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Saturday, April 30, 2011

JEFFREY McDANIEL, ET AL. VS. MAN WAI LEE, ET AL. A-5900-09T1

JEFFREY McDANIEL, ET AL. VS. MAN WAI LEE, ET AL.

A-5900-09T1

In this multi-vehicle auto negligence action, we conclude

N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, the fellow-servant provision of the Workers'

Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128, bars a third-party

tortfeasor's action against the co-worker seeking

indemnification and contribution. 04-27-11

STEVEN ORNER, ET AL. VS. GUANG LIU, ET AL. A-6185-09T4

STEVEN ORNER, ET AL. VS. GUANG LIU, ET AL.

A-6185-09T4

This action, which concerned disputes about plaintiffs'

sale of certain rental properties to defendants, was settled and

dismissed on June 8, 2009. The parties' settlement agreement

provided for the execution of new contracts within three days

and a closing no later September 15, 2009, after which -- if the

closing did not occur -- the parties would have no further

obligations. The parties failed to agree on the form and

content of new contracts, and plaintiffs sold the properties to

others.

Defendants filed a motion for relief, pursuant to Rule

4:50-1, on June 7, 2010, one day short of a year from the order

in question. The trial judge denied the motion and the court

affirmed, concluding among other things that the motion was

untimely. In affirming, the court emphasized that Rule 4:50-2

requires that all motions for relief pursuant to Rule 4:50-1

must be filed within "a reasonable time." Rule 4:50-2's

declaration that motions based on subsections (a), (b), or (c)

of Rule 4:50-1 may not be filed more than one year from the

order in question represents only an outer limit; such motions

must still be filed within "a reasonable time," which may be

less than one year. 04-26-11

IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION'S DENIAL OF PETITION TO ADOPT REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE NEW JERSEY HIGH SCHOOL VOTER REGISTRATION LAW

IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION'S

DENIAL OF PETITION TO ADOPT REGULATIONS

IMPLEMENTING THE NEW JERSEY HIGH SCHOOL VOTER

REGISTRATION LAW

A-5681-09T3

We construe N.J.S.A. 18A:36-28, which prescribes that the

Commissioner of Education "shall adopt pursuant to the

'Administrative Procedure Act' . . . rules and regulations

necessary to implement the provisions" of the High School Voter

Registration Law (the "HSVRL"), N.J.S.A. 18A:36-27, to impose a

mandatory, not a directory, obligation upon the Commissioner to

adopt regulations implementing the statute.

We affirm the denial of appellants' petition for rulemaking

because respondents have enacted regulations under N.J.A.C.

6A:30, Appendix A and B, to monitor compliance with the HSVRL by

public school districts. Although appellants contend that those

regulations are insufficient, we do not find respondents' chosen

method to implement the statute with respect to public schools

to be arbitrary or capricious. However, we reverse the denial

of appellants' petition with respect to nonpublic schools

because N.J.S.A. 18A:36-27 explicitly applies to both public and

nonpublic schools, and respondents have not adopted any

regulations to implement the HSVRL as to nonpublic schools. 04-25-11

DEAN SMITH VS. HUDSON COUNTY REGISTER, ET AL. JEFF ZEIGER VS. HUDSON COUNTY REGISTER, ET AL. A-4113-09T3, A-4114-09T3, (CONSOLIDATED)

DEAN SMITH VS. HUDSON COUNTY REGISTER, ET AL.

JEFF ZEIGER VS. HUDSON COUNTY REGISTER, ET AL.

A-4113-09T3, A-4114-09T3, (CONSOLIDATED)

A requestor who is charged an excessive amount to obtain copies

of public records under the Open Public Records Act ("OPRA"),

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, who then prevails in an OPRA action

against the public entity that engaged in the overcharging, or

whose OPRA action acts as a catalyst to a change in the public

entity's practices, is entitled to receive reasonable attorney's

fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. The requirement within the

fee-shifting provision, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, that the requestor be

"denied access" to the records is not restricted to instances

where physical access has been denied, but also encompasses

instances where a requestor has been forced to pay excessive

copying charges to obtain the records at rates above those

prescribed by OPRA in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(b). Applying these

standards, we hold that plaintiff Dean Smith, who was a

prevailing party in Smith v. Hudson County Register, 411 N.J.

Super. 538 (App. Div. 2010), which produced a change in

defendants' practices, is entitled to an award of reasonable

trial and appellate counsel fees. 04-25-11

BARBARA A BOTIS VS. ESTATE OF GARY G KUDRICK VS. WELLS FARGO BANK A-5562-09T4

BARBARA A BOTIS VS. ESTATE OF GARY G KUDRICK VS. WELLS

FARGO BANK

A-5562-09T4

Effective January 18, 2009, the statute of frauds, N.J.S.A.

25:1-5 to -16, was amended to include palimony agreements among

the types of "agreements or promises" that must be in writing

and signed by the parties in order to be enforceable. N.J.S.A.

25:1-5(h); L. 2009, c. 311, § 1. This case requires us to

determine whether to accord the amendment retroactive effect in

a case filed against the deceased promisor's Estate prior to the

effective date of the amendment on an alleged palimony agreement

enforceable when the complaint was filed. We conclude that the

amendment applies prospectively and affirm the June 9, 2010

order denying the Estate's motion to dismiss the complaint,

which is before us on leave granted. 04-21-11

DOVER-CHESTER ASSOCIATES, ETC. VS. RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP AND RANDOLPH TOWN CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P. ET AL. VS. RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP (CONSOLIDATED) A-3445-09T3

DOVER-CHESTER ASSOCIATES, ETC. VS. RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP

AND RANDOLPH TOWN CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P. ET AL. VS.

RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP (CONSOLIDATED)

A-3445-09T3, A-3446-09T3

These appeals from the judgment of a county board of

taxation to the Tax Court are governed by N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(b),

which requires that all taxes due for the year for which review

is sought must have been paid "[a]t the time that a complaint

has been filed with the Tax Court[.]" In contrast, direct

appeals to the Tax Court and initial appeals to a county board

of taxation are governed by N.J.S.A. 54:3-27, which requires the

appealing taxpayer to pay all taxes due, up to and including the

first quarter of the taxes assessed against him for the current

tax year. However, because N.J.S.A. 54:3-27 does not specify

when such payment must be made, we have found the requirement

satisfied when payment is made by the return date of a motion to

dismiss the appeal. The Legislature amended the statutes in

1999, adding provisions that permitted the relaxation of the tax

payment requirements in the "interests of justice" but did not

define that term. As we have not previously considered the

application of that provision and a conflict has arisen in

decisions in the Tax Court, we address the question whether

relaxation is required in the "interests of justice" under

N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(b) if the tax obligation is satisfied before

the return date of a motion to dismiss its complaint. We

conclude that it is not. 04-20-11

REZEM FAMILY ASSOCIATES, LP VS. THE BOROUGH OF MILLSTONE, ET AL. A-2290-09T2

REZEM FAMILY ASSOCIATES, LP VS. THE BOROUGH OF

MILLSTONE, ET AL.

A-2290-09T2

The primary issue on appeal is whether a plaintiff must

exhaust administrative and judicial remedies, and obtain a final

ruling on its land use claims, before it can pursue a cause of

action for alleged violation of its substantive due process

rights. We hold that a substantive due process claim in a land

use dispute requires both governmental misconduct that "shocks

the conscience" and exhaustion of remedies available under our

land use law. 04-15-11