ADP, LLC VS. ERIK KUSINS ADP, LLC VS. RYAN HOPPER ADP, LLC VS. ANTHONY M. KARAMITAS ADP, LLC VS. NICK LENOBLE ADP, LLC VS. MICHAEL DEMARCO ADP, LLC VS. DANIEL HOBAICA (C-000264, C-000023-16, C-000143-16, C-000117-16, C-000120-16, AND C-000118-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-4664-16T1/A-0692-17T3/A-0693-17T3/A-2990-17T4/A-4407-17T4/A-4527-17T4)

ADP, LLC VS. ERIK KUSINS ADP, LLC VS. RYAN HOPPER ADP, LLC VS. ANTHONY M. KARAMITAS ADP, LLC VS. NICK LENOBLE ADP, LLC VS. MICHAEL DEMARCO ADP, LLC VS. DANIEL HOBAICA (C-000264, C-000023-16, C-000143-16, C-000117-16, C-000120-16, AND C-000118-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-4664-16T1/A-0692-17T3/A-0693-17T3/A-2990-17T4/A-4407-17T4/A-4527-17T4)

In these consolidated appeals, the court considers the enforceability of the restrictive covenant agreements (RCAs) executed by the six defendants during their employment with plaintiff ADP, LLC. Each defendant was a top-performing sales representative. To award and incentivize their success, ADP invited defendants to participate in a stock award incentive program conditioned on their acceptance and execution of an RCA. The RCA included non-solicitation and non-compete provisions that restricted an employee from soliciting ADP's clients and competing with ADP upon leaving the company. The defendants left ADP at varying times and each accepted employment with the same direct competitor.

The court concluded that ADP demonstrated a legitimate and protectable interest in its customer relationships sufficient to justify enforcing the RCAs. However, the court also found the RCAs were overly broad and imposed an undue hardship on defendants. Therefore, the court blue-penciled the non-solicitation and non-compete provisions.

The court held that ADP may only prohibit its employees, upon separation from the company, from soliciting any of ADP's actual clients with whom the former employee was directly involved or who the employee knew was ADP's client.

As to the solicitation of prospective clients, the court found it unreasonable and onerous to restrict defendants from soliciting clients unknown to them while at ADP. Therefore, when working for a competitor, a former employee is only prohibited from soliciting a prospective ADP client if the employee gained knowledge of the potential client while at ADP and directly, or indirectly, solicits that client after leaving.

In considering the non-compete provision, the court determined it was reasonable for ADP to restrict its former employees, for a reasonable time, from providing services to a competing business in the same geographical territory in which the employee operated while at ADP.

The court reverses the summary judgment orders in favor of each defendant. Because each defendant breached the RCAs to some extent, the court remands the cases to the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the breach and to consider ADP's applications for counsel fees.

CENTRAL 25, LLC VS. ZONING BOARD OF THE CITY OF UNION CITY (L-1246-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0263-17T1)

CENTRAL 25, LLC VS. ZONING BOARD OF THE CITY OF UNION CITY (L-1246-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0263-17T1)

The Union City Zoning Board of Adjustment denied plaintiff's application for preliminary and final site plan approval, which required a number of bulk variances and a use variance. In an action in lieu of prerogative writs, the Law Division rejected plaintiff's claim that the two members of the Board should have recused themselves due to a conflict of interest. Applying the Supreme Court's recent decision in Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 237 N.J. 333 (2019), this court reverses and remands the matter for the Law Division to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the two Board members should have recused themselves.

RICHARD MARCONI VS. UNITED AIRLINES (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) (A-0110-18T4)

RICHARD MARCONI VS. UNITED AIRLINES (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) (A-0110-18T4)

Petitioner, a New Jersey resident, sought benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128, alleging injuries both as the result of a specific incident, and occupational injuries "while performing repetitive duties" as an aircraft technician while employed by United Airlines at the airport in Philadelphia. The judge of compensation dismissed both petitions for lack of jurisdiction.

Relying on dicta in Bunk v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 144 N.J. 176, 180-81 (1996), petitioner claimed residency alone was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Alternatively, he argued that United's business was "localized" in New Jersey, and combined with his residency, New Jersey should exercise jurisdiction over his petitions.

The court affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding the dicta in Bunk was not controlling, and residency alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. The court also concluded that although United maintained a "localized" presence in New Jersey, petitioner lacked any employment relationship to that presence.

LILLIAN COLLAS VS. RARITAN RIVER GARAGE, INC. (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) (A-3103-17T4)

LILLIAN COLLAS VS. RARITAN RIVER GARAGE, INC. (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) (A-3103-17T4)

After awarding dependent benefits under N.J.S.A. 34:15-13 to the surviving spouse of a worker who succumbed to an occupational disease, the judge of compensation awarded counsel fees based on the spouse's expected lifetime – in accordance with a 1995 amendment to N.J.S.A. 34:15-13(j) which provided that compensation shall be paid to a surviving spouse "during the entire period of survivorship" – as determined from the table of mortality and life expectancy printed as Appendix I to the New Jersey Rules of Court.

