05/02/14 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY VS. G.R. A-4594-12T4

05/02/14 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY VS. G.R.

A-4594-12T4

The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the "Division") informed G.R. that she neglected her two-year- old son by leaving him unattended in her minivan while shopping in a Target store. G.R. immediately requested an Office of Administrative Law hearing to resolve numerous issues of disputed material facts. Five years later, the Division placed her name on the child abuse registry and issued its final agency decision, summarily concluding that G.R. neglected her son by failing to exercise a minimum degree of care as required by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21c(4)(b). This substantial delay was caused by agency inaction and by the misplacement of G.R.'s file by a deputy attorney general. Although G.R. timely disputed the Division's initial substantiation of neglect, she lived with the uncertainty of the outcome of her administrative challenge during  the  entire five years. We  reversed without prejudice, remanded, and directed the OAL to conduct a hearing to resolve the disputed issues of fact, and we gave G.R. the opportunity to argue on remand that the case should be dismissed as a matter of fundamental fairness.

05/05/14 NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY VS. M.C

05/05/14

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY VS. M.C 

A-2398-12T2

On a father's appeal of a judgment entered against him a fact-finding hearing in an abuse or neglect action commenced pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73 and

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12, we reverse. Construing N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b), we conclude that in a case, such as this, where there is no finding of actual harm, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) requires a court to consider competent evidence establishing that the conditions that posed a risk of harm have been successfully remediated between the time that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency intervened and the time of the fact-finding hearing.  We  further conclude that if evidence of successful remediation by the time of the fact-finding hearing is undisputed and if there is no evidence establishing, or permitting a reasonable inference of,  likely repetition  of  the  conduct  or circumstances that warranted intervention, the evidence is insufficient to support a determination that the child "is in imminent danger of becoming impaired."

05/06/14 NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION VS. MORI A-0122-12T4

05/06/14 NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION VS.

MORI

A-0122-12T4

     This appeal concerns property acquired by New Jersey Transit through      condemnation. The  property contains navigable waters of the United States under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE). We held that because the ACOE has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the taking area falls under the category of wetlands, it was error to submit this issue to the jury.

     We also held that the trial judge should have conducted a pre-trial N.J.R.E. 104 hearing and rendered a determination that there existed the reasonable probability the ACOE would have granted a Section 404 permit as of the taking date for the proposed private development.

05/07/14 BARLYN VS. DOW A-0779-13T4

05/07/14 BARLYN VS. DOW

A-0779-13T4

     Plaintiff filed suit against various members of the Office of the Attorney General, individually and in their official capacities. He alleged that he was terminated from his position as an assistant county prosecutor after complaining that defendants dismissed indictments against the county Sheriff and members of her department for political purposes. Plaintiff claimed his termination was in violation of "clear mandates of public policy." See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72 (1980). The Law Division judge granted his motion and compelled defendants to produce a copy of all materials generated by the grand jury in connection with its investigation of the Sheriff's Office, including but not limited to transcripts, exhibits, subpoenaed documents and other evidence.

     We granted defendants' motion for leave to appeal and reversed, finding that plaintiff failed to make "a strong showing of   particularized need  that outweigh[ed]  the interest in grand jury secrecy." State v. Doliner, 96 N.J. 236, 246 (1984).

We also addressed whether a motion seeking to compel production of grand jury materials must be brought before the vicinage assignment judge where the grand jury was empanelled, or whether the trial judge in another vicinage could decide the motion.

05/08/14 NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES

VS .N.D., J.P. AND A.J. IN THE MATTER OF E.D.

A-2093-12T2

     A few days after ingesting cocaine, N.D. gave birth to a child who tested positive for the drug but displayed no signs of withdrawal. At a fact-finding hearing, the Division introduced evidence that the infant was born premature  and     underweight,  but  presented   no  medical evidence to connect these conditions to the mother's druguse. The Family Part found the mother put the child at risk by her use of cocaine.

    The fact-finding took place before the decision in Department of Children & Families v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1 (2013), and the Family Part judge did not have the benefit of the Court's holding that drug use by a parent during pregnancy, standing alone, may not substantiate a finding of abuse or neglect. We reversed the finding of abuse or neglect and took the unusual step of remanding with a direction to re-open the fact-finding hearing to permit the parties to present medical or expert testimony as to whether the mother's consumption of cocaine caused harm to the child.

05/13/14 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY VS. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BRUCE SOLOMON A-3381-12T1

05/13/14 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY VS.

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BRUCE

SOLOMON

A-3381-12T1

In response to a request for government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to 47:1A-13, a government agency does not have the authority to redact an admittedly responsive document to withhold information the agency deems to be outside the scope of the request.  Absent   a   legally   recognized  exception    to disclosure,  a  citizen's  right  of  access  to   public information is unfettered.

We also reverse the trial court's decision to place the "onus" on the requestor to clarify or engage in negotiations   with   the  custodian  as a  jurisdictional prerequisite to instituting legal action to enforce his or her rights to access public information. This extra bureaucratic hurdle the requestor must clear before getting to the courthouse doors is untethered to any provision in OPRA and contravenes our State's strong public policy favoring "the prompt disclosure of government records." Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 65 (2008); N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.

05/13/14 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY VS.

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BRUCE

SOLOMON

A-3381-12T1

In response to a request for government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to 47:1A-13, a government agency does not have the authority to redact an admittedly responsive document to withhold information the agency deems to be outside the scope of the request.  Absent   a   legally   recognized  exception    to disclosure,  a  citizen's  right  of  access  to   public information is unfettered.

We also reverse the trial court's decision to place the "onus" on the requestor to clarify or engage in negotiations   with   the  custodian  as a  jurisdictional prerequisite to instituting legal action to enforce his or her rights to access public information. This extra bureaucratic hurdle the requestor must clear before getting to the courthouse doors is untethered to any provision in OPRA and contravenes our State's strong public policy favoring "the prompt disclosure of government records." Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 65 (2008); N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.