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Monday, December 26, 2011

Summary judgment denied in ski accident DANIEL ANGLAND and DANIEL WHEELER, CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT E. ANGLAND, and CHARLES JOHN

Summary judgment denied in ski accident

DANIEL ANGLAND and DANIEL

WHEELER, CO-ADMINISTRATORS

OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT E.

ANGLAND, and CHARLES

JOHNSON, IV, ADMINISTRATOR

OF THE ESTATE OF NANCY

ANGLAND, v. MOUNTAIN CREEK RESORT, INC.,

a New Jersey Corporation,

and WILLIAM TUCKER BROWNLEE,

Defendant-Appellant.

MOUNTAIN CREEK RESORT, INC.,

Third-Party Plaintiff/

Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM TUCKER BROWNLEE,

Third-Party Defendant.

___________________________________________________

October 7, 2011


Argued May 31, 2011 – Decided

Before Judges A.A. Rodríguez and C.L. Miniman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Sussex County, Docket No. L-0474-08.

John Burke argued the cause for appellant (Burke & Potenza, attorneys; Mr. Burke, of counsel and on the brief).

Phillip C. Wiskow argued the cause for respondents the Administrators of the Estate of Robert E. Angland and Nancy Angland (Gelman, Gelman, Wiskow & McCarthy, attorneys; Mr. Wiskow, of counsel and on the brief).

Hueston McNulty, attorneys for respondent Mountain Creek Resort, Inc. (Samuel J. McNulty and John F. Gaffney, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

William Tucker Brownlee moved for leave to appeal from the August 31, 2010 interlocutory order denying his motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs, the Administrators of the Estate of Robert E. Angland and Nancy Angland, and Mountain Creek Resort, Inc. (Mountain Creek). We initially denied the motion. Angland v. Mountain Creek, et al., No. M-403-10 (App. Div. October 14, 2010). However, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and summarily remanded to us to consider the merits on February 15, 2011.

These are the facts presented to the summary judgment judge. On Friday, January 19, 2007, shortly before noon, plaintiff's decedent, Robert Angland, suffered injuries resulting in his death while skiing at a ski area operated by defendant Mountain Creek. The facts are sharply disputed. However, all parties agree that just before the accident, defendant William Tucker Brownlee was snowboarding at Mountain Creek on the same slope as decedent. Brownlee and Angland made contact.

Besides these two points, the parties' versions of the facts diverge. According to Brownlee, as he was snowboarding on the far right side of the trail, an unidentified skier wearing a brown puffy jacket came from his left and cut directly in front of him. In order to avoid the unidentified skier, Brownlee turned quickly to his left. In doing so, Brownlee's snowboard and the decedent's skis became entangled. The two men collided, fell, and slid downhill. Decedent ultimately impacted a concrete bridge headfirst. He died as a result. Brownlee stopped sliding. He stood up and went to Angland's assistance. The ski patrol arrived and took decedent for medical assistance.

According to plaintiffs, there were almost no skiers on the trail at the time of the collision between Brownlee and decedent. Plaintiffs allege that Brownlee's "phantom skier" scenario is impeached by other evidence. Brownlee's version is that the phantom skier went in front of him and to his left. At Brownlee's deposition, he testified the phantom skier was at "eleven o'clock" to his position, and that the phantom skier cut to his right and decreased his speed. As a result, Brownlee cut to his left. Before Brownlee's snowboard went over one of decedent's skis and under the other, Brownlee acknowledged that he was out of control.

Immediately after the accident, Greg Pack, Vice President and Managing Director of Mountain Creek, skied over to Brownlee, who was approximately fifteen feet from Angland and the bridge. According to Pack, less than one minute after the accident, Brownlee stated that he was cut-off and involved in a collision.

Within thirty minutes of the accident, Brownlee told his close high school friend, Keith Eilerstan, who accompanied him to Mountain Creek that day, that a lady fell in front of him, and as a result, he steered off to his right and collided with decedent. Brownlee also gave a written statement to Mountain Creek's ski patrol and spoke to the Vernon Police Department on the day of the accident.

