IN THE MATTER OF RIVERVIEW DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
WATERFRONT DEVELOPMENT PERMIT
NO. 0908-05-0004.3 WFD 060001
A-1843-08T3 01-27-10
Townhouse residents, whose views of the Hudson River and
the New York City skyline will be fully or partially blocked by
a proposed high-rise development, do not have the right to a
trial-type hearing in the Office of Administrative Law to
contest the high-rise developer's application to the Department
of Environmental Protection ("DEP") for a waterfront development
permit under the Coastal Zone Management Regulations, N.J.A.C.
7:7E-1.1 to -8A.5. We affirm the DEP Commissioner's
determination that such residents lack "a particularized
property interest sufficient to require a hearing on
constitutional or statutory grounds," as is necessary under
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2c. However, such residents do have standing
to challenge on appeal the merits of the issued permit.
Saturday, January 30, 2010
PAUL ROSEN, ET AL V. PETER KEELER, ET AL A-0555-08T2
PAUL ROSEN, ET AL V. PETER KEELER, ET AL
A-0555-08T2
01-27-10
An easement appurtenant cannot be transferred or assigned
for the benefit of another tenement separate from the dominant
estate unless the instrument creating it demonstrates a clear
intent to grant such a right. A provision in the instrument
stating that the easement runs with the land and inures to the
benefit of the grantees and their "assigns and successors in
title" does not grant such a right but is limited to subsequent
owners of the dominant estate. Therefore, the purported
assignment ofunenforceable.
A-0555-08T2
01-27-10
An easement appurtenant cannot be transferred or assigned
for the benefit of another tenement separate from the dominant
estate unless the instrument creating it demonstrates a clear
intent to grant such a right. A provision in the instrument
stating that the easement runs with the land and inures to the
benefit of the grantees and their "assigns and successors in
title" does not grant such a right but is limited to subsequent
owners of the dominant estate. Therefore, the purported
assignment ofunenforceable.
CFG HEALTH SYSTEMS, LLC V. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES A-2577-07T3
CFG HEALTH SYSTEMS, LLC V. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH
SERVICES
A-2577-07T3 01-25-10
It is appropriate under some circumstances to grant a party
adversely affected by a judgment leave to intervene for the
purpose of pursuing an appeal if a party with a similar interest
who actively litigated the case at the trial level has elected
not to appeal. Under the competitive contracting in lieu of
public bidding sections of the Local Public Contracts Law, a
local contracting agency may reject all contract proposals and
repeat the competitive contracting process if it reasonably
concludes that its consideration of the original proposals
violated the provisions or purposes of the Law.
SERVICES
A-2577-07T3 01-25-10
It is appropriate under some circumstances to grant a party
adversely affected by a judgment leave to intervene for the
purpose of pursuing an appeal if a party with a similar interest
who actively litigated the case at the trial level has elected
not to appeal. Under the competitive contracting in lieu of
public bidding sections of the Local Public Contracts Law, a
local contracting agency may reject all contract proposals and
repeat the competitive contracting process if it reasonably
concludes that its consideration of the original proposals
violated the provisions or purposes of the Law.
KATHRYN POTE V. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, ET AL. A-2544-08T
KATHRYN POTE V. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, ET AL.
A-2544-08T3 01-19-10
We affirm summary judgment dismissal and denial of
reconsideration of plaintiff's premises liability complaint
against SMG, the manager of Boardwalk Hall, for injuries
allegedly sustained when she slipped and fell on an icy patch of
snow on the Atlantic City boardwalk about ten feet away from
Boardwalk Hall's property as she was approaching the building to
attend a show. We perceive no just public policy consideration
or sound basis to create another exception to the general rules
governing premises liability and expand the duty established by
our current cof this case.
A-2544-08T3 01-19-10
We affirm summary judgment dismissal and denial of
reconsideration of plaintiff's premises liability complaint
against SMG, the manager of Boardwalk Hall, for injuries
allegedly sustained when she slipped and fell on an icy patch of
snow on the Atlantic City boardwalk about ten feet away from
Boardwalk Hall's property as she was approaching the building to
attend a show. We perceive no just public policy consideration
or sound basis to create another exception to the general rules
governing premises liability and expand the duty established by
our current cof this case.
Asbury Park Press v. County of Monmouth, et al. (A-8-09)
Asbury Park Press v. County of Monmouth, et al.
(A-8-09) 1-25-10
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
Ashrafi’s opinion. The Open Public Records Act
(OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, requires disclosure
of a settlement agreement between the County of
Monmouth and an employee who filed a lawsuit claiming
sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation,
and a hostile work environment. The Court also agrees
that plaintiffs Asbury Park Press and John Paff are
entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, which the
trial court is to determine on remand.
(A-8-09) 1-25-10
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
Ashrafi’s opinion. The Open Public Records Act
(OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, requires disclosure
of a settlement agreement between the County of
Monmouth and an employee who filed a lawsuit claiming
sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation,
and a hostile work environment. The Court also agrees
that plaintiffs Asbury Park Press and John Paff are
entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, which the
trial court is to determine on remand.
