VAN HORN V. VAN HORN A-6553-06T3 07-23-10
We reversed an order disqualifying counsel over her
client's objection for violating Rule 5:3-5(b) by taking a postjudgment
mortgage on her client's real estate while her
representation of her client continued during the time for
appeal by virtue of Rule 1:11-3. We held that disqualification
of counsel was not an available remedy for a violation of Rule
5:3-5(b). At most, the Family Part judge could have invalidated
the transaction. We did not require same because the direct
appeal has been decided and the evil sought to be prevented by
Rule 5:3-5(b) no longer exists.
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
CBS OUTDOOR, INC. V. BOROUGH OF LEBANON PLANNING (A-3479-08T2)
CBS OUTDOOR, INC. V. BOROUGH OF LEBANON PLANNING BOARD/BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT A-3479-08T2 07-22-10
This action in lieu of prerogative writs involves outdoor
advertising media. We provisionally remand the development
application to the local land use agency for further
proceedings. The opinion addresses several recurring land use
issues, including conditional use variances, the time of
decision rule, and the "turn square corners" doctrine.
This action in lieu of prerogative writs involves outdoor
advertising media. We provisionally remand the development
application to the local land use agency for further
proceedings. The opinion addresses several recurring land use
issues, including conditional use variances, the time of
decision rule, and the "turn square corners" doctrine.
Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center (A-52-09)
Gloria Hubner and Michael Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center (A-52-09)7-28-10
The Equine Act operates as a complete bar to plaintiff’s claim because her injuries were caused by one of the inherent risks of equine activities as defined in the statute.
The Equine Act operates as a complete bar to plaintiff’s claim because her injuries were caused by one of the inherent risks of equine activities as defined in the statute.
Abby Ryan, et al. v. Andrew Renny, M.D. (A-50-09)
Abby Ryan, et al. v. Andrew Renny, M.D. (A-50-09)7-22-10
Based on the plain language of the Affidavit of Merit
statute, plaintiff Abby Ryan satisfied the good faith standard of the statute’s waiver provision, which permits a non-board-certified physician to certify that the actions of a board-certified specialist did not meet the required standard of care.
Based on the plain language of the Affidavit of Merit
statute, plaintiff Abby Ryan satisfied the good faith standard of the statute’s waiver provision, which permits a non-board-certified physician to certify that the actions of a board-certified specialist did not meet the required standard of care.
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
TAC Associates v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, et al. (A-57-09)
TAC Associates v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, et al. (A-57-09) 7-15-10
Under the Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation
Act, an applicant for an Innocent Party Grant to
defray the cost of remediating a contaminated property
must own the property at the time it submits the
application. Because plaintiff TAC Associates no
longer owned the property when it applied for the
grant, it was ineligible.
Under the Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation
Act, an applicant for an Innocent Party Grant to
defray the cost of remediating a contaminated property
must own the property at the time it submits the
application. Because plaintiff TAC Associates no
longer owned the property when it applied for the
grant, it was ineligible.
TAC Associates v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, et al. (A-57-09)
TAC Associates v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, et al. (A-57-09) 7-15-10
Under the Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation
Act, an applicant for an Innocent Party Grant to
defray the cost of remediating a contaminated property
must own the property at the time it submits the
application. Because plaintiff TAC Associates no
longer owned the property when it applied for the
grant, it was ineligible.
Under the Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation
Act, an applicant for an Innocent Party Grant to
defray the cost of remediating a contaminated property
must own the property at the time it submits the
application. Because plaintiff TAC Associates no
longer owned the property when it applied for the
grant, it was ineligible.
BIG M, INC. V. TEXAS ROADHOUSE HOLDING, LLC A-3088-08T1
BIG M, INC. V. TEXAS ROADHOUSE HOLDING, LLC A-3088-08T1 07-16-10
In this appeal, we address whether tips and gratuities are
subject to wage garnishment. We explained that the issue turns
on the control exercised by the employer of the tips and
gratuities, but held that tips and gratuities paid in cash
directly to the employee or charged to a credit card and paid
contemporaneously to the employee are not subject to
garnishment. We reversed a judgment in favor of the judgment
holder against the employer of a judgment debtor and remanded
for development of the factual record.
In this appeal, we address whether tips and gratuities are
subject to wage garnishment. We explained that the issue turns
on the control exercised by the employer of the tips and
gratuities, but held that tips and gratuities paid in cash
directly to the employee or charged to a credit card and paid
contemporaneously to the employee are not subject to
garnishment. We reversed a judgment in favor of the judgment
holder against the employer of a judgment debtor and remanded
for development of the factual record.
BIG M, INC. V. TEXAS ROADHOUSE HOLDING, LLC A-3088-08T1
BIG M, INC. V. TEXAS ROADHOUSE HOLDING, LLC A-3088-08T1 07-16-10
In this appeal, we address whether tips and gratuities are
subject to wage garnishment. We explained that the issue turns
on the control exercised by the employer of the tips and
gratuities, but held that tips and gratuities paid in cash
directly to the employee or charged to a credit card and paid
contemporaneously to the employee are not subject to
garnishment. We reversed a judgment in favor of the judgment
holder against the employer of a judgment debtor and remanded
for development of the factual record.