In not one of Brownlee's statements to Pack, Eilerstan, Mountain Creek's ski patrol or the Vernon police on the day of the accident did he identify the phantom skier by way of age, sex or clothing.

In a written statement, and in certified answers to interrogatories provided months later, Brownlee indicated that decedent fell and slid down the hill after the collision. Yet, he testified at his deposition soon after that he did not see decedent fall or slide.

Plaintiffs also note that Mountain Creek's accident reconstruction expert has prepared a report stating that the collision between Brownlee and Angland most likely occurred approximately one hundred feet from the bridge. It is also likely that Angland's multiple facial fractures were caused by the collision between the two men, as opposed to by contact with the bridge.

Plaintiffs' liability expert, Irving S. Scher, Ph.D., a Biomechanical Engineer, has opined that Brownlee violated the standard of care set by N.J.S.A. 5:13-1 to -11 (Ski Act), the New Jersey statute that defines the duties involved in skiing. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 5:13-4 provides the duties of a skier. According to the report, the deviation from the statutory standard occurred when Brownlee failed to keep a proper lookout, made a panic stop, and turned to his left in front of decedent.

Plaintiffs sued Mountain Creek and Brownlee. After a period of discovery, Mountain Creek and Brownlee moved for summary judgment. Judge William J. McGovern, III, denied Brownlee's motion for summary judgment, and granted Mountain Creek's motion. In a written opinion, dated August 31, 2010, the judge concluded that, in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Brownlee, as required by Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995), Mountain Creek was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of the Ski Act providing a standard of care. The judge acknowledged that the purpose of the Ski Act was announced by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 5:13-1(b). This section of the Ski Act provides that "the purpose of this law is to make explicit a policy of this State which clearly defines the responsibility of ski area operators and skiers." N.J.S.A. 5:13-1(b). The judge noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that the Ski Act completely replaces the common law with respect to the activities and persons it covers.

[T]he analysis of liability under the Ski Statute and the analysis under the common law of negligence have significant parallels.

That fact, coupled with the Legislature's statements of intent, lead us to conclude that where the Ski Statute properly applies, the Legislature intended completely to displace the common law with regard to the statutorily defined parties. The Ski Statute was intended to "clearly define[] the responsibility of ski area operators." N.J.S.A. 5:13-1(b). The legislative committee statement stated as a primary concern the uncertainty over operator liability following Vermont's Sunday[[1]] case. That interest would have been poorly served had the Ski Statute merely supplemented the common law. By codifying, as modified, fundamental principles of negligence as they apply to skiers and ski-area operators, the Legislature provided certainty by occupying the entire field.

[Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 502 (1996) (internal citations omitted).]

On appeal, Brownlee contends that the judge "committed error in holding that New Jersey's ski statute sets forth the standard of care applicable to claims between skiers." We disagree and concur with Judge McGovern that this argument is without merit. We concur with the judge's analysis and note that although the main legislative intent was to define the responsibilities of skier and ski area operations towards each other, the Legislature also intended to create a standard of conduct for skiers towards other skiers. N.J.S.A. 5:13-4 provides in pertinent part:

Duties of skiers

a. Skiers shall conduct themselves within the limits of their individual ability and shall not act in a manner that may contribute to the injury of themselves or any other person.

b. No skier shall:

....

(4) Knowingly engage in any act or activity by his skiing or frolicking which injures other skiers while such other skiers are either descending any trail, or standing or congregating in a reasonable manner, and due diligence shall be exercised in order to avoid hitting, colliding with or injuring any other skier or invitee.

....

d. A skier shall be the sole judge of his ability to negotiate any trail, slope, or uphill track and shall not attempt to ski or otherwise traverse any trail, slope or other area which is beyond the skier's ability to negotiate.

....

g. No person on foot or on any type of sliding device shall knowingly operate said device so as to cause injury to himself or others, whether such injury results from a collision with another person or with an object.

[Ibid. (emphasis added).]

