STERLING LAUREL REALTY, LLC, ET AL. VS. LAUREL GARDENS CO-OP, INC., ET AL. A-0696-14T4

STERLING LAUREL REALTY, LLC, ET AL. VS. LAUREL GARDENS CO-OP, INC., ET AL. 

A-0696-14T4 

The central issue in this case is whether defendant Co-Op's Board of Directors could amend the bylaw definition of a quorum (for purposes of shareholder meetings) from a majority of the shareholders to twenty percent of the shareholders. We hold the New Jersey Business Corporation Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 14A:1-1 to 17-18, precludes the Board from unilaterally reducing the Co-Op's shareholder-quorum requirement. We conclude N.J.S.A. 14A:5-9 makes clear that an amendment to a corporation's bylaws is insufficient to supplant the default majority quorum requirement set forth in the Act; only an amendment to the certificate of incorporation — which can only be approved by a vote of the shareholders, see N.J.S.A. 14A:9-2(4) — could legally alter the Co-Op's shareholder-quorum requirement. 

RICHARD WALKER, ET AL. VS. COSTCO WHOLESALE WAREHOUSE A-2493-14T2

RICHARD WALKER, ET AL. VS. COSTCO WHOLESALE WAREHOUSE 

A-2493-14T2 

In this slip-and-fall case, we hold that the trial court erred in rejecting plaintiff's request to charge the jury with mode-of-operation liability principles under Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20F(11). Plaintiff presented a reasonable factual basis for a jury to find that what he perceived to be a "white, yogurt-based substance" on the floor of defendant's warehouse store came from a self-service display stand offering cups of free cheesecake. On retrial, the court should specifically include in its charge an instruction that the defendant is not liable under mode-of-operation principles unless the jury finds that the food offered at the self-service display was the source of the substance on which plaintiff slipped. 

RICHARD WALKER, ET AL. VS. COSTCO WHOLESALE WAREHOUSE A-2493-14T2

RICHARD WALKER, ET AL. VS. COSTCO WHOLESALE WAREHOUSE 

A-2493-14T2 

In this slip-and-fall case, we hold that the trial court erred in rejecting plaintiff's request to charge the jury with mode-of-operation liability principles under Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20F(11). Plaintiff presented a reasonable factual basis for a jury to find that what he perceived to be a "white, yogurt-based substance" on the floor of defendant's warehouse store came from a self-service display stand offering cups of free cheesecake. On retrial, the court should specifically include in its charge an instruction that the defendant is not liable under mode-of-operation principles unless the jury finds that the food offered at the self-service display was the source of the substance on which plaintiff slipped. 

DEBRA DUGAN, ET AL. VS. TGI FRIDAYS, INC., ET AL. A-3485-14T3

DEBRA DUGAN, ET AL. VS. TGI FRIDAYS, INC., ET AL. 

A-3485-14T3 

In this action, in which plaintiffs assert that defendants violated the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -184, and the Truth in Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18, by failing to disclose prices for beer, soda and mixed drinks on their menus, the trial court erred by certifying the matter as a class action because plaintiffs failed to establish that common questions of fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, as required by Rule 4:32-1(b)(3). 

WOLVERINE FLAGSHIP FUND TRADING LIMITED, ET AL. VS. AMERICAN ORIENTAL BIOENGINEERING, INC., ET AL. A-0654-14T1

 WOLVERINE FLAGSHIP FUND TRADING LIMITED, ET AL. VS. AMERICAN ORIENTAL BIOENGINEERING, INC., ET AL. 

A-0654-14T1 

Plaintiffs argue that the Chancery Division incorrectly interpreted Uniform Commercial Code 8-112, as adopted by this state at N.J.S.A. 12A:8-112, to require actual seizure of certificated shares owned by a debtor before a creditor can reach the debtor's interest in those shares. Having reviewed the arguments in light of the applicable law, we affirm the order of the Chancery Division. 

IN THE MATTER OF COUNTY OF ATLANTIC AND PBA LOCAL 243 AND FOP LODGE 34 AND PBA LOCAL 77/ IN THE MATTER OF TOWNSHIP OF BRIDGEWATER AND PBA LOCAL 174 A-2477-13T4/A-0107-14T1

IN THE MATTER OF COUNTY OF ATLANTIC AND PBA LOCAL 243 AND FOP LODGE 34 AND PBA LOCAL 77/ IN THE MATTER OF TOWNSHIP OF BRIDGEWATER AND PBA LOCAL 174 

A-2477-13T4/A-0107-14T1 

The Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) abandoned its long-standing dynamic status quo doctrine in an appeal by FOP Lodge 34 and PBA Local 77 alleging unfair practice charges against Atlantic County, thus reversing a hearing examiner's award in favor of the public employees. In reliance on that decision, PERC dismissed Local 174's grievance against Bridgewater Township. PERC held that Atlantic County's failure to pay salary increments during the period of an expired collective bargaining agreement (CNA) was not an unfair labor practice. In the Bridgewater appeal, PERC held that the issue of automatic salary increments after the expiration of a CNA was neither mandatorily negotiable nor legally arbitrable and dismissed the grievance. We reversed, concluding that PERC's abrupt change in adjudicative doctrine was action in conflict with its legislative mandate, which is the implementation of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 to -39. 

J.P. VS. GREGORY J. SMITH, ET AL. A-0055-15T1

J.P. VS. GREGORY J. SMITH, ET AL. 

A-0055-15T1 

This case involves claims of sexual abuse brought by plaintiff J.P. against defendants Southern Regional High School and Southern Regional School Board (collectively, "the School"). In her complaint, filed in September 2014, plaintiff alleged that, in 2004, she was subjected to repeated sexual abuse by the School's assistant band director, defendant Gregory Smith. The acts of abuse allegedly occurred (1) at the School, where plaintiff was a student; (2) during two School-organized overnight trips; and (3) in plaintiff's home. Plaintiff sought damages pursuant to the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1, and under various common law theories of tort liability. 

The CSAA's definition of passive sexual abuse limits the class of persons who are potentially liable to those who are "within the household." Distinguishing Hardwicke v. American Boychoir School, 188 N.J. 69 (2006), we conclude that the School, a public day school, is not liable as a passive abuser under the CSAA because it does not fit within that statutory definition. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's CSAA claim against the School. 

We further conclude that plaintiff's common law claims accrued no later than July 2013, when plaintiff's expert opined that she fully understood she had been abused and the consequences of that abuse. Hence, no Lopez hearing is necessary to determine the date the common law claims accrued. Those claims are in turn barred due to plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act. We therefore reverse that portion of the order under review that reinstated the common law claims and ordered a Lopez hearing.