GONZALO CHIRINO V. PROUD 2 HAUL, INC., (A-0703-15T2)

GONZALO CHIRINO V. PROUD 2 HAUL, INC., (A-0703-15T2)

The panel publishes this opinion at the Supreme Court's request. Trucking companies registered with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, subject to the Truth in Leasing regulations, 49 C.F.R. pt. 376, in conjunction with the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 13901, 13902, 14102, and 14704, are required to have lease agreements in place with independent drivers enumerating all deductions taken from their pay. The Truth in Leasing requirements apply even if the trucking company retains a third party to manage payments to drivers and to manage delivery paperwork. The trucking company's purpose in contracting the functions to a third party was to avoid the perception it was the drivers' employer, and to maintain the drivers' status as independent contractors. The trucking company alone, however, scheduled deliveries. That the trucks were "leased," to the third party was inconsequential so long as the trucking company retained exclusive control over the shipping schedule.

The majority further found that defendant's failure to raise a new fact-sensitive argument to the trial judge, based on records not available to the trial court, precluded the issue from being considered on appeal. Judge Accurso dissented on that point.

ADRIAN SOSA VS. MASSACHUSETTS BAY INSURANCE COMPANY (L-0160-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5349-16T3)

ADRIAN SOSA VS. MASSACHUSETTS BAY INSURANCE COMPANY (L-0160-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5349-16T3)

In this insurance coverage dispute, the court interprets a homeowner's insurance policy's water-damage exclusion. The court holds that damage caused by a water-main break under a public street, which released water that flowed down a driveway into plaintiff's first-floor apartment, was not excluded as a loss caused by "flood," "surface water," or "water below the surface of the ground." Therefore, the court reverses the trial court's order granting summary judgment dismissal of the homeowner's complaint for coverage, and remands for further proceedings.

JOHN E. SUSKO, ET AL. VS. BOROUGH OF BELMAR, ET AL. (L-1427-15, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3059-16T2)

JOHN E. SUSKO, ET AL. VS. BOROUGH OF BELMAR, ET AL. (L-1427-15, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3059-16T2)

The Appellate Division held that when a municipality violates the beach fee statute, N.J.S.A. 40:61-22.20, by charging unreasonable beach fees, that violation constitutes the deprivation of a substantive civil right under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA), and a successful plaintiff is entitled to counsel fees. However, because the CRA requires the violation of an unambiguous, specific statutory or constitutional provision, most of the conduct plaintiffs proved in this case, while wrongful, did not establish CRA violations or entitle them to counsel fees.

IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL OF COMMITMENT OF C.M. IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF M.H. IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF C.R.(CASC-561-18, CASC-426-18, AND SACC-168-18, CAMDEN COUNTY, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-4684-17T2/

IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL OF COMMITMENT OF C.M. IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF M.H. IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF C.R.(CASC-561-18, CASC-426-18, AND SACC-168-18, CAMDEN COUNTY, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-4684-17T2/A-4699-17T2/A-0015-18T2)

In these three similar matters, appellants were involuntarily held for longer than the law permits prior to entry of a temporary commitment order. By the time their motions to vacate could be heard, they were discharged from confinement; the trial judge thus denied the motions on mootness grounds. In these appeals, which were consolidated, the court held that, even if appellants' motions were technically moot because they had been released, they were entitled to a ruling on the merits because of the significant liberty interests at stake and because such occurrences were capable of repetition yet likely to evade review.

EDWARD CORREA AND NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE (A-4883-17T4)

EDWARD CORREA AND NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE (A-4883-17T4)

The court holds that where N.J.S.A. 19:23-22.4 requires that sample primary ballots be printed in Spanish and English, the official primary ballots, including mail-in ballots, must also be printed in Spanish and English.

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY VS. AMERICAN MEDICAL PLUMBING, INC. (L-0299-17, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5395-16T4)

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY VS. AMERICAN MEDICAL PLUMBING, INC. (L-0299-17, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-5395-16T4)

Affirming the grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff-insurer's subrogation action, the court broadly interprets the waiver-of-subrogation provisions of a widely used American Institute of Architects (AIA) form construction contract. The court relies on the contract's plain language, the majority view of other states' courts, and the evident goal to transfer the risk of construction-related losses to insurers and preclude lawsuits among contracting parties. In particular, the court rejects the insurer's argument that the subrogation waiver was limited to damages to the "Work" incurred during construction. Rather, the subrogation waiver extended to claims related to damages to property outside the Work, incurred after completion, because the insurance the owner obtained to comply with the contract also provided coverage for those damages.

COREY DICKSON VS. COMMUNITY BUS LINES, INC., ET AL. (L-0633-16, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3857-17T3)

COREY DICKSON VS. COMMUNITY BUS LINES, INC., ET AL. (L-0633-16, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3857-17T3)

In this case, the court holds that a perceived disability claim based on obesity under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, must be grounded upon direct or circumstantial evidence that defendants perceived the plaintiff to be disabled due to a medical condition that caused him or her to be overweight. Such proof is absent from this record and, accordingly, the court determined that summary judgment was correctly granted.