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Wednesday, January 9, 2008

Carbis Sales, Inc., d/b/a Carbis Ladders v. Israel N. Eisenberg, Esq.

12-11-07 A-4976-05T5

In this action alleging legal malpractice in the defense of
the client's cause, plaintiffs were awarded damages
substantially less than the amount of the adverse judgment
against them in the underlying products liability case.
Consequently, plaintiffs moved for a new trial on damages only,
or additur, which was denied. On appeal, we agreed with
plaintiffs there was no reasonable basis in the evidence for the
jury's damage award, which was disproportionate to the adverse
judgment against them. However, because a general verdict was
returned, the remedy is a remand for a new trial as to all
issues and all parties.
Instead of using special interrogatories that would have
elicited jury findings as to whether malpractice was committed
in defending the liability phase of the product liability action
– in which case there would have been no recovery but for
defendant's negligence (there being no claim of comparative
fault to warrant any apportionment of liability); or in the
damages phase – in which event recovery may have been less than
awarded but for defendant's negligence – the jury was given no
instruction as to damages other than it was in their discretion
what, if anything, to award plaintiffs, and the verdict sheet
did not require the jury to specify which conclusion they had
reached. Because of this uncertainty, plaintiffs are not
entitled, in effect, to a directed verdict on liability as would
result if a remand were limited, as urged by plaintiffs, to a
damages-only new trial.
We also held that plaintiffs may not recover for legal fees
and costs expended for the services of a predecessor attorney in
defendant's law firm who was not negligent.
We further denied defendant's own appeal because the
factual and expert proofs were ample to demonstrate the trial
attorney's deviations from the standards of care of a reasonably
prudent defense lawyer.