William DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, I

 The refund provision is limited in scope: N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 provides relief only to victims of food-related fraud as identified in Chapter 347 and does not extend to all CFA violations. Because the allegations in this matter are unrelated to misrepresentations of the “identity of food,” plaintiffs are not entitled to a full refund under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11.

JOHN DOE VS. THE ESTATE OF C.V.O., JR. A-2780-21

 This appeal pertains to the civil personal injury prosecution of statutory and common law claims arising from allegations of sexual abuse committed fifty-five years ago against a child by his sister, who also was a minor when the acts occurred. 

In 2019, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Child Victims Act (CVA), L. 2019, c. 120, which supplemented and amended the statute of limitations for statutory and common law causes of actions for sexual abuse. The CVA enacted two statutes of limitations that expanded the time for filing  personal injury claims resulting from the commission of one of the following four enumerated sexual offenses:  (1) "the commission of sexual assault"; (2) "any other crime of a sexual nature"; (3) "a prohibited sexual act as defined in [N.J.S.A. 2A:30B-2]"; (4) "or sexual abuse as defined in [the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1]."  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a; N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b.  Pertinent to this appeal is the enacted statute of limitations which provided a two-year revival window for victims to file otherwise time-barred claims for sexual crimes committed against them when they were minors.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b.

The court considered the dismissal of plaintiff's CSAA claims, concluding a derivative statutory passive abuser claim against a parent was properly dismissed by the motion judge as not cognizable under the CSAA because the alleged sexual abuse was committed by a minor.  Because the CSAA defines sexual abuse as sexual contact or sexual penetration committed by an adult, a CSAA claim alleging sexual assault by minor does not present a valid cause of action. 

The court further considered the motion judge's dismissal of plaintiff's common law claims stemming from the alleged sexual abuse committed by a minor, which were timely filed under the two-year revival window.  The court concluded the common law claims are actionable independent of the CSAA. 

MORRIS PROPERTIES, INC., ET AL. VS. JONATHAN WHEELER,

 In this legal-malpractice case, the corporate plaintiff and its president appeal from an order granting defendants' summary-judgment motion.  The trial court found plaintiffs' expert had failed to analyze how defendants' alleged breaches of the standard of care would have impacted a potential jury verdict or settlement and had not opined that defendants' alleged malpractice proximately caused any damages.  The judge also dismissed the president's individual claim because the undisputed facts showed she and defendants did not have an attorney-client relationship.   

The court affirms, holding plaintiffs had not established proximate cause as a matter of law and that expert testimony was necessary in this case to prove proximate causation and damages.  With respect to the president's individual claim of legal malpractice, the court holds she failed to demonstrate the existence of an attorney-client relationship between herself and defendants. 

AVA SATZ VS. ALLEN SATZ

 Defendant appeals from Family Part orders enforcing provisions of a marital settlement agreement (MSA).  A critical area of dispute centered on plaintiff's desire to obtain a get—a divorce recognized under Jewish religious law through a process known as a beis din proceeding.  Before a verdict was reached in the Family Part divorce trial, the parties reached an agreement on all issues, including each party's obligations with respect to participation in beis din proceedings.

The court rejects defendant's argument that the Family Part judge violated his First Amendment rights by ordering him to participate in beis din proceedings and to sign an arbitration agreement with the beis din.  The court acknowledges the fundamental principle that civil courts may not become entangled in religious proceedings.  The First Amendment's Establishment Clause bars a state from placing its support behind a religious belief, while the Free Exercise Clause bars a state from interfering with the practice of religion.  U.S. Const. amend. I.  The court concludes the Family Part judge was asked to enforce a civil contract, not a religious one.  The court holds the MSA is a legally binding contract based on ample consideration from both parties and entered into knowingly and voluntarily.  The Family Part judge therefore had the lawful authority to enforce the agreement as written.

New Jersey Supreme Court precedent permits civil courts to resolve controversies involving religious groups if resolution can be achieved by reference to neutral principles of law and does not require the interpretation of religious doctrine.  Defendant agreed in the MSA to abide by the beis din ruling, whatever that might be.  The Family Part judge did not interpret religious doctrine and scrupulously avoided entanglement with religion because the judge applied well-established principles of civil contract law, not rabbinical law.  The latter body of law remained solely within the province of the beis din and was not interpreted or applied by the Family Part judge.