In this appeal, we address whether tips and gratuities are
subject to wage garnishment. We explained that the issue turns
on the control exercised by the employer of the tips and
gratuities, but held that tips and gratuities paid in cash
directly to the employee or charged to a credit card and paid
contemporaneously to the employee are not subject to
garnishment. We reversed a judgment in favor of the judgment
holder against the employer of a judgment debtor and remanded
for development of the factual record.
LUCHEJKO V. CITY OF HOBOKEN,A-5702-07T2
RICHARD LUCHEJKO V. CITY OF HOBOKEN, CM3 MANAGEMENT
COMPANY and SKYLINE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION A-5702-07T2 07-12-10
In this appeal we decide whether, a condominium association
has a duty to maintain an abutting public sidewalk as if it were
a commercial landowner. We hold that a condominium association
does not bear such duty or responsibility. We also reject other
theories of liability against the association and the
municipality.
COMPANY and SKYLINE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION A-5702-07T2 07-12-10
In this appeal we decide whether, a condominium association
has a duty to maintain an abutting public sidewalk as if it were
a commercial landowner. We hold that a condominium association
does not bear such duty or responsibility. We also reject other
theories of liability against the association and the
municipality.
PALOMBI v. PALOMBI A-2189-08T2
PALOMBI v. PALOMBI A-2189-08T2 07-08-10
Appellant argued that the motion judge erred in deciding
six post-judgment motions that concerned "substantive" issues
without oral argument. Reviewing the circumstances of each
motion, the court found no abuse of discretion. Motions that
seek a modification of financial obligations without providing a
current and a prior case information statement pursuant to Rule motion, the
5:5-4(a) and motions for reconsideration that fail to explicitly
identify the matters or controlling decisions that demonstrate
that the court acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable
manner, see R. 4:49-2, are deficient on their face. Because
these deficiencies are evidentiary in nature, they cannot be
cured at oral argument. Therefore, although motions nominally
raised issues of a substantive nature, the motions failed to
present "substantive" issues to the court for determination;
oral argument would have been unproductive and unnecessary; and
the motion judge acted within his discretion to deny oral
argument.
Appellant argued that the motion judge erred in deciding
six post-judgment motions that concerned "substantive" issues
without oral argument. Reviewing the circumstances of each
motion, the court found no abuse of discretion. Motions that
seek a modification of financial obligations without providing a
current and a prior case information statement pursuant to Rule motion, the
5:5-4(a) and motions for reconsideration that fail to explicitly
identify the matters or controlling decisions that demonstrate
that the court acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable
manner, see R. 4:49-2, are deficient on their face. Because
these deficiencies are evidentiary in nature, they cannot be
cured at oral argument. Therefore, although motions nominally
raised issues of a substantive nature, the motions failed to
present "substantive" issues to the court for determination;
oral argument would have been unproductive and unnecessary; and
the motion judge acted within his discretion to deny oral
argument.
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
BAYER V. TOWNSHIP OF UNION (A-1482-07T2
BAYER V. TOWNSHIP OF UNION (A-1482-07T2) 7-7-10
In this case, where defendant was arrested based upon a
mistaken identification, we affirm the trial court's dismissal
of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 claim on summary judgment
because a careful review of the undisputed facts reveals that a
reasonable police officer would have believed there was probable
cause to arrest plaintiff. That was a determination
appropriately made by the trial court. We also affirm the trial
court's dismissal of plaintiff's Tort Claims Act claim because
plaintiff failed to provide timely notice pursuant to N.J.S.A.
59:8-8.
In this case, where defendant was arrested based upon a
mistaken identification, we affirm the trial court's dismissal
of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 claim on summary judgment
because a careful review of the undisputed facts reveals that a
reasonable police officer would have believed there was probable
cause to arrest plaintiff. That was a determination
appropriately made by the trial court. We also affirm the trial
court's dismissal of plaintiff's Tort Claims Act claim because
plaintiff failed to provide timely notice pursuant to N.J.S.A.
59:8-8.
CHARLES HAYWOOD, ET AL. VS. RICKY HARRIS, ET AL. A-1120-09T3
CHARLES HAYWOOD, ET AL. VS. RICKY HARRIS, ET AL. A-1120-09T3 7-2-10
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered after trial in
this uninsured motorist litigation brought against his carrier.
Plaintiff was subject to the "limitation on lawsuit" option
(LOL), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), and alleged a "permanent" injury, as
well as past and future lost wages based upon his inability to
return to his prior position as a union mason. Defendant
stipulated to liability, and the case was tried as to whether
plaintiff's injury was "permanent," and on causation and
damages. The jury concluded plaintiff's injury was not
permanent, but awarded plaintiff $75,000 in economic damages.