Moreover, N.J.S.A. 5:13-5 provides:

Assumption of risk of skier

A skier is deemed to have knowledge of and to assume the inherent risks of skiing, operating toboggans, sleds or similar vehicles created by weather conditions, conditions of snow, trails, slopes, other skiers, and all other inherent conditions. Each skier is assumed to know the range of his ability, and it shall be the duty of each skier to conduct himself within the limits of such ability, to maintain control of his speed and course at all times while skiing, to heed all posted warnings and to refrain from acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to the injury of himself or others.

[Ibid.; L.1979, c. 29, § 5, eff. Feb.22, 1979.]

Brownlee also contends that "there is no evidence that Brownlee breached the heightened standard of care." There are material facts in dispute regarding Brownlee's conduct. Disputes exist as to the presence of a phantom skier, and as to how and where decedent was injured. These factual disputes must be decided by the jury and summary judgment is precluded. Brill supra, 142 N.J. at 537.

Affirmed.



[1] Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 390 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1978).

DR. ENRICO BONDI, ETC. VS. CITIGROUP, INC., ET AL. A-2654-08T2

DR. ENRICO BONDI, ETC. VS. CITIGROUP, INC., ET AL.           A-2654-08T2 
     We affirm the order granting summary judgment in favor of Citibank that dismissed all of plaintiff's claims, except the claim that Citibank employees aided and abetted looting of corporate funds by senior corporate officers at a multi-national corporation that failed in December 2003.  In doing so, we held that the trial judge properly applied the in pari delicto affirmative defense asserted by Citibank to defeat most of plaintiff's claims.  Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Citibank on the looting claim. 
     We also affirmed a series of other pre-trial, trial, and post-trial rulings and affirmed the $431,318,824.84 judgment in favor of defendant-counterclaimant Citibank.  12-22-11  

IN THE MATTER OF DANIEL RODRIGUEZ // IN THE MATTER OF DOUGLAS TUBBY A-2616-10T1/A-2706-10T1

IN THE MATTER OF DANIEL RODRIGUEZ // IN THE MATTER OF           DOUGLAS TUBBY 
          A-2616-10T1/A-2706-10T1 
     Corrections officers, who are defendants in a civil action filed by an inmate, appeal from denials of legal representation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2.  The Attorney General relied on disciplinary charges against the officers that had been 
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withdrawn and did not consider discipline that the inmate received because his disruptive conduct gave the officers reason to believe he posed a threat of imminent assault. 
     Applying Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413 (2006), we reverse because the denials are predicated upon findings of probable willful misconduct and actual malice that lack support in the record and are inconsistent with controlling legal principles.  12-20-11  

THE SALT & LIGHT COMPANY, INC., ET AL. VS. WILLINGBORO TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT A-3393-10T1

THE SALT & LIGHT COMPANY, INC., ET AL. VS. WILLINGBORO           TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 

A-3393-10T1

     Although the duplex for occupancy by two homeless families that plaintiff-charitable organization proposed to construct would be an inherently beneficial use, the board of adjustment did not abuse its discretion in determining that the public benefit to be derived from this use was outweighed by the detrimental effect upon the integrity of the zoning plan that would result from construction of a two-family residence in an area zoned exclusively for single-family residences.  12-19-11  

K.L. VS. EVESHAM TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION A-1771-10T3

 K.L. VS. EVESHAM TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION           A-1771-10T3 
     The Open Public Records Act and the common law right of access to public records did not require disclosure at this time of notes kept by school personnel regarding incidents involving plaintiff's children because the notes were privileged under the attorney work product doctrine.  The recently-enacted Anti- Bullying Bill of Rights Act, L. 2010, c. 122, N.J.S.A. 18A:37- 13.1 to -32, did not apply to plaintiff's request or the school district's record-keeping obligations. 
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Plaintiff's OPRA lawsuit was the catalyst for disclosure of one document, and so, plaintiff was entitled to partial reimbursement of his attorney's fees.  The document was not disclosed only pursuant to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, which does not have a fee-shifting provision.  12-12-11 

DANIEL SCHULMANN, ET AL. VS. DIRECTOR, NEW JERSEY DIVISION, NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION A-2089-10T3

DANIEL SCHULMANN, ET AL. VS. DIRECTOR, NEW JERSEY           DIVISION, NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION           A-2089-10T3 

