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Wednesday, August 30, 2017

Cell phone penalties



3rd Cell phone use includes possible 90-day loss of license fines for talking or texting on a hand-held wireless communications device were increased. More details at http://www.njlaws.com/39_4-97_3cellph... 39:4-97.3 d. A person who violates this section shall be fined as follows: (1) for a first offense, not less than $200 or more than $400 plus court costs and possible court appearance; (2) for a second offense, not less than $400 or more than $600 plus court costs; and (3) for a third or subsequent offense, not less than $600 or more than $800 plus court costs . For a third or subsequent violation, the court, in its discretion, may order the person to forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of 90 days. In addition, a person convicted of a third or subsequent violation shall be assessed three motor vehicle penalty points pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5).

CONSENT TO ENTER JUDGMENT with deadbeat tenants


Clause to add All payments made during the term of this agreement shall be applied first to the rents that become due after today, and then they shall be applied to pay the balance of the arrears stated in paragraph 1. If the Tenant makes all payments required in paragraph 2b of this agreement, the Landlord agrees not to request a warrant of removal. If the Tenant does not make all payments required in paragraph 2b of this agreement, the Tenant agrees that the Landlord, with notice to the tenant, may file a certification stating when and what the breach was and that a warrant of removal may then be issued by the clerk. THIS MEANS THAT IF THE TENANT FAILS TO MAKE ANY PAYMENT THAT IS REQUIRED IN PARAGRAPH 2b OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE TENANT MAY BE EVICTED AS PERMITTED BY LAW AFTER THE SERVICE OF THE WARRANT OF REMOVAL. KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW More info at http://www.njlaws.com/landlords-eviciting_tenants_for_nonpayment.html

Sunday, August 27, 2017

MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY VS. COUNTY OF PASSAIC, ET AL. A-3318-15T3


 MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY VS. COUNTY OF PASSAIC, ET AL. 
A-3318-15T3 

In Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142 (1972), the Supreme Court addressed the limits of a local government's authority to regulate on-site construction on a state university's property that was confined to its campus. In this dispute, the court was asked to determine whether those limits apply to a state university's construction of a roadway that intersects with an off-site local road. The court held that the state university was not required to obtain local land use approval for the project because the limits imposed by Rutgers applied equally to the proposed development in this case. 

PAUL KAMIENSKI VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY A-4816-14T2


 PAUL KAMIENSKI VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT 
OF TREASURY 
A-4816-14T2 
This case presents us with questions of first impression regarding the interpretation of provisions of the Mistaken Imprisonment Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 to -7, relating to eligibility, the burden of proof, damages and "reasonable attorney fees." 
Plaintiff was convicted of two counts of purposeful murder and felony murder and drug conspiracy charges. His murder convictions were vacated after the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit directed that a writ of habeas corpus be issued. His drug conspiracy conviction remained undisturbed. Released after serving more than twenty years in prison, he brought this action under the Act, seeking more than $6,000,000 in damages and $1 million in attorney's fees. After granting summary judgment to plaintiff, the trial court awarded him a judgment of $433,230. We reverse the grant of summary judgment, concluding the federal decision granting plaintiff's habeas corpus petition did not satisfy his burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence "he did not commit the crime for which he was convicted," N.J.S.A. 52:4C-3(b), as a matter of law. We also conclude plaintiff's drug conspiracy conviction does not render him ineligible under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-6. Because a remand is necessary, we also provide guidance to the trial court regarding how damages should be calculated under the Act prior to its 2013 amendment and by concluding the "reasonable attorneys fee" 

recoverable under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-5(b) is limited to fees incurred in the civil litigation under the Act. 

E.S. VS. H.A. A-3230-14T2/

E.S. VS. H.A. 
A-3230-14T2/A-3256-14T2(CONSOLIDATED) 
The parties' final judgment of divorce left undecided issues of custody and parenting time regarding their four-year old son. DYFS subsequently substantiated defendant-father for child abuse. The Family Part judge concluded that finding was not conclusive for purposes of determining whether parenting time with defendant was in the child's best interest, and, so, he held a plenary trial to determine whether defendant had sexually abused his son and whether and under what circumstances defendant could exercise parenting time. 
Following months of testimony, the judge concluded by clear and convincing evidence defendant had abused the child, awarded custody to plaintiff-mother and denied defendant any parenting time. Accepting the testimony of the court's expert psychologist, the judge conditioned any future application for parenting time upon defendant's admission of "wrongdoing," a psycho-sexual evaluation and completion of individual therapy. 
The court concluded conditioning any future application for parenting time upon an admission of wrongdoing violated defendant's right against self-incrimination. Additionally, 

reiterating the holding in Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 2010), the court concluded it was error to restrict defendant's access to the court unless he met these conditions beforehand. 