The jury interrogatory did not distinguish between an award for
past versus future loss of earnings.
Plaintiff's past lost wages were approximately $28,000, and
the judge granted defendant's request to mold the verdict and
enter judgment in that amount. Plaintiff contended that the
jury's award reflected past lost wages, as well as future lost
wages for a reasonable period of time, and that the award was
fully supported by the evidence.
We concluded that plaintiff's claim for future lost wages
was not barred as a matter of law simply because the jury
concluded the injury was not "permanent" within the meaning of
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). However we affirmed, concluding that
plaintiff had failed to adduce sufficient proof of a continuing
future wage loss.
We also concluded that the current model jury charge on
future loss of earnings should be modified in situations where
the plaintiff alleges a permanent injury and the LOL applies.
The jury should be specifically instructed that in the event it
concludes that plaintiff's injury is not permanent, it may make
an award for future loss of earnings, but the amount of any
award must be limited to only those earnings "lost during a
reasonable period of recuperation and recovery." Miskelly v.
Lorence, 380 N.J. Super. 574, 578 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
185 N.J. 597 (2005).
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered after trial in
this uninsured motorist litigation brought against his carrier.
Plaintiff was subject to the "limitation on lawsuit" option
(LOL), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), and alleged a "permanent" injury, as
well as past and future lost wages based upon his inability to
return to his prior position as a union mason. Defendant
stipulated to liability, and the case was tried as to whether
plaintiff's injury was "permanent," and on causation and
damages. The jury concluded plaintiff's injury was not
permanent, but awarded plaintiff $75,000 in economic damages.
The jury interrogatory did not distinguish between an award for
past versus future loss of earnings.
Plaintiff's past lost wages were approximately $28,000, and
the judge granted defendant's request to mold the verdict and
enter judgment in that amount. Plaintiff contended that the
jury's award reflected past lost wages, as well as future lost
wages for a reasonable period of time, and that the award was
fully supported by the evidence.
We concluded that plaintiff's claim for future lost wages
was not barred as a matter of law simply because the jury
concluded the injury was not "permanent" within the meaning of
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). However we affirmed, concluding that
plaintiff had failed to adduce sufficient proof of a continuing
future wage loss.
We also concluded that the current model jury charge on
future loss of earnings should be modified in situations where
the plaintiff alleges a permanent injury and the LOL applies.
The jury should be specifically instructed that in the event it
concludes that plaintiff's injury is not permanent, it may make
an award for future loss of earnings, but the amount of any
award must be limited to only those earnings "lost during a
reasonable period of recuperation and recovery." Miskelly v.
Lorence, 380 N.J. Super. 574, 578 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
185 N.J. 597 (2005).
Sunday, July 4, 2010
Kenneth Vercammen Law Office 25th Anniversary Party Friday, July 30, 2010
Kenneth Vercammen Law Office
25th Anniversary Party
Friday, July 30, 2010
"Celebrating 25 years of providing excellent service to clients and the community"
1985-2010
Happy Hour, Open House, Client & Community Appreciation Social. Open to the public 4-7 PM
Food, Refreshments, T- shirts and special gifts
The Law office is located at 2053 Woodbridge Avenue, Edison, NJ 08817 near the Nixon Post Office, approximately 1/2 mile from Route 1/ Wick Plaza, and 1 mile from Middlesex County College. There is 50 parking spaces nearby on Russell Ave. and Lillian St. around the corner from Kim’s Kafe, on Woodbridge Ave. near the Green Derby Tavern, and across the street on School House Lane.
Visit our website at www.njlaws.com for Directions and other details or call and we will fax directions or email at KenV@njlaws.com
Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. at (732) 572-0500(Law office)
Fax form to 732-572-0030 or email
kenvnjlaws@verizon.net
-Yes, We will be attending the party
Name: _____________________________
email: _____________________________
http://www.kennethvercammen.com/25th.party.html
25th Anniversary Party
Friday, July 30, 2010
"Celebrating 25 years of providing excellent service to clients and the community"
1985-2010
Happy Hour, Open House, Client & Community Appreciation Social. Open to the public 4-7 PM
Food, Refreshments, T- shirts and special gifts
The Law office is located at 2053 Woodbridge Avenue, Edison, NJ 08817 near the Nixon Post Office, approximately 1/2 mile from Route 1/ Wick Plaza, and 1 mile from Middlesex County College. There is 50 parking spaces nearby on Russell Ave. and Lillian St. around the corner from Kim’s Kafe, on Woodbridge Ave. near the Green Derby Tavern, and across the street on School House Lane.
Visit our website at www.njlaws.com for Directions and other details or call and we will fax directions or email at KenV@njlaws.com
Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. at (732) 572-0500(Law office)
Fax form to 732-572-0030 or email
kenvnjlaws@verizon.net
-Yes, We will be attending the party
Name: _____________________________
email: _____________________________
http://www.kennethvercammen.com/25th.party.html
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