KELLY RAMOS VS. HERBERT FLOWERS, ET AL. A-4910-10T3

KELLY RAMOS VS. HERBERT FLOWERS, ET AL.
          A-4910-10T3

Plaintiff, who asserts that he was in the process of filming a documentary about gang activity in a public area, filed suit against the police officer whom he alleges ordered him to stop filming, claiming that the officer violated his free-speech rights under Article I, paragraphs 6 and 18 of the New Jersey Constitution, as well as the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He brought the suit under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. The Law Division granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding that qualified immunity barred the free-speech claims. We reversed.
We determined that the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is available in actions brought under the Civil Rights Act, just as it is in actions brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. However, as is the case with § 1983, it is only applicable to claims for money damages and does not apply to injunctive relief.
We further determined that the motion judge erred in applying the defense on summary judgment because the alleged actions of defendant, taken in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, violated plaintiff's free-speech rights, which we held were well-established at the time of the incidents that gave rise to plaintiff's claims. Under those circumstances, qualified immunity is not applicable.
We remanded claims involving allegations of an unlawful arrest for further consideration and the articulation of reasons for the dismissal of those claims. 09-21-12  

KATHERINE MILNE VS. ROBERT GOLDENBERG A-4062-10T4

KATHERINE MILNE VS. ROBERT GOLDENBERG
          A-4062-10T4/A-4319-10T4/A-4594-10T4 (CONSOLIDATED)

In this matrimonial matter the parties raised several challenges to four Family Part orders. Two significant issues warrant publication of our opinion. First, we examined the scope of the hearing regarding a report by a guardian ad litem (GAL) as required by Rule 5:8B. The trial judge limited the evidentiary hearing to examination, including cross-examination, of the GAL, after rejecting plaintiff's request to testify and allow an adjournment to obtain an expert opinion. We determined the trial judge employed too restrictive an interpretation of Rule 5:8B, and clarified the parties' ability to contest the facts presented by a GAL.
Second, we reversed as error the trial court's appointment of a parenting coordinator (PC) without conforming to the Supreme Court Guidelines implementing the PC Pilot Program as he believed the Guidelines applied only to pilot counties, which did not include Essex County. We held that although parties to a matrimonial dispute may agree to accept defined obligations regarding use of a PC, which do not violate the public policy of this State, any Family Part judge ordering the appointment of a PC must comply with the Supreme Court's established Guidelines. 09-12-12  

BARBARA GONZALEZ, ET AL. VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY APPORTIONMENT COMMISSION, ET AL. A-0747-11T4

BARBARA GONZALEZ, ET AL. VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY
          APPORTIONMENT COMMISSION, ET AL.

          A-0747-11T4; A-0869-11T4(CONSOLIDATED)

     In this appeal, we affirm the order dismissing a complaint
filed by numerous individuals and groups challenging the
legislative reapportionment map approved by the State of New
Jersey Apportionment Commission. 
09-10-12  

JOHN MULLEN AND HOWARD LEVINE VS. THE IPPOLITO CORPORATION, ET AL. A-5823-10T3

JOHN MULLEN AND HOWARD LEVINE VS. THE IPPOLITO
          CORPORATION, ET AL.

A-5823-10T3

          Plaintiffs, the owners of a single-family house
adjacent to a preexisting nonconforming motel, filed an action
in lieu of prerogative writs seeking mandamus relief against the
Borough of Point Pleasant Beach and its zoning, construction,
and dune protection officials.  Plaintiffs claimed that, over a
period of years, the municipal defendants ignored their numerous
complaints that the motel was expanding its physical footprint
and intensifying its business operations, all in violation of
municipal zoning and dune protection ordinances.

     The trial court granted the municipal defendants' motion
for summary judgment finding that plaintiffs' complaint was
untimely under Rule 4:69-6a, and for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under Rule 4:69-5.  Relying on Garrou v.
Teaneck Tryon Co., 11 N.J. 294 (1953), we now reverse and hold
the trial court should not have dismissed plaintiffs' complaint
against the municipal defendants. 
09-10-12  

D.W. v. R.W. (A-4-11;

D.W. v. R.W. (A-4-11; 068214)

          Neither the trial court nor the Appellate Division
          referenced the applicable statutory provision,
          N.J.S.A. 9:17-48, which addresses the circumstances
          that warrant an order of genetic testing when
          parentage is in doubt.  Even under the most generous
          view of the facts from Mark or Diane’s perspective,
          there is an absence of good cause to deny genetic
          testing. 
10-10-12  

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Ofra Dimant (A-2-11

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v.
          Ofra Dimant (A-2-11; 067993)

          To obtain damages under the Spill Act, the DEP must
          demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, a
          reasonable connection between the discharge, the
          discharger, and the contamination at the damaged site.
          The proofs failed to establish a sufficient nexus
          between the groundwater contamination and Sue’s
          discharge during its operation. 
9-26-12   

Steven J. Winters v. North Hudson Regional Fire and Rescue, et al. (A-45/46/47-10;

 Steven J. Winters v. North Hudson Regional Fire and
          Rescue, et al. (A-45/46/47-10; 066968)

          When an employee and employer engage the system of
          public employee discipline established by law and the
          employee raises a claim that employer retaliation at
          least partially motivated the decision to bring the
          charge or the level of discipline sought, both the
          employee and employer must live with the outcome,
          including its potential preclusive effect on related
          employment-discrimination litigation as a matter of
          the equitable application of estoppel principles.
9-13-12