The court concludes that the orders defendant challenges served the secular purpose of enforcing the parties' contractual obligations under the MSA, which in turn serves the secular purpose of encouraging divorce litigants to resolve their disputes by negotiating and entering an MSA.

BRANDON MEREDITH HARDY VS. SUSAN D. JACKSON

          Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at a federal prison located in New Jersey, wants to marry someone who is incarcerated at a federal prison located in a different state.  He sued the New Hanover Township Municipal Clerk and Registrar, claiming she had violated his civil rights contrary to the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, by applying the requirement in N.J.S.A. 37:1-7 and -8 that couples appear in person to obtain a marriage license.  He appeals an order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and granting defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the complaint.  He argues the enforcement of the in-person requirement was unconstitutional and contends the motion judge should have used his equitable powers to enjoin enforcement of the requirement. 

         The court rejects both arguments.  The court holds the statutes at issue do not create an unconstitutional bar of a prisoner's right to marry but instead apply to individuals who want to marry and are reasonably related to the legitimate goal of ensuring the validity of marriages.  The court also holds the motion judge could not have used his equitable powers to enjoin defendant's enforcement of the statutory in-person requirement.  Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and the denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.

MUSCONETCONG WATERSHED ASSOCIATION VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,

    On February 23, 2017, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued a flood hazard area applicability determination (FHA Determination) to Hampton Farm, LLC (Hampton Farm).  Shortly thereafter, appellant Musconetcong Watershed Association (MW Association) requested the DEP to conduct an adjudicatory hearing so it could challenge the FHA Determination.  Four years later, on April 6, 2021, the DEP denied that request.  MW Association timely appealed from the April 6, 2021 decision.  It also sought leave to appeal from the February 23, 2017 FHA Determination, contending it had become final when the DEP denied MW Association's request for a hearing.  On an interlocutory motion, a two-judge panel of the court denied leave.  The court now reconsiders, reverses that interlocutory ruling, and grants leave to appeal.

          The court holds that the DEP's FHA Determination became a final agency decision subject to appeal when the DEP denied MW Association's request for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the FHA Determination.  At that time, all administrative remedies were exhausted.  To address the DEP's four-year time delay in deciding MW Association's request for an adjudicatory hearing, the court holds that any party, including a third-party objector, has the right to petition the DEP to rule on a pending request for an adjudicatory hearing under N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1(a).  The DEP will then have thirty days from receipt of the petition to "inform all parties of its determination" regarding that request.  N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1(a).

          The court also holds that MW Association did not have a right to an adjudicatory hearing because no statute conferred that right to MW Association, which is a third-party objector, and MW Association did not have a particularized property interest warranting a hearing.  Accordingly, the court affirms the April 6, 2021 final agency decision.

          Finally, because the court has reversed the ruling on the interlocutory motion, the DEP has two options concerning its FHA Determination.  It can either (1) elect to address MW Association's challenges to its February 23, 2017 FHA Determination and a new briefing schedule will be issued; or (2) request a remand so it can expand and update the factual findings supporting its FHA Determination. 

CHRISTOPHER NEUWIRTH VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY

 Plaintiff, who had been terminated from his position as assistant commissioner for the Department of Health, filed a complaint against the State, alleging a claim under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8.  In his second amended complaint, plaintiff asserted a defamation claim against Governor Philip D. Murphy.  A Law Division judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss the defamation claim, concluding plaintiff had not pleaded the element of actual malice with sufficient specificity.  

     In his fourth amended complaint, plaintiff again asserted a defamation claim against Governor Murphy, referencing in particular statements made during May 29, 2020 and June 1, 2020 press briefings.  Defendants moved to dismiss the defamation claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).  The judge denied the motion, concluding plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts in the fourth amended complaint to demonstrate actual malice.  
     The court reversed, concluding the judge had misapplied the actual-malice standard.  After conducting a de novo review, the court held plaintiff's conclusory allegations did not meet the actual-malice standard and, as a result, plaintiff's defamation claim failed.  Reversing the denial of defendants' motion to dismiss, the court remanded the case with a direction that the judge enter an order dismissing the defamation claim.