9-12-07 (A-15-06)
A physician has a common law duty to provide a woman with
material information concerning the medical risks of terminating
her pregnancy; however, there is no common law duty requiring a
physician to inform a pregnant patient that an embryo is an
existing, living human being and that an abortion results in the
killing of a family member.
Tuesday, September 25, 2007
International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc.
9-6-07 (A-22-06)
Certification of a nationwide class is not appropriate because
common questions of fact or law do not predominate and a class
action is not superior to other available mechanisms for
redress.
Certification of a nationwide class is not appropriate because
common questions of fact or law do not predominate and a class
action is not superior to other available mechanisms for
redress.
Carolyn Amm Ausley v. County of Middlesex
09-24-07 A-2765-06T5
We addressed the circumstances under which a decedent's
relative may obtain tissue samples taken during an autopsy, for
purposes of further testing by a privately-retained medical
expert. We also discussed the proper procedure to be followed
in such cases.
We addressed the circumstances under which a decedent's
relative may obtain tissue samples taken during an autopsy, for
purposes of further testing by a privately-retained medical
expert. We also discussed the proper procedure to be followed
in such cases.
Exit A Plus Realty v. Edison Zuniga
09-05-07 A-5406-05T2
Where a real estate broker violates N.J.S.A. 45:15-17f, the
listing agreement is voidable, but is not automatically null and
void. To that extent, we expressly disapprove of the Law
Division ruling in Winding Brook Realty v. Platzer, 166 N.J.
Super. 575 (Law Div. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 173 N.J.
Super. 472 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 119 (1980).
Where a real estate broker violates N.J.S.A. 45:15-17f, the
listing agreement is voidable, but is not automatically null and
void. To that extent, we expressly disapprove of the Law
Division ruling in Winding Brook Realty v. Platzer, 166 N.J.
Super. 575 (Law Div. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 173 N.J.
Super. 472 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 119 (1980).
In the Matter of R.A.
09-04-07 A-4106-06T1
Held that In the Matter of R.D., 384 N.J. Super. 61 ((App.
Div. 2006) does not authorize a different trial judge to alter a
previously adjudicated Megan's Law Tier Assessment and Community
Notification Determination where there are no facts previously
unknown or undisclosed to the judge who made the initial
determination. It also clarifies the scope of the phrase
"household/family member" as used in the Registrant Risk
Assessment Scale.
Held that In the Matter of R.D., 384 N.J. Super. 61 ((App.
Div. 2006) does not authorize a different trial judge to alter a
previously adjudicated Megan's Law Tier Assessment and Community
Notification Determination where there are no facts previously
unknown or undisclosed to the judge who made the initial
determination. It also clarifies the scope of the phrase
"household/family member" as used in the Registrant Risk
Assessment Scale.
J.H. v. Mercer County Youth Detention Center
08-29-07 A-3637-05T2
We hold that a county youth detention center is a "person
standing in loco parentis within the household" of a detained
juvenile within the meaning of the Child Sexual Abuse Act
(CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1. We further hold that the New Jersey
Tort Claims Act provisions, N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 and N.J.S.A. 59:9-2
(c) and (d), do not bar a juvenile detainee's compensatory and
punitive damages cause of action under the passive abuser
liability provision of the CSAA against the county youth
detention center and the county that operates the center, where
a worker with supervisory authority sexually abuses a child
under the age of eighteen years and those in supervisory
authority knowingly permit or acquiesce in the child sexual
abuse.
We hold that a county youth detention center is a "person
standing in loco parentis within the household" of a detained
juvenile within the meaning of the Child Sexual Abuse Act
(CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1. We further hold that the New Jersey
Tort Claims Act provisions, N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 and N.J.S.A. 59:9-2
(c) and (d), do not bar a juvenile detainee's compensatory and
punitive damages cause of action under the passive abuser
liability provision of the CSAA against the county youth
detention center and the county that operates the center, where
a worker with supervisory authority sexually abuses a child
under the age of eighteen years and those in supervisory
authority knowingly permit or acquiesce in the child sexual
abuse.
M.S. v. Millburn Police Department
08-28-07 A-5601-05T1
The prohibition set by N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3c(8) that a Firearms
Purchase Identification card shall not be issued "[t]o any
person whose firearm is seized pursuant to the 'Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act of 1991' . . . and whose firearm has not
been returned," survives even if, as in the case here, the
domestic violence restraining order is vacated.
The prohibition set by N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3c(8) that a Firearms
Purchase Identification card shall not be issued "[t]o any
person whose firearm is seized pursuant to the 'Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act of 1991' . . . and whose firearm has not
been returned," survives even if, as in the case here, the
domestic violence restraining order is vacated.
Borough of Glassboro v. Fraternal Order of Police
08-27-07 A-3145-05T2
When two police officers apply for the same promotion in a
non-civil service municipality, residency may be considered by
the appointing authority only where the resident and nonresident
achieve the same score on a qualifying test. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-
122.6.
When two police officers apply for the same promotion in a
non-civil service municipality, residency may be considered by
the appointing authority only where the resident and nonresident
achieve the same score on a qualifying test. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-
122.6.
Mortimer Hetsberger v. Department of Corrections
08-24-07 A-4813-05T1
We reverse and remand a summary judgment dismissal because
the trial court did not apply the two-part standard of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1, in determining whether genuine
issues of material fact existed. The State prison inmate had
pleaded RLUIPA and the trial court was obliged to determine
whether DOC regulations regarding security threat groups and its
actions in respect of this plaintiff are (1) "in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) . . . the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest." The trial court's application only of First
Amendment standards did not satisfy the statutory requirements.
We reverse and remand a summary judgment dismissal because
the trial court did not apply the two-part standard of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1, in determining whether genuine
issues of material fact existed. The State prison inmate had
pleaded RLUIPA and the trial court was obliged to determine
whether DOC regulations regarding security threat groups and its
actions in respect of this plaintiff are (1) "in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) . . . the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest." The trial court's application only of First
Amendment standards did not satisfy the statutory requirements.
Carol Jones v. Department of Community
08-24-07 A-0701-05T3
Constitutional questions should not be considered in a
vacuum in the absence of a well-developed record isolating the
essential factual issues at their basis and including findings
of fact. Constitutional questions necessary to the complete
resolution of contested case issues may be considered, in the
first instance, in an administrative proceeding.
Constitutional questions should not be considered in a
vacuum in the absence of a well-developed record isolating the
essential factual issues at their basis and including findings
of fact. Constitutional questions necessary to the complete
resolution of contested case issues may be considered, in the
first instance, in an administrative proceeding.
Danilo Arias v. Freddy Figueroa
08-23-07 A-1866-05T5
The close questions involved in weighing the relative
governmental interests of New Jersey and New York to determine
which jurisdiction's rule of vicarious liability governs a car
rental company's amenability to suit, in the circumstances, is
resolved by a determination that the New York statutory rule was
not intended to apply extra-territorially.
The close questions involved in weighing the relative
governmental interests of New Jersey and New York to determine
which jurisdiction's rule of vicarious liability governs a car
rental company's amenability to suit, in the circumstances, is
resolved by a determination that the New York statutory rule was
not intended to apply extra-territorially.
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