Wilman Pinto and Alvaro Vasquez v. Spectrum Chemicals, et al. (A-94-08
Wilman Pinto and Alvaro Vasquez v. Spectrum Chemicals,
et al. (A-94-08) 1-21-10
The Court upholds the decision of the trial judge who
found that the parties did not reach a settlement
through the mediator. In addition, the Court lifts
the bar that Coleman v. Fiore Bros., 113 N.J. 594
(1989) placed on public-interest attorneys and
defendants from simultaneously negotiating merits and
attorneys’ fees claims in Consumer Fraud Act (CFA)
cases. In the Conscientious Employee Protection Act
(CEPA) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(LAD) claims at issue in this case, and in future CFA
cases, public-interest counsel may simultaneously
negotiate merits and fees. Defendants, however, may
not insist on a waiver of fees or dictate how
settlement proceeds should be divided between a
public-interest attorney and her client in a fee-
shifting case.
et al. (A-94-08) 1-21-10
The Court upholds the decision of the trial judge who
found that the parties did not reach a settlement
through the mediator. In addition, the Court lifts
the bar that Coleman v. Fiore Bros., 113 N.J. 594
(1989) placed on public-interest attorneys and
defendants from simultaneously negotiating merits and
attorneys’ fees claims in Consumer Fraud Act (CFA)
cases. In the Conscientious Employee Protection Act
(CEPA) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(LAD) claims at issue in this case, and in future CFA
cases, public-interest counsel may simultaneously
negotiate merits and fees. Defendants, however, may
not insist on a waiver of fees or dictate how
settlement proceeds should be divided between a
public-interest attorney and her client in a fee-
shifting case.
Sunday, January 17, 2010
Fernando Roa and Liliana Roa v. LAFE and Marino Roa (A-72-08
Fernando Roa and Liliana Roa v. LAFE and Marino Roa
(A-72-08) 1-14-10
Under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination, the
statute of limitations begins to run on a discrete
retaliatory act, such as a discharge, on the date on
which the act takes place, and a timely claim based on
post-discharge retaliatory conduct does not sweep in a
prior untimely discrete act which the victim knew or
should have known gave rise to a retaliation claim.
However, a discrete post-discharge act of retaliation
is independently actionable even if it does not relate
to present or future employment, and evidence relating
to barred claims may be admissible in the trial of the
timely claim.
(A-72-08) 1-14-10
Under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination, the
statute of limitations begins to run on a discrete
retaliatory act, such as a discharge, on the date on
which the act takes place, and a timely claim based on
post-discharge retaliatory conduct does not sweep in a
prior untimely discrete act which the victim knew or
should have known gave rise to a retaliation claim.
However, a discrete post-discharge act of retaliation
is independently actionable even if it does not relate
to present or future employment, and evidence relating
to barred claims may be admissible in the trial of the
timely claim.
JESSE J. COOPER, SR. v. BARNICKEL ENTERPRISES, INC. A-1813-08T3
JESSE J. COOPER, SR. v. BARNICKEL ENTERPRISES, INC.
A-1813-08T3 01-13-10
Injuries resulting from accident which occurred while offsite
employee was driving for a cup of coffee in employer's
vehicle on his coffee break was compensable under the workers'
compensation law because the accident occurred within a
reasonable distance from the place at which the off-site
employee was waiting to perform a work related meeting and the
coffee break was equivalent to that of an on-site employee.
A-1813-08T3 01-13-10
Injuries resulting from accident which occurred while offsite
employee was driving for a cup of coffee in employer's
vehicle on his coffee break was compensable under the workers'
compensation law because the accident occurred within a
reasonable distance from the place at which the off-site
employee was waiting to perform a work related meeting and the
coffee break was equivalent to that of an on-site employee.
JOSEPH BERNSTEIN, ET AL. V. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL. A-1601-08T3
JOSEPH BERNSTEIN, ET AL. V. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET
AL.
A-1601-08T3 01-11-10
In this prisoner-on-prisoner homicide, the decedent's
estate sued a number of Department of Corrections (DOC)
officials as well as administrators and employees of East Jersey
State Prison, alleging common law tort and federal civil rights
claims based on defendants' alleged delayed response to the
attack, resulting in the inmate's death. Specifically,
plaintiff claimed that the attack was delayed by: (1) a prison
policy dictating supervision of the mess hall from protective
cages above the floor rather than direct floor patrol and (2) a
violation of a standing order by assembling two emergency
response teams rather than one before interceding. Plaintiff
also sought to hold defendants liable for failing to remove the
attacking inmate from the prison's general population, as he
suffered from psychological problems.
We affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint finding the individual State defendants immune from
State tort claims under N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4) in the absence of
any evidence of willful misconduct. As to the federal civil
rights claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, we also found no proof
of a constitutional violation, that is, no evidence defendants
acted with a deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to
decedent in violation of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and
unusual punishment" ban. Moreover, because we discerned no
violation of a clearly established constitutional right, we held
the individual State defendants have a qualified immunity from
liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
AL.
A-1601-08T3 01-11-10
In this prisoner-on-prisoner homicide, the decedent's
estate sued a number of Department of Corrections (DOC)
officials as well as administrators and employees of East Jersey
State Prison, alleging common law tort and federal civil rights
claims based on defendants' alleged delayed response to the
attack, resulting in the inmate's death. Specifically,
plaintiff claimed that the attack was delayed by: (1) a prison
policy dictating supervision of the mess hall from protective
cages above the floor rather than direct floor patrol and (2) a
violation of a standing order by assembling two emergency
response teams rather than one before interceding. Plaintiff
also sought to hold defendants liable for failing to remove the
attacking inmate from the prison's general population, as he
suffered from psychological problems.
We affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint finding the individual State defendants immune from
State tort claims under N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4) in the absence of
any evidence of willful misconduct. As to the federal civil
rights claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, we also found no proof
of a constitutional violation, that is, no evidence defendants
acted with a deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to
decedent in violation of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and
unusual punishment" ban. Moreover, because we discerned no
violation of a clearly established constitutional right, we held
the individual State defendants have a qualified immunity from
liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN v. AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING, INC. A-5533-07T3
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN v. AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING, INC.
A-5533-07T3 01-11-10
In this case that arises from our remand in Triffin v.
Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div.
2007), we affirm the trial judge's decision and hold that the
finding that plaintiff committed a fraud upon the court was
supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence and
that the sanctions imposed for such fraud were permissible and
reasonable.
A-5533-07T3 01-11-10
In this case that arises from our remand in Triffin v.
Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div.
2007), we affirm the trial judge's decision and hold that the
finding that plaintiff committed a fraud upon the court was
supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence and
that the sanctions imposed for such fraud were permissible and
reasonable.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
J.T.'s TIRE SERVICE, INC. and EILEEN TOTORELLO V. UNITED RENTALS NORTH AMERICA, INC. A-2989-08T2
J.T.'s TIRE SERVICE, INC. and EILEEN TOTORELLO V.
UNITED RENTALS NORTH AMERICA, INC.
A-2989-08T2 01-06-10
A woman entrepreneur claimed that defendant stopped buying
tires from her company because she refused to submit to sexual
demands from defendant's branch manager. We held that her
allegations of quid pro quo sexual harassment stated a cause of
action under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-
12(l).
UNITED RENTALS NORTH AMERICA, INC.
A-2989-08T2 01-06-10
A woman entrepreneur claimed that defendant stopped buying
tires from her company because she refused to submit to sexual
demands from defendant's branch manager. We held that her
allegations of quid pro quo sexual harassment stated a cause of
action under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-
12(l).
YAAKOV ABDELHAK v. THE JEWISH PRESS INC., OLEG RIVKIN, RICHARD I. SCHARLAT and GABRIELLE TITO, et al. A-2023-08T3
YAAKOV ABDELHAK v. THE JEWISH PRESS INC., OLEG RIVKIN,
RICHARD I. SCHARLAT and GABRIELLE TITO, et al.
A-2023-08T3 12-31-09
We reject plaintiff's contention that when a cause of
action is secular in nature, and the defendants are not
religious figures, there can be no excessive entanglement.
Where, as here, a jury cannot evaluate plaintiff's cause of
action without developing a keen understanding of religious
doctrine, and without applying such religious doctrine to the
facts presented, the excessive entanglement that the First
Amendment seeks to avoid is squarely presented. Thus, we
conclude that neither the secular nature of the cause of action
nor the secular professions of the defendants serve as a per se
bar to a finding of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
RICHARD I. SCHARLAT and GABRIELLE TITO, et al.
A-2023-08T3 12-31-09
We reject plaintiff's contention that when a cause of
action is secular in nature, and the defendants are not
religious figures, there can be no excessive entanglement.
Where, as here, a jury cannot evaluate plaintiff's cause of
action without developing a keen understanding of religious
doctrine, and without applying such religious doctrine to the
facts presented, the excessive entanglement that the First
Amendment seeks to avoid is squarely presented. Thus, we
conclude that neither the secular nature of the cause of action
nor the secular professions of the defendants serve as a per se
bar to a finding of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
Hildegard Kay v. George Kay (A-93-08)
Hildegard Kay v. George Kay (A-93-08) 1-6-10
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
Grall’s opinion below. A trial court may not refuse
to consider the equitable claims raised by the estate
of a deceased spouse who, during the divorce
litigation, was attempting to pursue a claim that the
surviving spouse had diverted marital assets.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
Grall’s opinion below. A trial court may not refuse
to consider the equitable claims raised by the estate
of a deceased spouse who, during the divorce
litigation, was attempting to pursue a claim that the
surviving spouse had diverted marital assets.
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