JAMES MORAN VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM A-1041-13T1

JAMES MORAN VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM
A-1041-13T1
In the absence of the unit that normally forced entry into structures, and having no battering tools at his disposal, a firefighter rescued two people from a burning building by kicking in the reinforced front door. He was permanently disabled as a result, but was denied an accidental disability pension. Finding that the PFRS Board took too narrow a view of the standards set forth in Richardson v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189 (2007), we reversed the Board's decision that the firefighter was not disabled due to a traumatic event because the incident was not undesigned and unexpected. We concluded that the incident was undesigned and unexpected, and qualified as a traumatic event within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7. 

J.T., ET AL. VS. DUMONT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ET AL. A-2424-12T1

J.T., ET AL. VS. DUMONT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ET AL.
          A-2424-12T1

We considered an appeal brought under the New Jersey Law against Discrimination by the parent of a child receiving special education and related services. The parent claimed that

the child had a right under the LAD to attend his or her neighborhood school even when the child's special education placement provided an appropriate education pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. We determined, based upon cases brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, that the program or benefit a school district must provide to a special education child is a free and appropriate public education. We preclude the isolation of specific components of an Individual Education Plan, such as neighborhood placement or mode of transportation, as separate benefits under the LAD. 

CHRISTINE A. DISPENZIERE, ET AL. VS. KUSHNER COMPANIES, ET AL. A-3022-13T4

CHRISTINE A. DISPENZIERE, ET AL. VS. KUSHNER COMPANIES, ET AL.
A-3022-13T4
Plaintiffs, who purchased condominium units in a real estate development that the project developer allegedly failed to complete, appeal from an order directing their statutory and common-law claims to arbitration. Following Atalese v. United States Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014), we conclude that the arbitration provision in the parties' purchase agreements is unenforceable because it lacked any language that would inform unit buyers that they were waiving their right to seek relief in court. We also hold that the fact that many of the purchasers were represented by counsel during the real estate transaction does not suffice to cure the inadequacy of the contractual arbitration provision. 

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY STUDENT ASSEMBLY (RUSA), ET AL. VS. MIDDLESEX COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL. A-2383-13T3

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY STUDENT ASSEMBLY (RUSA), ET AL. VS. MIDDLESEX COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL.
A-2383-13T3
In this case of first impression, plaintiffs appeal from the December 11, 2013 order of the Chancery Division, granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiffs' complaint challenging the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b, which requires all eligible persons to register to vote no later than twenty-one days prior to an election. Plaintiffs also appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment. Because the trial court did not make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning defendants' justification for maintaining the twenty-one-day advance registration requirement in the face of the evidence submitted by plaintiffs that the requirement is no longer necessary to protect the integrity of the electoral process, we are constrained to reverse both decisions and remand for further proceedings. 

MORTGAGE GRADER, INC. VS. WARD & OLIVO, L.L.P., AND JOHN OLIVO, ESQ., AND JOHN WARD, ESQ. A-3777-13T3

MORTGAGE GRADER, INC. VS. WARD & OLIVO, L.L.P., AND
          JOHN OLIVO, ESQ., AND JOHN WARD, ESQ.

A-3777-13T3
In this legal malpractice case, in which plaintiff asserts claims against two attorneys who practiced law as a limited

liability partnership ("LLP"), we hold that the direct claims against defendant John Ward must be dismissed because Ward is not vicariously liable for the alleged malpractice of his partner John Olivo. Ward was shielded from liability under the Uniform Partnership Act, N.J.S.A. 42:1A-1 to -56, and the LLP did not revert to a general partnership, as the judge had concluded, notwithstanding the LLP's failure to maintain professional liability insurance covering the claims in this lawsuit, as required by Rule 1:21-1C(a)(3). We also hold that plaintiff failed to comply with the Affidavit of Merit Statute ("AMS"), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, by not serving an affidavit of merit on Ward or otherwise substantially complying with the AMS. 

L.T. VS. F.M. A-2422-12T1

L.T. VS. F.M.
          A-2422-12T1

Plaintiff obtained a final restraining order (FRO) against defendant in the Family Part and subsequently brought an action in the Law Division seeking to recover damages for injuries allegedly inflicted upon her by defendant in the assaults that were the subject of the Family Part proceedings. In this

appeal, we address the issue of whether defendant was collaterally estopped from arguing in the Law Division action that he did not assault plaintiff. We also consider whether evidence of a prior alleged assault that was not raised in plaintiff's complaint was admissible as habit evidence, and whether plaintiff should have been permitted to introduce the FRO into evidence. Based upon our review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar defendant from challenging plaintiff's claims in the Law Division action. We also hold that evidence of the prior alleged assault and the FRO should not have been admitted into evidence. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 

Sam Hargrove, et al. v. Sleepy’s LLC

Sam Hargrove, et al. v. Sleepy’s LLC (A-70-12; 072742)

          The “ABC” test derived from the New Jersey
          Unemployment Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 43:21-
          19(i)(6), governs whether a plaintiff is an employee
          or an independent contractor for purposes of resolving
          a wage-payment or wage-and-hour claim.