A.L., JR., AND A.K.L. A-4905-14T2

 A.L., JR., AND A.K.L. 

A-4905-14T2 

A biological mother succeeds in her appeal of the trial court's denial of her request to testify after the close of evidence. She did not appear for her termination of parental rights trial, but came to court seeking to testify on the day the judge was prepared to render his decision. A parent facing the termination of parental rights is entitled to every reasonable opportunity to produce evidence. If a parent seeks to reopen the record to testify after the close of evidence, the trial court is constitutionally obligated to grant that request as long as it does not interfere with the children's essential and overriding interest in stability and permanency. 

EDWARD MCGLYNN, JR., ET AL. VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL.

 EDWARD MCGLYNN, JR., ET AL. VS. STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, ET AL.
A-1743-12T3

A utility company does not owe a duty of care to passing motorists to remove a dead tree located within its right-of-way over privately owned lands where the New Jersey Department of Transportation also has a right-of-way. The tree fell on an adjoining highway, striking a vehicle, killing one occupant, and causing severe injuries to another. 01/03/14

RAYMOND TARABOKIA, JR., ET AL. VS. STRUCTURE TONE A-3822-11T2

RAYMOND TARABOKIA, JR., ET AL. VS. STRUCTURE TONE

A-3822-11T2

We affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of a negligence

action by an employee of a subcontractor against the general

contractor for a work-site injury, finding, under the

circumstances presented, that the scope of the duty owed by the

general or prime contractor does not encompass the manner and

means of using equipment selected, supplied and controlled by

the subcontractor.  11-16-12 

Francis J. McGovern, Jr., v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

Francis J. McGovern, Jr., v. Rutgers, the State

University of New Jersey (A-113-10; 067787)

The Board’s resolution adopted at the special meeting

satisfied N.J.S.A. 10:4-13 by advising of “the general

nature” of what was to be discussed at the closed

session. The notice of that meeting was not adequate

under N.J.S.A. 10:4-8 because it did not include the

proposed agenda for the meeting “to the extent known”

at the time the notice was prepared. OPMA does not

permit excluding the public from discussion of issues

such as policy recommendations and rule formulation.

However, OPMA affords no remedy for these violations

because the Board took no action that could be voided

and there was no showing of a pattern of noncompliance

or of a knowing violation. Finally, OPMA does not

require that a public body complete the open portion

of its meetings before going into closed session. 7-25-12

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES VS. H.P AND V.P. IN THE MATTER OF H.P., JR., A.P. AND A.P. A-0642-10T1

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES VS. H.P AND V.P.

IN THE MATTER OF H.P., JR., A.P. AND A.P. A-0642-10T1

Defendant appealed from an order that concluded he had abused or neglected his three children. The finding was rendered by the judge's consideration only of testimony taken at a hearing conducted the day the complaint was filed, at a time when defendant was present but not represented by counsel.

The court held that defendant's claim that the record considered when the finding of abuse/neglect was made was inadequate because he was not represented when the testimony was taken lacked merit because defendant was represented when he consented to the judge's reliance on that earlier testimony. The court reversed and remanded, however, because the judge made a finding of abuse/neglect by using the clear and convincing standard without providing defendant advance notice of that standard's use. In addition, the judge's findings consisted only of a summary of the testimony followed by a conclusion parroting the requirements of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 without credibility determinations or an analysis of what the judge found had actually occurred. Absent greater clarity regarding this and other factual circumstances, the court was unable to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to meet the applicable preponderance standard even though the judge felt the higher clear and convincing burden had been met. 10-27-11

ALFRED HEHRE VS. ROBERT DEMARCO, JR., ET AL A-2812-10T4

Plaintiff was injured in a car accident while being driven to a school-sponsored track meet by a fellow student-athlete. He sued the track coach, Holy Spirit High School, and the Catholic diocese of Camden, claiming these defendants failed to provide him with a safe means of transportation to the school- sponsored event and, under principles of agency, were vicariously liable for the driver's negligence.

By leave granted from the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the Charitable Immunity Act, we hold that the exemption to immunity provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c)(2) applies only to a "trustee, director, officer, employee, agent, servant or volunteer" of a charitable entity who causes "damage as the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle." By its plain and clear language, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c)(2) does not vitiate the immunity otherwise granted by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a) to an associated charitable entity. 8-18-11

JOSEPH VAS v. JOSEPH J. ROBERTS, JR., ETC. A-0399-09T3

JOSEPH VAS v. JOSEPH J. ROBERTS, JR., ETC. A-0399-09T3

Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly suspended a member's salary and benefits while still holding office but following his indictment for crimes of public corruption. The Assemblyman filed this direct appeal, arguing that the Speaker's unilateral action in withholding a member's constitutionally- guaranteed salary was not legally authorized and therefore ultra vires.We hold that although the Speaker's action was not a final decision of a "state administrative officer" within the meaning of Rule 2:2-3(a)(2), and therefore should have been brought in the Law Division as an action in lieu of prerogative writs (mandamus) pursuant to Rule 4:69-1, we nevertheless elect to exercise our original jurisdiction, Rule 2:10-5, to address a strictly legal issue of general public interest and to avoid further litigation. On the merits, we conclude that the Speaker's unilateral action was without any constitutional or statutory authority and clearly contravened the Assembly's own internal rules for disciplining its members. 3-04-11

FRANCIS J. McGOVERN, JR., ESQ v. RUTGERS, ET AL. A-2531-09T1

FRANCIS J. McGOVERN, JR., ESQ v. RUTGERS, ET AL. A-2531-09T1

Construing the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21, we conclude: 1) a public body violates the requirements of the Act by routinely scheduling a five-minute public session, followed by a closed session of indeterminate duration, followed by another public session; 2) the Rutgers Board of Governors is not a "board of education" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(a), and is therefore not required to set aside a portion of its meetings for publiccomment; and 3) the notice issued to advise the public of an upcoming special meeting contained an insufficient description of the matters that were expected to be discussed in closed session. 2-18-11

PAUL G. SKLODOWSKY v. JOHN F. LUSHIS, JR., ESQ. A-3918-09T3

PAUL G. SKLODOWSKY v. JOHN F. LUSHIS, JR., ESQ. A-3918-09T3 2-02-11

The entire controversy doctrine does not require a client to assert legal malpractice claims against his or her attorney in this action, which arose from the attorney's alleged negligent advice, even though the attorney is a party to that action. Furthermore, if the doctrine could be applied in such a case, it would not be fair to do so here because the assertion of the legal malpractice claims in the underlying action would have further compromised an already strained attorney-client relationship and prejudiced the parties' ability to advance their respective interests in that lawsuit.