IN THE MATTER OF TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS AND PARSIPPANY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1
A-0471-10T2
We affirm the Public Employment Relations Commission's decision that a town cannot as a matter of statutory or managerial right require a union employee to fill out a Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) medical certification if that employee expressly declines FMLA leave. 05-05-11
ONE STEP UP LTD, VS. SAM LOGISTIC, INC., ET AL. A-2494-09T3
The primary issue in this case is whether a bailee can escape liability for conversion under the UCC's good faith exception, N.J.S.A. 12A:7-404. We hold that a bailee faced with adverse claims cannot avail itself of this exception where it failed to follow the procedure set forth in Capezzaro v. Winfrey, 153 N.J. Super. 267, 273 (App. Div. 1977). Specifically, in order to establish that the property was released in "good faith," the bailee must show that it either (1) investigated the competing claims and confirmed the validity of the claim underlying the release, or (2) filed an action for interpleader. 05-04-11
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES VS. K.L.W. AND P.L.J.
A-5178-09T3, A-5234-09T3 (CONSOLIDATED)
Although the Division of Youth & Family Services knew that this child's siblings were in the custody of their maternal grandparents and had their address, the Division did not contact them as required by N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1. Because the Division's non-compliance affected the trial judge's analysis of the child's best interests under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15a(1)-(4), we reverse.05-03-11
ESTATE OF NANCY Z. PALEY VS. BANK OF AMERICA (f/k/a FLEET BANK, f/k/a FIRST JERSEY BANK, f/k/a WESTMINSTER BANK, f/k/a SUMMIT BANK), ET AL. A-4391-07T3, A-5519-07T3, A-5864-07T3 (CONSOLIDATED)
We held that the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) does not apply to a claim by a bank depositor for payment by the bank of multiple checks presented to and paid by it to the depositor's medical aide. We held that the CFA provides no remedy to the depositor when a bank adopts a check presentation and clearance procedure consistent with the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), specifically Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101 to -605 and 4-101 to -504, has acted in conformity with those procedures, and does not have an agreement with the depositor that creates a special relationship with duties beyond those imposed by the UCC. 04-29-11
THERESA MEIER, ET AL. VS. PASQUALE D'AMBOSE A-2555-09T1
In the absence of a lease provision to the contrary, defendant-landlord had a duty to the lessee of a single-family dwelling to maintain the furnace and to inspect periodically for defects in order to prevent a hazardous condition leading to a fire and the lessee's death. Although the lease was for the entirety of the premises, the controlling law is that expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 358, rather than the holdingsof Patton v. Texas Co., 13 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 7 601 (App.N.J. 348 (1951), and Szeles v. Vena, 321 N.J. Super. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 129 (1999). 04-28-11
JEFFREY McDANIEL, ET AL. VS. MAN WAI LEE, ET AL. A-5900-09T1
In this multi-vehicle auto negligence action, we conclude N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, the fellow-servant provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128, bars a third-party tortfeasor's action against the co-worker seeking indemnification and contribution.
STEVEN ORNER, ET AL. VS. GUANG LIU, ET AL. A-6185-09T4
This action, which concerned disputes about plaintiffs' sale of certain rental properties to defendants, was settled and dismissed on June 8, 2009. The parties' settlement agreement provided for the execution of new contracts within three days and a closing no later September 15, 2009, after which -- if the closing did not occur -- the parties would have no further obligations. The parties failed to agree on the form and content of new contracts, and plaintiffs sold the properties to others.
Defendants filed a motion for relief, pursuant to Rule 4:50-1, on June 7, 2010, one day short of a year from the order in question. The trial judge denied the motion and the court affirmed, concluding among other things that the motion was untimely. In affirming, the court emphasized that Rule 4:50-2 requires that all motions for relief pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 must be filed within "a reasonable time." Rule 4:50-2's declaration that motions based on subsections (a), (b), or (c) of Rule 4:50-1 may not be filed more than one year from the order in question represents only an outer limit; such motions must still be filed within "a reasonable time," which may be
less than one year. 04-26-11