The taxpayer used his personal funds to pay commissions owed by two S corporations. He and his wife then deducted the commission expenses from the S corporation income that they reported on their personal income tax returns. Affirming the reported opinion of the Tax Court, we held that the taxpayer could not disregard the corporate form by taking personal deductions for paying corporate obligations. The attempted deductions also violated the rule against "cross-netting" of losses, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 54A:5-2. 12-06-11

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ANIMAL PROTECTION LEAGUE OF NEW JERSEY, THE BEAR EDUCATION AND RESOURCE GROUP, ET AL. VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION("NJDEP"),

ANIMAL PROTECTION LEAGUE OF NEW JERSEY, THE BEAR EDUCATION AND RESOURCE GROUP, ET AL. VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION("NJDEP"), BOB MARTIN, ET AL. A-1603-10T2

     On this appeal challenging the validity of the Comprehensive Black Bear Management Policy (CBBMP) adopted by respondent New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, we conclude that while there may be disagreements as to available data and its interpretation, under our standard of review we defer to agency findings that are based on sufficient evidence in the record.  We further conclude that the agency findings here meet that standard.  Most important, we determine that appellants have failed to demonstrate that respondents acted arbitrarily or capriciously or in bad faith.  We further find that appellants have failed to demonstrate any procedural deficiencies supporting invalidation of the CBBMP.  Accordingly, we affirm.  12-01-11 

NEW PROVIDENCE APARTMENTS CO., L.L.C. VS. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF BOROUGH OF NEW PROVIDENCE, ET AL. A-2924-10T4

 NEW PROVIDENCE APARTMENTS CO., L.L.C. VS. MAYOR AND           COUNCIL OF BOROUGH OF NEW PROVIDENCE, ET AL.           A-2924-10T4 
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A municipal ordinance that imposes a $100 annual fee per apartment unit for sewer service upon owners of apartment houses, but does not impose this fee upon owners of single- family houses, complies with the statutory mandate that sewer fees shall be "uniform and equitable for the same types and classes of use and service" and the equal protection guarantees of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, because the fee is reasonable designed to reduce the gross disparity in the contributions to the costs of sewer service derived from real estate taxes paid by apartment owners and owners of single- family houses.  12-01-11 

MICHAEL C. SENISCH VS. JAMES CARLINO, ET AL. A-6218-09T3

MICHAEL C. SENISCH VS. JAMES CARLINO, ET AL.           A-6218-09T3 
     Pursuant to the 2005 "Health Care Professional Responsibility and Reporting Enhancement Act" (colloquially called the "Cullen Act"), N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.2c, and also pursuant to prior case law establishing a qualified immunity for truthful job references by a former employer, defendants could not be held liable in a civil lawsuit for responding to a reference request with negative information from the personnel file of plaintiff, a physician's assistant.  Defendants were not required to include in the reference plaintiff's version of the circumstances of his termination since the settlement of a prior CEPA and LAD lawsuit he brought did not include an admission of wrongdoing by defendant former employer.  12-01-11  

Michael McDade, et al. v. Rodolfo Siazon, et al. (067086; A-59-10)

Michael McDade, et al. v. Rodolfo Siazon, et al.           (067086; A-59-10) 
          In asserting a claim against the Egg Harbor Township           Municipal Utilities Authority (MUA) under the New           Jersey Tort Claims Act, plaintiff Michael McDade did           not comply with the statutory ninety-day notice of           claim requirement, N.J.S.A. 59:8-8(a), or seek relief           from that requirement by filing a notice of motion for           leave to file a late notice of claim, N.J.S.A. 59:8-9.           Because the discovery rules does not obviate the need           to comply with the statutory notice requirements, the           defendant MUA is entitled to summary judgment.  12-22-11  

In the Matter of Ty Hyderally, an Attorney at Law (D-134-10; 068701)

