Sunday, August 21, 2016
RICHARD CATENA VS. RAYTHEON COMPANY, ET AL.
In this appeal, we apply the discovery rule to fraud claims under common law and the Consumer Fraud Act arising from the sale of commercial real property. The seller and his lender, both defendants, knew about environmental contamination on the property, which they partly remediated before the closing. Rather than disclose that information, the seller provided plaintiff an affidavit stating that he was unaware of any contamination on the site. In reversing the summary judgment dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, we hold that discovery did not occur until plaintiff was aware of facts indicating defendant knew his statements were false, and intended plaintiff to rely upon their falsity. We base this on the rule that a plaintiff cannot discover the basis for a fraud claim until he is aware of facts establishing the essential elements of the claim, one of which is mens rea.
Rachel A. Parsons v. Mullica Township Board of Education (A-69-14; 075859)
The failure to timely communicate the results of a preventative public health examination falls within the purview of N.J.S.A. 59:6-4. Therefore, defendants are immune from liability under the TCA. The Court further holds that immunizing defendants under N.J.S.A. 59:6-4 does not render meaningless the provisions of N.J.A.C. 6A:16-2.2(1)(6).
Salvatore Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, Inc.
Under the circumstances here, Puglia’s CEPA claim, which neither requires interpretation of the CBA nor presents a question that would be within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, is not preempted by the LMRA or the NLRA.
Northwest Bergen County Utilities Authority v. Kathleen A. Donovan (A-36/37-14; 075060)
The County Executive’s termination of the Authority commissioners was not conducted in accordance with her authority, and her unilateral action was contrary to and in violation of N.J.S.A. 40:14B-16. Likewise, the County Executive’s use of the veto power to diminish the compensation (the $5000 stipend) being paid to the commissioners since 1979 violated N.J.S.A. 40:14B-17 and must be declared void. However, in respect of the health benefits provided to the commissioners in more recent years, the County Executive’s supervisory authority to review and reject Authority action through her veto power is broad and easily encompasses authority to disapprove such administrative action.
Sunday, August 14, 2016
JOHN GIOVANNI GRANATA VS. EDWARD F. BRODERICK, JR.,
ESQ., ET AL.
In a case of first impression, we hold that an attorney's pledge of anticipated counsel fees can be considered a receivable under UCC Article 9 and a creditor may perfect a security interest in those fees that were pledged as collateral for a loan made to the attorney. Because the creditor filed a UCC-1 financing statement and fully complied with Article 9, it had a perfected security interest which attached, even though the counsel fees had not been awarded, and enjoyed priority over subsequent lien creditors claiming against the same collateral.
Stephen Meehan v. Peter Antonellis, DMD
The enhanced requirements of section 41 of the Patients First Act which govern the qualifications of persons permitted to submit an affidavit of merit, or provide expert testimony, in a medical malpractice action, apply only in medical malpractice actions. In all other actions against a licensed professional, section 27 of the AOM statute prescribes the qualifications of the person who may submit an affidavit of merit against a licensed professional. The affidavit of merit that plaintiff submitted in this action, from a licensed dentist with experience in the treatment of sleep apnea, satisfies section 27. The trial court therefore improperly dismissed the complaint.
Cypress Point Condominium Association, Inc. v. Adria Towers, LLC (A-13/14-15; 076348)
The consequential damages caused by the subcontractors’ faulty workmanship constitute “property damage,” and the event resulting in that damage – water from rain flowing into the interior of the property due to the subcontractors’ faulty workmanship – is an “occurrence” under the plain language of the CGL policies at issue here.