To schedule a confidential consultation, email us at VercammenAppointments@NJlaws.com, call or

visit Website www.njlaws.com

Kenneth Vercammen was included in the 2011 “Super Lawyers” list published by Thomson Reuters.

Kenneth Vercammen is a Middlesex County trial attorney who has published 130 articles in national and New Jersey publications on litigation topics. He was awarded the NJ State State Bar Municipal Court Practitioner of the Year. He lectures for the Bar and handles litigation matters. He is Past Chair of the ABA Tort & Insurance Committee,GP on Personal Injury and was a speaker at the ABA Annual Meeting attended by 10,000 attorneys and professionals. To schedule a confidential consultation, email us at VercammenAppointments@NJlaws.com, call or

visit Website www.njlaws.com

Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.

2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817

(732) 572-0500

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

THE RIDGE AT BACK BROOK, LLC VS. W. THOMAS KLENERT A-2345-12T1


THE RIDGE AT BACK BROOK, LLC VS. W. THOMAS
          KLENERT
A-2345-12T1
Defendant represented himself from the commencement of the action, through the summary judgment stage and when final judgment was entered. Following the entry of final judgment, defendant retained counsel and unsuccessfully sought Rule 4:50 relief, arguing he could not previously afford counsel and did not understand what was required of him in responding to Rule 4:22 requests or in opposing summary judgment. In this appeal, the court vacated the order denying Rule 4:50 relief, concluding the trial judge should have more liberally indulged defendant's argument and remanding for that purpose. The court held the Rule 4:50 motion should have been treated in the same manner as such motions are treated when the moving party has been represented by a negligent attorney, as in cases such as Parker v. Marcus, 281 N.J. Super. 589, 593 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 324 (1996). 

GLOBE MOTOR COMPANY AND THE MARGOLIS LAW FIRM, LLC VS.ILYA IGDALEV AND JULIA IGDALEV A-0897-12T1

GLOBE MOTOR COMPANY AND THE MARGOLIS LAW FIRM, LLC VS.ILYA IGDALEV AND JULIA IGDALEV
A-0897-12T1
Plaintiffs' action sought enforcement of the terms of settlement, when a portion of the funds transferred by defendants in satisfaction of their obligations was reclaimed by a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee as a fraudulent transfer of the corporate debtor's funds. Defendant Ilya Igdalev certified the bank and certified checks he gave plaintiffs were sent by his friend, who was holding Ilya's money, which he was owed. In support of summary judgment,plaintiffs attached the Trustee's adversary proceeding, emails from bankruptcy counsel suggesting, after his review, settlement was appropriate, and the final settlement of the adversary proceeding.
We concluded, as did the motion judge, the documents sufficiently showed the money came from the debtor corporation and Ilya's claim his friend was to send his money did not defeat the fact his friend actually used the debtor corporation's funds. Also, Ilya never asserted the debtor owed him money.
We concluded even if Ilya was unaware of his friend's conduct, he directed the transaction and is responsible for the consequences. In accordance with the terms of settlement, defendants were liable to pay plaintiff the sum accepted by the Chapter 7 Trustee, along with attorney's fees and costs.
Judge Sapp-Peterson dissents, reasoning summary judgment should have been granted in favor of defendants on the breach of contract claim as a matter of law. As for plaintiffs' remaining claims of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, unjust enrichment and indemnification, she finds there are genuinely disputed issues of fact surrounding the source of the funds utilized to satisfy defendants' obligations under the settlement agreement, which are sufficient to defeat summary judgment. She would reverse and remand for trial on those remaining claims. 

K.A.F. VS. D.L.M. D.L.M. VS. K.A.F. AND F.D. A-0878-12T2

K.A.F. VS. D.L.M.
          D.L.M. VS. K.A.F. AND F.D.
A-0878-12T2
We hold that the consent of both fit and active legal parents to the creation of a psychological relationship between their child and a third party is not necessary for standing on the part of the third party to bring an action asserting psychological parenthood. It is sufficient if only one of the legal custodial parents has consented, and such consent need not be explicit, but may be gleaned from the circumstances. The status of the non-consenting parent, rather, is one factor among many a court should consider in determining whether the third party has established that he or she is a psychological parent, and,
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if so, whether the best interests of the child warrant some form of custody or visitation. 

Sunday, August 10, 2014

I/M/O GOVERNOR CHRIS CHRISTIE'S APPOINTMENTOF MARTIN PEREZ AS PUBLIC MEMBER 7 OF THE RUTGERS UNIVERSITY BOARD OF GOVERNORS A-6047-12T3


I/M/O GOVERNOR CHRIS CHRISTIE'S APPOINTMENTOF MARTIN PEREZ AS PUBLIC MEMBER 7 OF THE RUTGERS UNIVERSITY BOARD OF GOVERNORS
A-6047-12T3

In this case, Senate President Stephen M. Sweeney challenges Governor Chris Christie's appointment of Martin Perez to the Rutgers Board of Governors. We hold that the Appellate Division has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely, and the Senate President has standing to challenge the Governor's action. We also hold that Governor's appointment of Perez without the advice and consent of the State Senate is a valid exercise of authority conferred on the Governor by the New Jersey Medical and Health Services Education Restructuring Act, L. 2012, c. 45. 

R.K. VS. F.K. A-4165-11T4

 R.K. VS. F.K.
          A-4165-11T4
Under the two-step process outlined in Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980), a movant seeking a change of custody must show a change of circumstances warranting relief to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, but the judge must
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decide the evidentiary hearing based on the best interests of the child. After a seven-day divorce trial focused on child custody, the trial court mistakenly found no substantial change in circumstances rather than determining the best interests of the children.
The trial court also erred by relying on the Domestic Violence Act's provision that the court "shall presume that the best interests of the child are served by an award of [temporary] custody to the non-abusive parent." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(11). That presumption, important in the initial FRO proceeding, has no application in a subsequent custody determination in a divorce trial, particularly once a change of circumstances has been shown. Rather, that trial is governed by N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, under which "the history of domestic violence" is one factor among several that the court must consider in determining the best interests of the children. 

DARCY J. KOLODZIEJ VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SOUTHERN REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, OCEAN COUNTY A-4826-12T1


DARCY J. KOLODZIEJ VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
          SOUTHERN REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, OCEAN
          COUNTY
          A-4826-12T1
We hold that maternity leave constitutes continued employment under N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5(a), entitling petitioner in this matter to tenure protection and status under the school district's Reduction In Force (RIF) plan. 

MICHAEL C. KAIN VS. GLOUCESTER CITY, ET AL. A-4854-12T2

MICHAEL C. KAIN VS. GLOUCESTER CITY, ET AL.
          A-4854-12T2
The plan or design immunity provision of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to :12-3, applies to injuries caused by "the plan or design of public property" approved "by the Legislature or the governing body of a public entity or some other body or a public employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval . . . ." N.J.S.A. 59:4-6(a) (emphasis added). This case requires us to decide whether this provision exempts municipal defendants from liability for an allegedly dangerous condition in a pier designed by the Coast Guard and, specifically, whether the Coast Guard falls within the scope of the term, "some other body," under the statute. We decide that it does. We also conclude that the Charitable Immunity Act applies to the non-municipal defendants.