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Sunday, September 17, 2017

JEFFREY SAUTER VS. COLTS NECK VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY NO. 2 A-0354-15T1


 JEFFREY SAUTER VS. COLTS NECK VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY NO. 2 
A-0354-15T1 

The court affirms the dismissal on summary judgment of a volunteer firefighter's whistleblower claim against Colts Neck Volunteer Fire Company No. 2, and several individual officers and members of the fire company, finding volunteer firefighters are not entitled to the protections of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14. Because plaintiff is not an employee of the fire company, its vote to strip him of his membership in the organization in alleged retaliation for his letters to the fire company's fidelity carrier and Colts Neck's Executive Fire Council, even if true, is not a violation of CEPA. 

The Palisades at Fort Lee Condominium Association, Inc. v. 100 Old Palisades, LLC (A-101/102/


 The Palisades at Fort Lee Condominium Association, 
Inc. v. 100 Old Palisades, LLC 
(A-101/102/103/104-15; 077249) 

A construction-defect cause of action accrues at the time that the building's original or subsequent owners first knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the basis for a claim. From that point, the plaintiff has six years to file a claim. A subsequent owner stands in no better position than a prior owner in calculating the limitations period. If a prior owner knew or reasonably should have known of a basis for a construction-defect action, the limitations period began at that point. Here, the Court cannot determine when the accrual clock commenced for each defendant based on the record before it and accordingly remands to the trial court. 

Sunday, September 10, 2017

NEW JERSEY ELECTION LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION VS. JOSEPH DIVINCENZO AND JORGE MARTINEZ A-4131-15T3


 NEW JERSEY ELECTION LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION VS. 
JOSEPH DIVINCENZO AND JORGE MARTINEZ 
A-4131-15T3 

The New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC) appeals from an initial decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a complaint. The initial decision was deemed adopted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) at a time when the Commission lacked a sufficient number of members to act due to longstanding vacancies. The resulting question of first impression implicates the primacy of an administrative agency's decisional authority, the exclusive jurisdiction of this court to review agency action, and the interpretation of the deemed-adopted provision as applied to the circumstances here. An ALJ lacks any independent decisional authority and may not encroach upon the ultimate decisional authority of the agency. Interpreting the deemed-adopted provision under the circumstances here and in light of the constitutional mandate for appellate review of administrative agency action, we will not infer a legislative intent to foreclose review. Finally, we conclude that the common law quorum requirement applies to the Commission's issuance of a complaint and reverse the ALJ's decision. 

Monday, September 4, 2017

PATRICIA J. MCCLAIN VS. BOARD OF REVIEW, ET AL. A-4319-15T3

PATRICIA J. MCCLAIN VS. BOARD OF REVIEW, ET AL. 
A-4319-15T3 
Appellant left one job upon another's promise of employment. The new employer, however, rescinded the offer the day after appellant voluntarily quit the first job. The Board of Review affirmed the denial of appellant's application for unemployment benefits based on its interpretation of a 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), which exempts from disqualification "an individual who voluntarily leaves work with one employer to accept from another employer employment which commences not more than seven days after the individual leaves . . . the first employer." The Board determined that because appellant did not commence employment with the new employer, she was not entitled to the statutory exemption from disqualification. The court rejects the Board's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) and finds the exemption from disqualification does not require that the claimant actually commence employment with the new employer. 


Wednesday, August 30, 2017

Cell phone penalties



3rd Cell phone use includes possible 90-day loss of license fines for talking or texting on a hand-held wireless communications device were increased. More details at http://www.njlaws.com/39_4-97_3cellph... 39:4-97.3 d. A person who violates this section shall be fined as follows: (1) for a first offense, not less than $200 or more than $400 plus court costs and possible court appearance; (2) for a second offense, not less than $400 or more than $600 plus court costs; and (3) for a third or subsequent offense, not less than $600 or more than $800 plus court costs . For a third or subsequent violation, the court, in its discretion, may order the person to forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of 90 days. In addition, a person convicted of a third or subsequent violation shall be assessed three motor vehicle penalty points pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5).

CONSENT TO ENTER JUDGMENT with deadbeat tenants


Clause to add All payments made during the term of this agreement shall be applied first to the rents that become due after today, and then they shall be applied to pay the balance of the arrears stated in paragraph 1. If the Tenant makes all payments required in paragraph 2b of this agreement, the Landlord agrees not to request a warrant of removal. If the Tenant does not make all payments required in paragraph 2b of this agreement, the Tenant agrees that the Landlord, with notice to the tenant, may file a certification stating when and what the breach was and that a warrant of removal may then be issued by the clerk. THIS MEANS THAT IF THE TENANT FAILS TO MAKE ANY PAYMENT THAT IS REQUIRED IN PARAGRAPH 2b OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE TENANT MAY BE EVICTED AS PERMITTED BY LAW AFTER THE SERVICE OF THE WARRANT OF REMOVAL. KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW More info at http://www.njlaws.com/landlords-eviciting_tenants_for_nonpayment.html