IN THE MATTER OF DECEMBER 9, 2014 SPECIAL SCHOOL ELECTION A-0653-14T2

 IN THE MATTER OF DECEMBER 9, 2014 SPECIAL SCHOOL ELECTION 

A-0653-14T2 

The Lower Cape May School District is a limited purpose school district educating students in grades seven through twelve who reside in the Borough of West Cape May (West Cape May), the City of Cape May (Cape May) and the Township of Lower (Lower). Cape May sought to withdraw from the regional school district. Accordingly, a special school election was scheduled pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-57 to afford the voters of Cape May and the constituent districts the opportunity to vote on whether Cape May should be permitted to withdraw. However, the statute is silent as to whether Cape May or the regional school district should bear the cost of the special election. As a matter of first impression, we conclude that N.J.S.A. 19:60-12 obligates the regional school district to pay the cost of the special school election to determine Cape May's proposed withdrawal from the Lower Cape May School District.  03/04/15

STATE FARM INDEMNITY COMPANY VS. NATIONAL LIABILITY & FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY A-5972-13T1

STATE FARM INDEMNITY COMPANY VS. NATIONAL LIABILITY & FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 

A-5972-13T1 

In an inter-company arbitration between insurers over contribution for PIP benefits, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-11, all issues, including disputes over coverage, are to be decided by the arbitrator. Given the purpose of the no-fault law to expedite the resolution of PIP disputes, we infer that the Legislature intended to permit summary actions to enforce arbitration under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-11. Hence, the trial court properly allowed plaintiff to proceed by order to show cause, filed pursuant to Rule 4:67-1(a). 03/04/15 

DELRAY HOLDING, LLC AND BAY DOCK HOLDINGS, LLC VS. SOFIA DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT AT SOUTH BRUNSWICK, LLC, A-0203-13T3

DELRAY HOLDING, LLC AND BAY DOCK HOLDINGS, LLC VS. 

SOFIA DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT AT SOUTH BRUNSWICK, LLC,  

A-0203-13T3 

Members of and investors in two LLCs lacked standing as individuals to pursue claims that belonged to the LLCs and that had been settled in other litigation, notwithstanding the individuals' characterization of the claims as tortious interference with their investment agreements with the LLCs. 03/02/15 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, BY THE COMMISSIONER OF TRANSPORTATION VS. CHERRY HILL MITSUBISHI, INC., ET AL. A-2899-13T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, BY THE COMMISSIONER OF TRANSPORTATION VS. CHERRY HILL MITSUBISHI, INC., ET AL. 

A-2899-13T2 

In a summary proceeding filed by the State seeking to remove encroachments from its right-of-way pursuant to N.J.S.A. 27:7-44.1, the named defendants filed a counterclaim against Department of Transportation officials for monetary damages resulting from the alleged violation of their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, recovery for unjust enrichment, and injunctive relief. We find that the doctrine of qualified immunity bars recovery because there is no cognizable property interest in the activity in these circumstances, nor any basis in the record for injunctive relief. The New Jersey Contractual Immunity Act, N.J.S.A. 59:13-3, waived sovereign immunity only for express contracts or contracts implied in fact, not for a contract implied in law which might support defendants' claim for unjust enrichment. The counterclaim is dismissed in its entirety. 02/26/15 

GARDEN HOWE URBAN RENEWAL ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. VS. HACBM ARCHITECTS ENGINEERS PLANNERS, L.L.C. AND DEL-SANO CONTRACTING CORP. A-1144-13T2

GARDEN HOWE URBAN RENEWAL ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. VS. HACBM 

ARCHITECTS ENGINEERS PLANNERS, L.L.C. AND DEL-SANO 

CONTRACTING CORP. 

A-1144-13T2 

In this case, in which plaintiff is asserting claims of professional negligence against defendant architects, we hold that: (1) plaintiff's principal expert report should not have been barred because the report was written by two professional engineers and a code enforcement official rather than a licensed architect; (2) plaintiff established exceptional circumstances to extend the time for discovery pursuant to Rule 4:24-1(c) because its principal expert report was barred on the eve of trial; and (3) plaintiff's architectural expert should have been permitted to testify at trial concerning one of plaintiff's claims because, although the expert had not explicitly opined as to the standard of care applicable to this claim, that opinion was implicit in the expert's report. 02/26/15 

Deborah Townsend v. Noah Pierre (A-2-13; 072357)

Deborah Townsend v. Noah Pierre (A-2-13; 072357) 

Given the uncontradicted testimony that the driver’s view was unimpeded by the shrubbery on defendants’ property, the trial court properly barred the causation opinion of plaintiffs’ expert and granted summary judgment. The opinion on the issue of causation was a net opinion that was directly contradicted by the factual evidence. The opinion with regard to the duty of care owed by the property owner and lessee was properly substantiated and was therefore admissible under N.J.R.E. 702 and 703. 3-12-15 

In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Housing (M-392-14; 067126)

In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Housing (M-392-14; 067126) 

The FHA’s exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement is dissolved until further order of the Court. The courts may resume their role as the forum of first resort for evaluating municipal compliance with Mount Laurel obligations, as provided in this opinion and the Court’s corresponding Order. The effective date of the Court’s Order is delayed by ninety days to effectuate an orderly transition to the judicial remedies authorized by the Court. 3-10-15