In the Matter of Ty Hyderally, an Attorney at Law           (D-134-10; 068701) 
          There is no clear and convincing evidence that           Hyderally either intentionally included the New Jersey           Supreme Court Certified Attorney seal or approved its           continued presence on his website, so there is no           basis on which to find that his conduct constituted           "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," in           violation of RPC  8.4 (c), and the ethics complaint           should be dismissed.  Attorneys are responsible for           monitoring the content of all communications with the           public, including their websites, so henceforth,           attorneys who are not authorized to display the           Certified Attorney seal on their websites or in other           communication but do so, will be subject to           appropriate discipline.  12-20-11  

Mark Tannen v. Wendy Tannen (A-53-10; 066951)

Mark Tannen v. Wendy Tannen (A-53-10; 066951) 
          The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed           substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge           Messano’s opinion.  12-8-11   

Sunday, December 11, 2011

DANIEL SCHULMANN, ET AL. VS. DIRECTOR, NEW JERSEY DIVISION, NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION A-2089-10T3

DANIEL SCHULMANN, ET AL. VS. DIRECTOR, NEW JERSEY

DIVISION, NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION

A-2089-10T3

The taxpayer used his personal funds to pay commissions

owed by two S corporations. He and his wife then deducted the

commission expenses from the S corporation income that they

reported on their personal income tax returns. Affirming the

reported opinion of the Tax Court, we held that the taxpayer

could not disregard the corporate form by taking personal

deductions for paying corporate obligations. The attempted

deductions also violated the rule against "cross-netting" of

losses, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 54A:5-2. 12-06-11

CHARLES WILLIAMS VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS A-5962-08T3

CHARLES WILLIAMS VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS

A-5962-08T3

An inmate at the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center (ADTC)

challenged the authority of the Commissioner of the Department

of Corrections to transfer inmates to the ADTC who do not meet

the qualifications for confinement at the ADTC set forth in the

Sexual Offender Act (SOA), N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 to -10, more

specifically the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3. We concluded

that the very specific provisions of the SOA, as explored at

length by the Supreme Court in In re Civil Commitment of W.X.C.,

204 N.J. 179, 196-99 (2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.

Ct. 1702, 179 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2011), significantly limit the

Commissioner's otherwise broad discretion to assign inmates to

available institutions under N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.2, and that only

sex offenders who meet each of the three criteria set forth in

the SOA can be confined at the ADTC. Those criteria are: (1)

the offender's conduct was characterized by a pattern of

repetitive, compulsive behavior, (2) the offender is amenable to

sex offender treatment, and (3) the offender is willing to

participate in such treatment. 12-02-11

ANIMAL PROTECTION LEAGUE OF NEW JERSEY, THE BEAR EDUCATION AND RESOURCE GROUP, ET AL. VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION("NJDEP"),

ANIMAL PROTECTION LEAGUE OF NEW JERSEY, THE BEAR EDUCATION

AND RESOURCE GROUP, ET AL. VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION("NJDEP"), BOB MARTIN, ET AL.

A-1603-10T2

On this appeal challenging the validity of the

Comprehensive Black Bear Management Policy (CBBMP) adopted by

respondent New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, we

conclude that while there may be disagreements as to available

data and its interpretation, under our standard of review we

defer to agency findings that are based on sufficient evidence

in the record. We further conclude that the agency findings

here meet that standard. Most important, we determine that

appellants have failed to demonstrate that respondents acted

arbitrarily or capriciously or in bad faith. We further find

that appellants have failed to demonstrate any procedural

deficiencies supporting invalidation of the CBBMP. Accordingly,

we affirm. 12-01-11

NEW PROVIDENCE APARTMENTS CO., L.L.C. VS. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF BOROUGH OF NEW PROVIDENCE, ET AL. A-2924-10T4

NEW PROVIDENCE APARTMENTS CO., L.L.C. VS. MAYOR AND

COUNCIL OF BOROUGH OF NEW PROVIDENCE, ET AL.

A-2924-10T4

A municipal ordinance that imposes a $100 annual fee per

apartment unit for sewer service upon owners of apartment

houses, but does not impose this fee upon owners of singlefamily

houses, complies with the statutory mandate that sewer

fees shall be "uniform and equitable for the same types and

classes of use and service" and the equal protection guarantees

of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, because the

fee is reasonable designed to reduce the gross disparity in the

contributions to the costs of sewer service derived from real

estate taxes paid by apartment owners and owners of singlefamily

houses. 12-01-11

MICHAEL C. SENISCH VS. JAMES CARLINO, ET AL. A-6218-09T3

MICHAEL C. SENISCH VS. JAMES CARLINO, ET AL.

