied discovery, denied Jane's lawyer the right to participate in the proceedings, did not afford cross-examination or an opportunity to call witnesses and decided the issues without fact-finding or a consideration of the statutory custody factors, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). The court reviews the appropriate way to handle FD custody matters, pursuant to Administrative Directive #01-02, "Standards for Child Custody and Parenting Time Investigation Reports" (Apr. 2, 2002), the Rules of Court and relevant statutes.

INTERACTIVE BROKERS, LLC, ET AL. VS. RICHARD W. BARRY, ETC. (C-000036-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4197-17T4)

INTERACTIVE BROKERS, LLC, ET AL. VS. RICHARD W. BARRY, ETC. (C-000036-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4197-17T4)

In this action arising out of the aftermath of a Ponzi scheme operated through a hedge fund, a Receiver was appointed on behalf of the fund and authorized to pursue all causes of action belonging to the fund.

The hedge fund operated through the securities trading platform of plaintiffs Interactive Brokers, and its employee, Kevin Michael Fischer. The Receiver instituted suit against plaintiffs, alleging they aided and abetted the breach of fiduciary duty and common law fraud and initiated arbitration proceedings under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Code and the Customer Agreement executed between plaintiffs and the hedge fund's founder.

Plaintiffs moved for injunctive relief, arguing the claims asserted by the Receiver were beyond the scope of his authority because they were grounded on the damages suffered by the hedge funds' defrauded investors, rather than the hedge fund itself.

The court concluded the Receiver acted within the statutory authority granted him under N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(c) and (d) and N.J.S.A. 14A:14-1 to -27. The Statement of Claims submitted to FINRA listed the hedge fund as its sole claimant. A receiver's action is not invalidated, even if the return of the assets to the receivership may ultimately benefit its investors.

As the dispute fell within the Agreement, the parties were mandated to arbitrate the dispute in FINRA.