Tuesday, August 15, 2017

NANCY G. SLUTSKY VS. KENNETH J. SLUTSKY A-5829-13T1


NANCY G. SLUTSKY VS. KENNETH J. SLUTSKY
          A-5829-13T1/A-2813-14T1(CONSOLIDATED)
Among the issues discussed in these appeals from a final judgment of divorce, are two of note. First, the court reversed the trial judge's conclusion fixing the value of defendant's interest in his law firm as including goodwill, because the trial judge's limited findings were unsupported and failed to properly analyze the methodology set forth in Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423 (1983), and Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340 (1975). The court highlighted the starting point of the analysis must be review of a shareholder's agreement fixing the interest of an equity partner to discern whether it properly captured goodwill. Second, the court reversed a fee award to the payee because it failed to account for the ordered financial obligations imposed upon the payor by the final judgment, and because following fee arbitration, the stipulated fees now due to counsel were less than the sum the payee was ordered to contribute. 

Jaime Taormina Bisbing v. Glenn R. Bisbing, III (A-2-16


Jaime Taormina Bisbing v. Glenn R. Bisbing, III
          (A-2-16; 077533)
          The Court recognizes a “special justification” to
          abandon the standard it established in Baures v.
          Lewis, 167 N.J. 91 (2001) for determining the outcome
          of contested relocation determinations pursuant to
          N.J.S.A. 9:2-2.  In place of the Baures standard,
          courts should conduct a best interests analysis to
          determine “cause” under N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 in all
          contested relocation disputes in which the parents
          share legal custody.

Robert A. Verry v. Franklin Fire District No. 1 (Somerset) (A-77-15


Robert A. Verry v. Franklin Fire District No. 1
          (Somerset) (A-77-15; 077495)
          The fire district, to which the OPRA request was made,
          is obliged to release such documents in its possession
          or to obtain them from a member volunteer fire company
          under its supervision and release them.  OPRA demands
          such transparency and accountability of public agencies,
          and the fire district is undoubtedly a public agency
          subject to OPRA.  The Court therefore affirms the
          judgment in that respect.  However, to the extent the
          holding under review also concluded that the member
          volunteer fire company is a “public agency” subject
          directly and independently to OPRA requirements, the
          Court disagrees and modifies the judgment.

In the Matter of the New Jersey State Fireman’s Association Obligation to Provide Relief Applications Under the Open Public Records Act (A-68-15


In the Matter of the New Jersey State Fireman’s
          Association Obligation to Provide Relief Applications
          Under the Open Public Records Act (A-68-15; 077097)
          OPRA does not, in all instances, prohibit a public
          entity from instituting proceedings under the
          Declaratory Judgment Act to determine whether records
          are subject to disclosure.  After carefully balancing
          the public’s interest in accessing information against
          the private interest in confidentiality, the Court
          finds that the relief checks to Doe are exempt from
          disclosure under OPRA and the common law right of
          access.

Sunday, August 6, 2017

NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP INC., D/B/A THE RECORD VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, ET AL. A-3947-14T3/A

 NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP INC., D/B/A THE RECORD VS. 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, ET AL. 
A-3947-14T3/A-3948-14T3(CONSOLIDATED) 

In this OPRA action, plaintiff appealed the trial court's denial of an order in aid of litigant's rights and the denial of the imposition of a civil penalty, finding N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 authorizes only the Government Records Council to impose a penalty. The court reversed, holding that N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 authorizes the Superior Court, and not just the Government Records Council, to impose a civil penalty where it is determined there is a knowing and willful violation of OPRA and access to government records has been unreasonably denied under the circumstance. The court also reversed the denial of plaintiff's request for relief under Rule 1:10-3 because the affidavit describing the search for records in response to the second set of requests violated the case management order, was not based on personal knowledge and could not properly support the court's determination that defendant's search was reasonable. 

In the Matter of the New Jersey State Fireman’s Association Obligation to Provide Relief Applications Under the Open Public Records Act (A-68-15

 In the Matter of the New Jersey State Fireman’s 
Association Obligation to Provide Relief Applications 
Under the Open Public Records Act (A-68-15; 077097) 

OPRA does not, in all instances, prohibit a public entity from instituting proceedings under the Declaratory Judgment Act to determine whether records are subject to disclosure. After carefully balancing the public’s interest in accessing information against the private interest in confidentiality, the Court finds that the relief checks to Doe are exempt from disclosure under OPRA and the common law right of access. 

In the Matter of County of Atlantic; In the Matter of Township of Bridgewater (A-98/99/100-15

 In the Matter of County of Atlantic; In the Matter of 
Township of Bridgewater (A-98/99/100-15) 

In these cases, the governing contract language of the respective agreements required that the salary step increases remain in place after expiration and until the parties reach agreement on a new CNA. Atlantic County and Bridgewater Township committed an unfair labor practice when they altered those terms. 

GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Tamilynn Willoughby (A-97-15; 076006)


 GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Tamilynn Willoughby 
(A-97-15; 076006) 
Willoughby satisfied all contingent terms of the May 2010 Agreement, rendering the Agreement permanent and binding. Despite being compelled to engage in subsequent mediations and negotiations in an effort to save her home, Willoughby did not voluntarily abandon the May 2010 Agreement. The chancery court should 

have granted her pro se motion to enforce the Agreement as a permanent loan modification.