The court rejected the employer's argument on appeal that the proper calculation should have been based on the long-standing basis for counsel fee awards: the 450-week period of payments provided in N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(b) and portions of N.J.S.A. 34:15-13. N.J.S.A. 34:15-64 authorizes a judge of compensation to allow a prevailing party "a reasonable attorney fee, not exceeding [twenty percent] of the judgment." Although the court did not hold the use of the 450-week method traditionally used to calculate counsel fees was improper, it concluded the use of the table to calculate counsel fees was reasonable because it is designed to actuarially calculate the amount of time over which a surviving spouse can expect to receive benefits; in other words, it is based on the judgment amount calculated using the spouse's projected lifespan.

ALCATEL-LUCENT USA INC. VS. TOWNSHIP OF BERKELEY HEIGHTS (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) (A-0743-16T1)

ALCATEL-LUCENT USA INC. VS. TOWNSHIP OF BERKELEY HEIGHTS (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) (A-0743-16T1)

Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. (Alcatel), is the owner of real property in the Township of Berkeley Heights on which is located its North American headquarters.1 There are approximately 1.5 million square feet of improvements on the 153.4 acre Berkeley Heights property – of which Alcatel contends 53 acres are woodlands.

N.J.S.A. 54:4-34 – commonly referred to as Chapter 91 (you have to read the decision to find out why) – requires every real property owner to provide "a full and true account of his [or her] name and real property and the income therefrom, in the case of income-producing property" to the municipal tax assessor upon the assessor's written request. The statute also precludes the owner from appealing the assessor's valuation and assessment if the owner fails or refuses to respond to the Chapter 91 request.

After Alcatel failed to respond to the tax assessor's request for information pertaining to its Berkeley Heights property, LTI filed a farmland assessment application for the woodland portion of the property. The assessor denied the application concluding agriculture was not the dominant use of the property; Alcatel filed a complaint with the Tax Court challenging the denial. The Tax Court dismissed the complaint holding it was precluded under Chapter 91 because Alcatel failed to respond to the assessor's Chapter 91 request.

The court rejected Alcatel's arguments that the Tax Court erred in: extending the application of the Chapter 91 preclusion penalty to its farmland assessment appeal; applying the Chapter 91 preclusion penalty to the woodland property because it is not income producing; and formulating a new rule that misinterprets our prior holding and undermines the legislative purpose of Chapter 91 and the Act. It also argued that technical deficiencies in the Township's Chapter 91 request bar preclusion of its claim.

The property was conveyed by Lucent Technologies, Inc. (Lucent) to LTI NJ Finance LLC (LTI), which simultaneously entered into a twenty-year agreement with Lucent, the sole member of LTI, pursuant to which Lucent was considered the "beneficial owner." Lucent merged with Alcatel, a French company, in 2006, to form Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. The agreement between LTI and Lucent was terminated in 2013 and LTI was merged into Alcatel. The court was informed by Alcatel's merits brief that it is now known as "Nokia".

The court perceived no reason why Chapter 91's preclusion should not apply to Alcatel's farmland assessment complaint and affirmed Judge Joshua D.Novin's dismissal. The court recognized that the comprehensive statutory scheme requires tax assessors to assess every property at its full and fair value each year. Inasmuch as the Chapter 91 data is essential to the valuation of a split-use property, and, in turn, to the fulfillment of the assessor's statutory duties for the entire municipality, the court agreed with Judge Novin that the statute's preclusion provision should be applied to owners who fail to respond to the assessor's request.

ANASIA MAISON VS. NJ TRANSIT CORP., ET AL. (L-3535-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3737-17T2)

ANASIA MAISON VS. NJ TRANSIT CORP., ET AL. (L-3535-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3737-17T2)

A jury awarded plaintiff $1.8 million in damages against New Jersey Transit and its bus driver for injuries she sustained when an unidentified bus passenger struck plaintiff in the head with a thrown glass bottle. We affirm the trial court's determination to hold defendants to the common carrier standard of negligence but conclude the trial court misinterpreted applicable statutes when it denied defendants' request to include the bottle thrower on the verdict sheet.

We hold that joint tortfeasors are not required to apportion liability in cases involving a public entity. Instead, a jury should be permitted to apportion liability when a public employee or entity is determined to be a tortfeasor in a cause of action with one or more other tortfeasors.

We therefore affirm the liability verdict and award of damages but vacate the final judgment and remand for another jury to address the issue of allocation of fault between the bottle thrower and defendants.

IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES IN THE STATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) (A-5150-16T1)

IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES IN THE STATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) (A-5150-16T1)

The court held that the Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission was authorized to approve the creation of a new job title and did not act arbitrarily in approving the title at issue in this case.