A-6218-09T3

Pursuant to the 2005 "Health Care Professional

Responsibility and Reporting Enhancement Act" (colloquially

called the "Cullen Act"), N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.2c, and also

pursuant to prior case law establishing a qualified immunity for

truthful job references by a former employer, defendants could

not be held liable in a civil lawsuit for responding to a

reference request with negative information from the personnel

file of plaintiff, a physician's assistant. Defendants were not

required to include in the reference plaintiff's version of the

circumstances of his termination since the settlement of a prior

CEPA and LAD lawsuit he brought did not include an admission of

wrongdoing by defendant former employer. 12-01-11

NEWARK MORNING LEDGER CO., PUBLISHER OF THE STARLEDGER VS. NEW JERSEY SPORTS & EXPOSITION AUTHORITY A-1810-10T1

NEWARK MORNING LEDGER CO., PUBLISHER OF THE STARLEDGER

VS. NEW JERSEY SPORTS & EXPOSITION AUTHORITY

A-1810-10T1

We are asked to examine the scope of certain exemptions

from the disclosure requirements set forth in the Open Public

Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13. We conclude

disclosure of the terms of the licensing agreements for use of

the IZOD Center, a state-owned facility, is mandated by OPRA.

The redacted terms relating to the use of the arena do not fall

within the scope of "trade secrets" or "proprietary commercial

or financial information" as used in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.

Further, disclosure of the details regarding the licensing fees

and other remunerative arrangements would not afford an

advantage to other venues competing for bookings because they

are widely known among those involved in this branch of the

entertainment industry, defeating defendant's claims of

confidentiality. 11-30-11

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. T.I., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF S.L.M. A-2850-10T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V.

T.I., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF S.L.M.

A-2850-10T3

In this appeal from an order terminating parental rights,

we are asked to consider the definition of "feasible" under the

Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG) statute, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -

7. We conclude that, when a caregiver in a case brought by the

Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) unequivocally

asserts a desire to adopt, the finding required for a KLG that

"adoption of the child is neither feasible nor likely" cannot be

met. 11-28-11

IN THE MATTER OF THE NOVEMBER 2, 2010, ELECTION FOR THE OFFICE OF MAYOR IN THE BOROUGH OF SOUTH AMBOY, MIDDLESEX COUNTY, NEW JERSEY A-2499-10T1

IN THE MATTER OF THE NOVEMBER 2, 2010, ELECTION FOR

THE OFFICE OF MAYOR IN THE BOROUGH OF SOUTH AMBOY,

MIDDLESEX COUNTY, NEW JERSEY

A-2499-10T1

This case considers an election contest pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 19:29-1 and addresses, among other things, issues of

domicile and late amendments to petitions under N.J.S.A. 19:29-

5. Further, we address the requirements for voter registration

when applying for driver's license renewal at the Division of

Motor Vehicles under N.J.S.A. 19:31-6(b) and N.J.S.A. 39:2-3.2.

We hold that citizens who are accorded a voter registration

opportunity when obtaining or renewing a driver's license must

complete the voter registration application in order to become a

registered voter. 11-23-11

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES VS. I.S. IN THE MATTER OF N.S. AND S.S. A-5793-09T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES VS.

I.S.

IN THE MATTER OF N.S. AND S.S.

A-5793-09T3

We clarify our earlier decision in New Jersey Division of

Youth and Family Services v. I.S., 422 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div.

2011). We state that our reference to the trial judge's

finding, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that I.S. was

unable to care for her daughters, was illustrative of the

quality of proof presented rather than our alteration of the

preponderance of the evidence standard of proof governing abuse

or neglect proceedings under Title 9.

We also clarify that proceedings under Title 30 are

governed by the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof,

except where the Division seeks an order terminating parental

rights. In such cases, the Division is required to prove that

termination is in the best interests of the child by clear and

convincing evidence. 11-23-11